The Philippines has been embroiled in a prolonged and intense struggle against repeated intrusions by the Chinese Coast Guard into its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). These intrusions, primarily centered around the Second Thomas Shoal, have heightened tensions in the South China Sea (SCS), a region fraught with overlapping territorial claims and strategic rivalries. Despite sporadic diplomatic efforts to defuse the situation, including during recent ASEAN meetings, the situation remains volatile, with China’s aggressive posturing continuing unabated. This ongoing conflict underscores the complex geopolitical landscape of the region, the limitations of ASEAN’s collective response, and the strategic recalibrations the Philippines is now exploring.
The South China Sea is a critical maritime corridor, rich in resources and a vital passageway for global trade. However, it is also a flashpoint for territorial disputes, primarily between China and several Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. China’s expansive claims, demarcated by the so-called “nine-dash line,” encompass nearly the entire SCS, overlapping with the EEZs of these nations.
The Philippines, under international law as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), has sovereign rights over resources within its 200-nautical-mile EEZ. Despite a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which invalidated China’s claims under the nine-dash line, China has refused to acknowledge the ruling, continuing its assertive actions in the region.
These actions have included the harassment of Filipino fishing boats, the blockading of resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal, and the deployment of Chinese maritime militia vessels in contested areas. The Second Thomas Shoal, in particular, has become a symbol of the Philippines’ resistance, where a small contingent of Filipino marines remains stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre, a deliberately grounded vessel that serves as an outpost to assert the Philippines’ claim.
ASEAN’s Tepid Response and Philippines’ Strategic Shift
During the recent ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, accompanied by parallel meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and the China-ASEAN Meeting, there was a noticeable decrease in the intensity of Chinese restrictions on Filipino vessels. This temporary reprieve was widely interpreted as a diplomatic gesture from China, possibly aimed at easing tensions during the high-profile summits. However, this de-escalation was short-lived, with Chinese aggression resuming almost immediately after the meetings concluded.
The inconsistency in China’s behavior highlights the challenges ASEAN faces in dealing with the South China Sea dispute. ASEAN, as a regional bloc, has historically been reluctant to confront China directly, partly due to the varying degrees of economic and political influence China holds over individual member states. This has often led to a muted or fragmented response from ASEAN, much to the frustration of the Philippines and other claimant states.
The Philippines, feeling increasingly isolated, has been compelled to seek alternative strategies to counterbalance China’s assertiveness. One such strategy involves closer alignment with the Quad countries—Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Although the Philippines is not seeking formal membership in the Quad, it is pursuing stronger bilateral ties with these nations to enhance its security posture and deterrence capabilities in the face of Chinese aggression.
South China Sea Code of Conduct: A Stalled Process
The idea of a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea has been in the works for over two decades, dating back to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002. The DOC was intended as a precursor to a more binding COC, which would establish rules for behavior and conflict resolution in the SCS. However, the COC remains elusive, bogged down by protracted negotiations and disagreements over key issues such as its geographical scope, enforceability, and the activities it would regulate.
One of the major sticking points in the negotiations is China’s reluctance to include UNCLOS as a framework for the COC. China’s objection is rooted in its desire to maintain its expansive claims in the SCS, which have no basis under UNCLOS. A COC that references UNCLOS would implicitly undermine China’s position and lend credence to the 2016 arbitral ruling that favored the Philippines.
Moreover, China envisions the SCS as its internal sea, where it can dictate the rules and exclude external powers, particularly the United States and its allies, from operating freely. This is in stark contrast to the interests of other ASEAN countries and Quad members, who advocate for freedom of navigation and overflight in what they consider international waters.
China’s approach to the COC negotiations appears to be one of strategic delay, engaging ASEAN just enough to avoid outright confrontation but not enough to reach a meaningful agreement that could constrain its actions. This tactic allows China to consolidate its gains on the ground while projecting an image of diplomatic engagement.
