Three years have passed since the landmark announcement on September 15, 2021, when the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom unveiled their strategic security partnership known as AUKUS. This trilateral agreement, primarily focused on enhancing regional security in the Indo-Pacific, included a significant provision: assisting Australia in acquiring nuclear-propulsion submarines.
The AUKUS deal represented a pivotal shift in Australia’s defense strategy, as the Morrison government chose to back out of a longstanding A$90 billion agreement with a French company to purchase 12 diesel-electric submarines, opting instead for the more advanced nuclear-powered option. The move sparked controversy not only in diplomatic circles, particularly with France, but also domestically, as former political leaders such as ex-Prime Ministers Paul Keating and Malcolm Turnbull, and former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans voiced their criticism. Additionally, media commentators and other influential figures began questioning the merits of AUKUS, pointing to five main concerns.
Despite the heated debate, there are strong counterarguments to these claims, as each one seems to miss key nuances about Australia’s defense and foreign policy needs. Here’s a closer look at the five primary criticisms and why they may not hold as much weight as they initially appear.
AUKUS Increases the Likelihood of War
Critics argue that by acquiring nuclear-propulsion submarines, Australia is entangling itself in the escalating tensions between the United States and China, especially regarding the potential conflict over Taiwan. The concern is that Australia’s alignment with the US could lead to a more aggressive posture in the region, thus making war more likely.
However, this view disregards the complexity of international deterrence strategies. While it is true that tensions with China have increased, particularly in Taiwan and the South China Sea, the assumption that AUKUS is designed solely to bolster American belligerence is misleading. US policymakers are well aware of their limitations and the risks of provoking China unnecessarily. The idea that the US would recklessly engage in a conflict with China overlooks Washington’s measured approach to its strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, AUKUS should be seen as a means to strengthen Australia’s own deterrence capability, rather than simply aligning itself unquestioningly with US policy.
As Peter Dean, a noted defense expert, pointed out, the debate surrounding Taiwan is often overly simplified and lacks context. The question isn’t whether Australia will automatically follow the US into war, but rather how Australia can ensure its own security while contributing to regional stability. A robust defense posture serves as a deterrent to conflict, not an invitation for it. In fact, history shows that strong, capable forces can prevent wars by discouraging potential aggressors from making moves that could backfire.
Deterrence is a key component of modern strategic thinking, and AUKUS, by providing Australia with nuclear-propulsion submarines, enhances this capability. These submarines are critical in maintaining a credible deterrence force, especially when conventional military power alone may not suffice to keep adversaries at bay. AUKUS isn’t about ramping up aggression; it’s about ensuring that Australia’s regional security interests are protected.
Australia Doesn’t Need Nuclear-Propulsion Submarines
Another criticism often voiced is that Australia doesn’t need nuclear-powered submarines at all, with some arguing that they’re too costly or unnecessary. Yet, this argument doesn’t fully take into account the evolving nature of modern warfare and technology. Australia’s existing fleet of Collins-class submarines, which use diesel-electric propulsion, is becoming increasingly vulnerable to modern detection technologies.
Traditional diesel-electric submarines rely on snorkels to recharge their batteries, making them susceptible to detection by low-earth polar orbit satellites, armed drones, and other modern surveillance systems that use artificial intelligence and pattern recognition to identify potential threats. This means that Australia’s current fleet is increasingly exposed, particularly when covering the vast distances required to patrol areas of strategic interest such as the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
In contrast, nuclear-powered submarines offer a host of operational advantages. They can travel at much faster speeds—around 20 knots on average compared to just 6.5 knots for diesel-electric submarines—and they can operate underwater for extended periods without surfacing. For Australia, which faces the challenge of patrolling expansive oceanic areas, this capability is crucial. A nuclear-propulsion submarine can transit from Fremantle to the strategically important Strait of Malacca in just six days, compared to the 18 days it would take a diesel-electric counterpart. This speed allows for quicker deployments and a higher level of adaptability in responding to threats.
Additionally, these submarines can remain on station for extended durations, making them a far more effective tool for maintaining security in key maritime choke points. By opting for nuclear propulsion, Australia is ensuring that it has the capabilities to protect its national interests across a wide geographic area.
AUKUS Makes Southeast Asian Neighbors Uneasy
Critics have also suggested that Australia’s involvement in AUKUS has made its neighbors in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, uncomfortable. After all, nuclear technology can evoke concerns about an arms race or the militarization of the region.
Yet, these apprehensions don’t appear to reflect the full picture. For instance, recent defense engagements and treaties suggest that Southeast Asian nations are more pragmatic in their outlook towards Australia’s evolving defense posture. The enhanced defense pact signed between Australia and Indonesia on August 29, 2023, illustrates this point. It suggests that Indonesia, while committed to its “free and active” foreign policy, is not as uneasy with AUKUS as some claim.
Other regional powers such as the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam have also expressed varying degrees of support for Australia’s involvement in AUKUS. These countries, like Australia, share concerns over China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, and they likely recognize that a strong, capable Australia contributes to regional security. In short, the notion that AUKUS is widely unpopular in the region doesn’t hold up against the evidence of recent diplomatic and defense cooperation between Australia and its neighbors.
AUKUS Draws Australia Back into the Anglosphere
A further criticism suggests that by aligning with the US and UK, Australia is regressing into its traditional Anglosphere alliances, thereby neglecting its geographical and cultural ties to the Asia-Pacific region. This critique stems from Australia’s history as a country with deep historical ties to Britain and the United States, which some argue detracts from its focus on Asia.
However, this view fails to appreciate the nuanced role Australia plays as both a member of the Anglosphere and a key player in the Indo-Pacific. Australia has managed to balance these sometimes competing allegiances effectively, drawing on its Western alliances while also engaging deeply with Asia. Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s successful diplomacy in the Pacific and her outreach to Southeast Asian leaders, including recent summits with ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum, demonstrate that Australia is more engaged than ever in its region.
Moreover, even France, which was most aggrieved by Australia’s decision to cancel the submarine deal, has mended relations. Australia and France, alongside New Zealand, have recently renewed the trilateral FRANZ agreement, underscoring Australia’s commitment to its Indo-Pacific relationships.
Submarines’ Cost is Unconscionably High
A final criticism of AUKUS relates to the eye-watering cost of the submarines, which is projected to be between A$268 and A$368 billion over the next 30 years. Critics argue that this money could be better spent elsewhere, particularly on social services or domestic infrastructure.
While the cost is undeniably high, it’s important to view it in the context of national security. Defense spending is a long-term investment that ensures Australia can safeguard its interests in an increasingly uncertain world. The defense budget is being managed incrementally, with substantial increases not expected for several years. This allows for a more gradual allocation of funds, minimizing immediate fiscal strain.
Moreover, the high cost of these submarines comes with significant strategic benefits, including advanced technology transfers from the US, which will bolster Australia’s defense industry and technological capacity. Over time, this investment will make Australia more self-reliant in defense matters, reducing the need for future reliance on foreign partners.
National Interests in a Complex World
As we reflect on the three years since the AUKUS deal was announced, it is clear that while criticism of the agreement is inevitable, many of the arguments against it are based on outdated assumptions or an oversimplification of Australia’s geopolitical realities. The need for a strong, independent defense posture has never been more important, especially given the growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. Nuclear-propulsion submarines, while costly, offer Australia the best means of ensuring its security and maintaining peace in its neighborhood.
Australia, through AUKUS, is not retreating into the Anglosphere nor provoking war; it is positioning itself as a formidable player in regional security. As the world changes, so too must Australia’s defense strategy. And for now, AUKUS provides the pathway to a more secure and stable future.
