Russia and Ukraine have primarily been understood as a brutal ground war with fierce aerial combat, particularly as Russia relentlessly bombards civilian infrastructure and Ukrainian forces respond with growing resilience. However, a lesser-known but equally crucial aspect of the war is taking place at sea. The battle for control of the Black Sea has led to a stunning and humiliating defeat for Russia, one that could have long-lasting geopolitical ramifications.
Russia’s inability to maintain dominance in the Black Sea not only limits its regional influence but also hampers its global power projection. In a broader context, this naval setback has led Moscow to increasingly cooperate with China on maritime matters, with Russia emerging as a junior partner to Beijing. This shift could redefine power dynamics across several key maritime regions worldwide.
The ongoing conflict between land and sea forces has deep roots in geopolitical theory. Late 19th and early 20th-century scholars like Sir Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan developed influential theories categorizing nations as either land powers or maritime powers. Mackinder, for instance, argued that land powers, often authoritarian and militaristic, held significant control over vast territories and populations. Meanwhile, Mahan focused on the idea that maritime powers, typically seen as democratic and liberal, could project their influence through strong navies and control of sea lanes, which were crucial for trade and economic development.
While such dichotomies have always been oversimplified and have often served to demonize enemies in geopolitical narratives, they have remained useful frameworks. The Ukraine conflict highlights the outdated nature of viewing land and sea warfare as separate domains. Russia’s land and air advances have been accompanied by significant setbacks in the Black Sea, which threaten its broader military strategy and regional ambitions.
Despite some advances on land, Russia’s position at sea has weakened substantially since the beginning of its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Black Sea, an enclosed body of water bordered by Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Russia, has historically been a contested region. The Black Sea’s strategic importance is not new; it has been a flashpoint for centuries, playing a vital role in the balance of power in Eastern Europe and the wider Mediterranean region.
Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 marked a key turning point in the modern contest for the Black Sea. By taking control of Crimea, Russia also captured the strategic naval base at Sevastopol. This base gave Russia control over the near waters of the Black Sea, which had once been part of Ukraine’s maritime territory. This enabled Moscow to disrupt Ukrainian exports and exert pressure on Ukraine’s economy.
However, despite its early gains, Russia’s attempts to dominate the Black Sea have floundered. Ukraine, supported by its NATO allies, has mounted a robust resistance. Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey have cooperated to keep sea routes open, allowing Ukraine to continue exporting its grain—a vital economic lifeline. Ukrainian cargo ships have traveled through these countries’ near waters and then passed through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean Sea, continuing to supply crucial grain to global markets, particularly in Africa.
As a result of this cooperation, Ukraine has been able to export between 5.2 and 5.8 million tons of grain per month in the first quarter of 2024, a significant recovery from the 2 million tons it managed in the summer of 2023 when Russian attacks had temporarily stifled trade. Although Ukraine’s grain exports remain below their pre-war levels of 6.5 million tons per month, the country’s resilience at sea has helped sustain its economy.
Beyond securing trade routes, Ukraine has taken direct action against Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Using unmanned drones, Ukraine has successfully sunk or damaged around 15 Russian warships, nearly half of Russia’s pre-war Black Sea fleet. This ongoing attrition has forced Russia to withdraw its ships from Sevastopol and relocate them to the eastern Black Sea, far from the conflict’s front lines.
This series of defeats has starkly illustrated Russia’s inability to maintain dominance in its near waters, despite its historical claims to the region. More broadly, Russia’s inability to control the Black Sea significantly weakens its ability to project naval power beyond the region. Without control over the Black Sea, Russia cannot exert influence in the Mediterranean, further undermining its strategic position in Europe and the Middle East.
Russia’s naval challenges are not unique to the present conflict. The country has a long history of struggling to project power at sea, often being forced into defensive postures within its own near waters.
In 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, Russia experienced a catastrophic naval defeat when the Imperial Japanese Navy annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Battle of Tsushima. This humiliating loss was a clear indication of Russia’s difficulties in far-water operations. Similar issues arose during World War I and World War II, when Russia’s naval power was mostly limited to defensive operations in the Baltic and Black Seas. During these conflicts, Russia often relied on foreign assistance, such as material support from the Allies during World War II, to sustain its military efforts.
Even during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union significantly expanded its naval capacity, its ability to operate in far waters remained limited. Soviet submarine fleets became the backbone of its maritime strategy, designed primarily to prevent NATO forces from penetrating Soviet-controlled near waters rather than to project power into global far waters.
Today, Russia faces a situation reminiscent of these past struggles. With its influence in the Black Sea severely diminished, Russia’s capacity to project naval power beyond its near waters is in jeopardy. The loss of control in the Black Sea not only limits Russia’s influence in the Mediterranean but also reduces its ability to threaten NATO’s southern flank or control key maritime trade routes.
In response to its growing vulnerability, Russia has sought new avenues for expanding its naval reach. This has led to increased military cooperation with China, a country with growing ambitions in both near and far waters.
Russia’s defeat in the Black Sea has prompted it to strengthen its naval ties with China. The two nations have increasingly cooperated in maritime drills, including joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in July 2024. These drills, according to Chinese officials, have deepened the cooperation between the two powers and enhanced their ability to jointly respond to maritime security threats.
This cooperation has benefits for both countries. For Russia, aligning with China allows it to remain relevant on the global stage despite its Black Sea losses. By partnering with China, Russia gains access to Chinese naval expertise and far-water capabilities, particularly in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. China, for its part, benefits from Russia’s expertise in Arctic waters, which are becoming more navigable due to climate change.
However, the nature of this relationship is unequal. As Russia grows more dependent on China for far-water operations, it is increasingly seen as the junior partner in the relationship. This dynamic is evident in Russia’s reliance on Chinese naval support to secure its interests in Africa and the Indian Ocean. While Russia has its own far-water economic interests, particularly in Africa, these interests often align with China’s broader strategy for global economic expansion.
Russia’s diminished naval presence in the Black Sea is unlikely to recover in the near term. Even if Russia achieves some form of victory on land in its war against Ukraine, it will not compensate for the significant loss of naval power. The Black Sea defeat has boxed Russia into a defensive maritime posture, forcing it to rely on alliances with stronger naval powers like China to maintain any semblance of global naval influence. Russia’s broader geopolitical strategy in the years to come.
With limited ability to project power independently, Russia may increasingly focus on regional alliances and asymmetric warfare strategies to compensate for its naval shortcomings. The growing cooperation with China, while beneficial in some ways, also underscores Russia’s declining status as a global naval power and highlights the limitations of its military reach. Russia’s naval strategy. Its inability to control the Black Sea has undermined its broader military objectives, weakened its position in global maritime affairs, and left it increasingly reliant on China. These consequences will resonate far beyond the Black Sea, reshaping the balance of power across key maritime regions for years to come.