ASEAN’s Internal Challenges and Role of External Powers
ASEAN’s inability to present a united front against China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea is partly due to the differing priorities and interests of its member states. Countries like Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, which have little at stake in the SCS, have shown little interest in challenging China. Myanmar, for instance, has served as ASEAN’s country coordinator for China in recent years, a role that involves facilitating dialogue between ASEAN and China. Laos, the current ASEAN chair, has similarly demonstrated a reluctance to confront China, reflecting its close economic ties with Beijing.
In contrast, countries directly impacted by Chinese actions, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia, have been more vocal but remain cautious about pushing too hard. Vietnam, which has had its own confrontations with China in the SCS, has recently adopted a more subdued stance, likely influenced by the growing economic interdependence between ASEAN and China. Since 2020, China has become ASEAN’s largest trading partner, a development that complicates any efforts to counterbalance Chinese influence.
The Philippines’ experience in challenging China has also been sobering. In previous instances where Manila took a firm stand, it faced economic retaliation from China, including restrictions on banana exports and a decline in Chinese tourist arrivals. These experiences have made other ASEAN countries wary of provoking Beijing, preferring instead to seek quiet diplomacy or avoid the issue altogether.
Given the limitations of ASEAN’s collective response, the Philippines and other concerned nations have increasingly turned to external powers for support. The United States, in particular, has reaffirmed its commitment to defending the Philippines under the Mutual Defense Treaty, while also conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the SCS to challenge China’s excessive maritime claims.
Japan, Australia, and India have also deepened their security ties with the Philippines through joint exercises, capacity-building initiatives, and defense cooperation agreements. These partnerships, while not part of a formal alliance like the Quad, provide Manila with additional leverage and deterrence against Chinese aggression.
ASEAN-China Relations and South China Sea
As the Philippines continues to grapple with Chinese intrusions, the broader question of ASEAN-China relations and the future of the South China Sea remains uncertain. The ongoing COC negotiations are unlikely to yield a breakthrough in the near term, given the deep-seated differences between China and ASEAN on key issues. Moreover, China’s actions on the ground—building artificial islands, militarizing features, and deploying its coast guard and maritime militia—suggest that it is more interested in consolidating its control over the SCS than in reaching a compromise.
For ASEAN, the challenge is not only to negotiate a COC that can effectively manage tensions in the SCS but also to maintain its centrality in regional security architecture. This requires greater coordination among ASEAN members, particularly those with direct stakes in the SCS, to develop a coherent strategy that balances engagement with China and the need to uphold international law and freedom of navigation.
In recent months, there have been signs that ASEAN is beginning to take maritime security more seriously. In September 2023, ASEAN leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing mutual trust and confidence and exercising self-restraint in the conduct of activities in the SCS. They also called for strengthening maritime cooperation and exploring new initiatives to maintain stability in the region. These statements indicate a growing recognition within ASEAN of the need to address maritime issues more proactively.
However, internal divisions within ASEAN, particularly among countries that prioritize their economic ties with China, continue to pose a significant obstacle to a unified approach. Some ASEAN members may still prefer to negotiate their positions based on what they perceive as China’s preferences, rather than on a collective ASEAN stance. This dynamic constrains ASEAN’s ability to effectively challenge China’s actions in the SCS and weakens its bargaining position in the COC negotiations.
The Philippines’ struggle against Chinese intrusions in its EEZ is emblematic of the broader challenges facing Southeast Asia in navigating the South China Sea dispute. While ASEAN has made some progress in engaging China diplomatically, the persistent lack of a binding COC and the continuation of Chinese assertiveness underscore the limitations of these efforts. The Philippines, increasingly isolated within ASEAN, is seeking new avenues of support through closer ties with the Quad countries and other external powers. However, these efforts are not without risks, as Manila must balance its need for security with the potential economic consequences of antagonizing China.
As ASEAN continues its slow march toward a COC, the region remains in a state of flux, with the South China Sea serving as a key battleground for influence and control. The outcome of this struggle will have far-reaching implications not only for the Philippines but for the broader security and stability of Southeast Asia. In the meantime, the Philippines must navigate a complex and uncertain path, seeking to safeguard its interests in the face of formidable challenges both within ASEAN and from an increasingly assertive China.
