Ishiba Shigeru, former defense minister and prominent hardliner on national security, has been elected President of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), making him the new Prime Minister of Japan. His ascension comes with significant implications, particularly in shaping Japan’s defense policies and international alliances. As Ishiba steps into the leadership role, Japan may witness a more assertive stance in national security, moving further away from its traditionally pacifist post-war policies. This development is set to reverberate across the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, potentially reshaping regional security dynamics.
Ishiba’s rise is emblematic of Japan’s growing concerns over an increasingly volatile security environment. Known for his hardline stance on defense, Ishiba has long advocated for an Asian NATO, a collective security framework aimed at deterring China and addressing rising threats from North Korea and Russia. His proposal seeks to involve key US allies in the region, including South Korea and Australia, mirroring the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) model in Europe.
The concept of an Asian NATO is not entirely new, but Ishiba’s firm advocacy elevates it into mainstream Japanese political discourse. His vision stems from concerns that Japan’s current defense framework, which heavily relies on its alliance with the United States, is insufficient in the face of mounting threats. For Ishiba, an Asian NATO would provide a robust collective security system, bolstering Japan’s ability to defend itself in collaboration with its regional allies. The Ukraine crisis, which has significantly altered global security dynamics, is a driving force behind his call for this new alliance structure. Ishiba believes that just as NATO was pivotal in organizing a collective defense for Europe, an Asian equivalent could deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific, particularly from China, North Korea, and Russia.
The Growing Threats from China, Russia, and North Korea
Ishiba’s push for a stronger defense posture and multilateral security frameworks is heavily influenced by what he sees as imminent threats from China, Russia, and North Korea. The trilateral alliance between these nations, which increasingly shows signs of military cooperation, has deeply alarmed Japan.
China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, particularly its potential plans to invade Taiwan, is a significant concern for Ishiba. He views this potential conflict as a localized version of the Ukraine crisis, one that would have direct implications for Japan. Without a collective security framework like NATO in Asia, Ishiba argues, Japan and its neighbors would be vulnerable to Chinese expansionism.
In addition to China, North Korea’s continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has long been a pressing issue for Japan. The growing military relationship between North Korea and Russia, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, has only heightened the sense of urgency for Japan to strengthen its defense capabilities. For Ishiba, North Korea’s unpredictable regime and its nuclear ambitions represent a grave threat that must be countered with a collective defense mechanism and enhanced deterrence.
Japan’s Evolving Defense Posture
Under the leadership of Ishiba’s predecessors, particularly Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Fumio Kishida, Japan has already taken significant steps to bolster its defense capabilities. The reinterpretation of Japan’s pacifist Constitution during the Abe administration permitted collective self-defense, allowing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to engage in military actions even if Japan itself is not under direct attack. This shift marked a major departure from Japan’s post-World War II pacifism.
During the Kishida administration, Japan increased its defense spending to nearly 2% of its GDP, a significant increase that signaled a more proactive defense posture. Japan also enhanced its strategic partnerships with the United States and other key allies, participating in the Quad, and strengthening trilateral cooperation with South Korea and the US. These initiatives, along with Japan’s growing engagement with NATO countries, such as its participation in joint exercises and increased defense equipment production, underscore the country’s commitment to playing a larger role in regional security.
Ishiba, however, wants to take these developments further. While Japan has been modernizing its military and enhancing its alliances, Ishiba’s vision involves making Japan more self-reliant in defense matters. He believes that Japan should not always depend on the US, though he recognizes the enduring importance of the US-Japan alliance. His call for an Asian NATO, coupled with the idea of shared nuclear deterrence, underscores his belief that Japan must do more to secure its independence in defense.
A New Era of Japan’s Foreign Policy: Revising the Security Treaty
One of the most significant components of Ishiba’s vision for Japan’s foreign policy is his desire to revise the Japan-US security treaty, which has long served as the cornerstone of Japan’s defense strategy. Under the current treaty, the US is obligated to defend Japan in the event of an attack, while US military forces are stationed at various bases throughout Japan. However, the treaty is asymmetrical in its obligations, as Japan does not have a reciprocal obligation to defend the US in the same manner.
Ishiba envisions a more equal partnership between the US and Japan, akin to the US-UK alliance. He argues that Japan should take on greater responsibility for its own defense, reducing the imbalance in obligations between the two countries. In this context, Ishiba has proposed several bold ideas, including the possibility of stationing Japanese SDF forces in Guam, where US forces are based, as part of a reciprocal defense arrangement.
Moreover, Ishiba has suggested that Japanese SDF forces could take on a greater role in the management of US military bases in Japan. This idea stems from the desire to reduce friction with local populations, particularly in Okinawa, where the presence of US military bases has long been a source of tension. By allowing the SDF to have a more active role in base management, Ishiba hopes to address local concerns while strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities.
In his recent article for the Hudson Institute, Ishiba also emphasized the need for Japan to establish a comprehensive national security law. Despite the piecemeal efforts to update Japan’s defense policies, Ishiba argues that there is still no overarching legal framework to address the growing security challenges facing the country.
He believes that the current geopolitical crisis surrounding Japan, particularly with the rise of China and the increasing military collaboration between North Korea and Russia, could lead to a war without notice. To prepare for such contingencies, Ishiba has called for the creation of national security legislation that would provide a clear legal basis for Japan’s defense actions. This would include provisions for collective self-defense and the ability to respond to threats even if Japan itself is not directly attacked.
The prospect of such legislation, however, is likely to be met with resistance both domestically and internationally. Japan’s post-war Constitution, which renounces war as a means of resolving international disputes, has long been a source of national identity and pride. Any move to further revise Japan’s defense policies, particularly with regard to collective self-defense, is likely to provoke debate within the country. Internationally, Ishiba’s proposals could raise concerns in China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as among Japan’s other neighbors in Southeast Asia.
As Ishiba assumes the role of Prime Minister, the world will be watching closely to see how his ideas translate into policy. His hardline approach to defense and security will likely garner support from those within Japan who believe the country must do more to protect itself in an increasingly dangerous world. At the same time, his proposals could provoke anxiety in Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, as well as concern in Washington, where the Biden administration is navigating its own complex foreign policy challenges ahead of the 2024 US election.
Ishiba’s desire to elevate Japan to a position of greater equality with the US in defense matters, and his advocacy for an Asian NATO, marks a bold new direction for Japan’s foreign policy. Whether these ideas will become reality remains to be seen, but they reflect a growing recognition in Japan that the security landscape has changed dramatically, and that the country must adapt accordingly.
Ishiba will have the opportunity to test his ideas on the global stage. His tenure as Prime Minister could be a defining moment for Japan as it seeks to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century, from the rise of China to the persistent threat of North Korea and the shifting dynamics of the US-Japan alliance. What is certain is that Japan’s role in the Indo-Pacific region—and its approach to security—will never be the same.
