On the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, President Xi Jinping delivered a statement imbued with both pride and defiance: “No one can stop the wheel of history.” The phrase, spoken during celebrations of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) historic achievement, is a reflection of the Party’s ongoing assertion of power, influence, and control. However, the meaning behind those words may carry a more complex undertone, particularly as China navigates an uncertain future. For Xi and the Party, the challenges facing the fourth-generation heirs of China’s Communist revolution are more pressing than ever.
While China today stands as a global power with an increasingly influential role in world affairs, its Communist leadership faces significant questions about the future of the regime and the political system that has ruled since 1949. History looms large, not only as a reminder of the victories of the past, but also as a warning that no system is guaranteed to endure forever.
To fully appreciate China’s current trajectory, it’s crucial to revisit the global context of Communism’s rise and fall. The 1950s marked the peak of Communism, a time when both fear and hope surrounded the potential for its spread across the globe. The Soviet Union was seen as the leader of this movement, and countries like Cuba and Vietnam followed in its wake. Yet, while Communism did expand in some regions, it never became the global force that many had anticipated or feared.
By the time the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the dream of a global Communist order had largely faded. The peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union was a profound moment in world history, and it sent a powerful message to the remaining Communist regimes. It was proof that no matter how solid a political system may seem, it can still unravel, sometimes with little warning. The age of the Soviet Union came to an end at 74 years, and with it, the European Communist regimes crumbled as well.
At that point, China became the world’s oldest surviving Communist state—a status that sent a psychological shockwave through the CCP. As historian Glyn Ford noted, “It was like the moment when a person loses their parents. Suddenly, the generation in the middle realizes they are next in line for mortality.” For the CCP, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a moment of reckoning. It became the central preoccupation of China’s political elite to ensure that the People’s Republic would not meet the same fate.
The question of how to avoid the Soviet Union’s downfall has dominated the internal debates of the Chinese Communist Party for decades. From the 1990s onward, two distinct factions within the Party emerged, each with its own vision for China’s future: the “princelings” and the “populists.”
The princelings were the children and grandchildren of the founding leaders of the Communist revolution. Born into privilege and accustomed to wielding power, they advocated for a centralized and authoritarian approach to governance. Their rise within the Party was often swift, given their family ties, and they tended to view any moves toward reform or liberalization with suspicion. In their view, Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the Soviet Union in the 1980s were directly responsible for its collapse. For them, preserving the power of the Party required maintaining strict control over the state, the economy, and the military.
The populists, on the other hand, had more humble origins. Many of them had grown up in the rural interior of China and understood the plight of the country’s poor and working-class citizens. This faction, often referred to as the “League faction” or tuanpai, advocated for policies that addressed the needs of vulnerable social groups, including farmers, migrant workers, and the urban poor. They pushed for a more open media, a stronger welfare state, and increased internal democracy within the Party itself. Their guiding philosophy was that the Party could only survive by adapting to the changing needs of society and addressing the growing inequality that accompanied China’s rapid economic growth.
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, these two factions maintained a delicate balance of power. The economic boom that followed China’s market-oriented reforms allowed the CCP to delay any hard choices between these competing visions. Both factions shared power, and although their internal rivalry simmered beneath the surface, they avoided direct conflict.
The tension between the princelings and the populists remained relatively contained as long as China’s economy continued to grow at an unprecedented pace. For three decades, China’s economy expanded by an average of 10% per year, transforming the country from a poor, agrarian society into the world’s second-largest economy. This period of rapid growth was often described as “miraculous,” but in reality, it followed a familiar pattern seen in other industrializing nations.
Just as Britain experienced rapid industrial growth in the mid-19th century, the United States in the late 19th century, and Japan in the post-World War II era, China’s growth was fueled by the migration of its rural population to the cities, where they provided an abundant supply of cheap labor for emerging industries. The same forces that had powered China’s rise—urbanization, industrialization, and an abundant labor force—were also responsible for the rapid growth seen in other countries throughout history.
However, like all economic miracles, China’s boom could not last forever. By 2015, the country’s growth had begun to slow. The population was aging, labor costs were rising, and the limits of industrial expansion were becoming apparent. The economic model that had sustained China for three decades was no longer viable, and the Party faced the prospect of a prolonged period of slower growth and rising social discontent.
It was in this context that Xi Jinping, the ultimate princeling, rose to power. Beginning in 2012, Xi methodically consolidated his control over the state, the Party, and the military. His vision for China was clear: only through centralized, authoritarian control could the CCP maintain its grip on power in the face of economic and social challenges. The era of compromise between the princelings and the populists was over.
Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has become more authoritarian than at any point since the days of Mao Zedong. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, while ostensibly aimed at cleaning up graft within the Party, has been widely seen as a tool for eliminating political rivals and consolidating power. The once-powerful League faction has been largely sidelined, and many of its leading figures have been purged from the Party.
In addition to his political crackdown, Xi has overseen the creation of a high-tech surveillance state unlike anything the world has ever seen. The Chinese government has invested heavily in technologies like facial recognition, artificial intelligence, and big data analytics to monitor the behavior of its citizens. The result is a system of “social credit” that tracks individual behavior and rewards or punishes citizens based on their compliance with state-mandated norms. This is the “total surveillance state” that Xi envisions as the future of Chinese governance.
While the scope and ambition of this system are unprecedented, its long-term viability remains an open question. Can a regime built on such extensive surveillance and control truly endure, or will it eventually collapse under the weight of its own contradictions? Many observers are skeptical. China’s history is filled with dynasties and regimes that seemed invincible, only to be swept away by popular unrest or internal decay. As the saying goes, “The Old Hundred Names,” a reference to the common people of China, have outlasted numerous dynasties and invaders. There’s little reason to believe that the current regime is immune to the forces of history.
Perhaps the most significant challenge facing Xi’s China is demographic decline. China’s one-child policy, which was in effect from 1980 to 2015, has left the country with a rapidly aging population and a shrinking workforce. By 2030, the number of Chinese citizens over the age of 60 is expected to reach 400 million, while the working-age population will continue to decline.
This demographic shift has profound implications for China’s economic future. As the labor force shrinks, economic growth is likely to slow further, making it harder for the government to meet the rising expectations of its citizens. At the same time, the cost of caring for an aging population will place increasing strain on the country’s welfare systems. These demographic challenges are not unique to China, but the scale of the problem is unmatched anywhere in the world.
As China marks 75 years under Communist rule, the question of its future remains uncertain. Xi Jinping’s regime has made it clear that it intends to maintain its hold on power through a combination of authoritarian control and high-tech surveillance. Yet history has shown that no regime, no matter how powerful, can stop the wheel of history.
China’s Communist leaders are keenly aware of the lessons of the past. The collapse of the Soviet Union serves as a constant reminder of the fragility of even the most entrenched political systems. For now, Xi’s China continues to move forward, but the challenges of economic stagnation, demographic decline, and rising social tensions could eventually prove too much for the regime to handle.
