The Philippine government expressed concerns over China’s sincerity in negotiating a long-discussed regional Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea, casting doubt on Beijing’s true intentions in resolving territorial disputes in the highly strategic and contested waters. Philippine Defence Minister Gilberto Teodoro voiced these concerns on Monday, despite President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s approval of continued discussions on the COC with China. Teodoro’s skepticism highlights ongoing tensions and a growing sense of uncertainty over whether China is genuinely committed to a peaceful resolution or merely stalling while continuing to assert dominance in the region.
Teodoro’s remarks come at a critical time, as negotiations over the COC have been stagnant for years despite increasing calls from Southeast Asian nations for a more concrete framework to address the South China Sea disputes. The code is seen as a crucial step to prevent escalating tensions and ensure maritime safety in a region through which approximately $3 trillion worth of trade passes annually.
“While President Marcos has approved good-faith discussions with China on the code of conduct, I personally have doubts about China’s sincerity in this process,” Teodoro told reporters during a media briefing. “Right now, honestly speaking, I do not see that,” he added, making it clear that the Philippines is proceeding with caution in these talks.
China’s embassy in Manila has yet to respond to the statements made by the Philippine Defense Minister. However, the growing skepticism in Manila echoes broader regional concerns about China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, where Beijing claims nearly all of the territory, including areas that are also claimed by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Just a day before Teodoro’s comments, Southeast Asian leaders, during a summit held by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), called for swift progress on the COC. They emphasized that the code must be based on international law, notably the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides a legal framework for maritime governance.
ASEAN leaders urged China to work towards a formal agreement, given the increasing frequency of confrontations in the South China Sea. In recent months, Chinese coast guard vessels have engaged in incidents involving water cannon use, ramming tactics, and other aggressive actions to block resupply and patrol missions by rival claimants, including the Philippines. These actions have escalated tensions and raised concerns about the potential for an outright conflict if no formal mechanism is established to resolve disputes.
Teodoro’s doubt about China’s genuine willingness to pursue a meaningful COC underscores the broader question: Is Beijing using diplomacy as a delaying tactic while it continues to cement its control over the region?
The South China Sea is one of the most geopolitically significant regions in the world. Its waters are not only crucial for global commerce, but they are also believed to contain vast reserves of oil, natural gas, and other valuable resources. For decades, Beijing has asserted sweeping claims to almost the entirety of the South China Sea, delineated by its so-called “nine-dash line,” a claim that has been ruled as invalid by an international tribunal in 2016 in response to a case brought by the Philippines.
However, China has rejected the tribunal’s ruling and has continued its militarization of the region by building artificial islands, deploying military forces, and conducting naval exercises in disputed waters. Its actions have been met with condemnation from the United States and other Western allies, which have stressed the importance of freedom of navigation and the need for peaceful dispute resolution based on international law.
Despite this, China continues to engage ASEAN countries in negotiations over the COC. Some observers believe that Beijing’s engagement is a bid to manage its relations with Southeast Asia while buying time to further consolidate its territorial gains in the region.
The Philippines, as one of the primary claimants to disputed areas in the South China Sea, is particularly vulnerable to China’s aggressive actions. The country has long relied on its alliance with the United States to counterbalance Beijing’s influence. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the U.S. has maintained a strategic presence in the Philippines, conducting joint military exercises and increasing military aid.
However, the Philippines has also sought to engage China diplomatically, hoping to strike a balance between asserting its territorial rights and maintaining economic ties with its powerful neighbor. This delicate balancing act has become more complicated as confrontations between the Philippine and Chinese vessels in disputed areas become more frequent.
One recent incident in August 2024 involved a near-collision between Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels near Second Thomas Shoal, an area within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) but claimed by China. This and other similar confrontations have prompted outcry from Filipino officials, with the Philippine government filing diplomatic protests against Beijing.
Teodoro’s expression of doubt reflects mounting frustrations within Manila, particularly as the Marcos administration juggles the twin pressures of defending the Philippines’ territorial rights while trying to prevent a full-blown confrontation with China. As Teodoro noted, Manila will continue to engage in discussions over the COC, but without much optimism about tangible results.
If China continues to delay or derail COC negotiations, the implications for the region could be severe. The absence of a formal mechanism to manage disputes increases the risk of accidents or miscalculations that could spiral into larger conflicts. Countries like Vietnam, which has had its own share of confrontations with China in the South China Sea, have voiced similar concerns about the need for a legally binding COC.
ASEAN has been spearheading discussions on the COC since the early 2000s, but progress has been sluggish, partly due to the differing interests of the member states. Some countries, such as Cambodia and Laos, which have strong economic ties to China, have been less willing to confront Beijing, while other nations, like the Philippines and Vietnam, have been more vocal in their demands for a stronger code of conduct.
The United States and other Western powers have also been watching these developments closely, as they have a vested interest in ensuring freedom of navigation and maintaining the rules-based order in the region. The U.S. regularly conducts freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea to challenge China’s claims, further complicating the regional dynamics.
For ASEAN, the challenge is how to unify its members around a COC that effectively addresses the concerns of all parties involved, particularly smaller states that are vulnerable to China’s economic and military power. The association’s consensus-driven approach, while promoting dialogue, has often slowed decision-making, leaving some member states frustrated with the pace of progress.
A binding COC could serve as a deterrent to China’s increasingly assertive behavior, but for now, the likelihood of reaching such an agreement remains uncertain. Beijing’s preference for bilateral negotiations over multilateral frameworks has further complicated ASEAN’s efforts, as China has often sought to divide ASEAN members by negotiating with them individually.
In his remarks, Teodoro alluded to these challenges, noting that while the Philippines remains open to negotiations, it would not compromise its sovereign rights or national interests. This stance is likely to be supported by other ASEAN claimants, particularly Vietnam, which has also experienced Chinese encroachment in its EEZ.
As Southeast Asian leaders and China continue to negotiate the terms of the South China Sea Code of Conduct, the path forward remains murky. The growing tensions, highlighted by confrontations at sea and doubts about China’s sincerity, present significant obstacles to reaching a final agreement.
For the Philippines, the stakes are particularly high. Caught between defending its sovereignty and managing its relations with a rising superpower, Manila must carefully navigate the diplomatic tightrope. Teodoro’s comments suggest that while the Philippines is willing to engage in dialogue, it remains cautious about placing too much trust in Beijing’s assurances.
Ultimately, the question remains whether China is genuinely committed to a peaceful resolution or whether its engagement in COC talks is a strategic delay tactic. As the world watches the unfolding developments in the South China Sea, the urgency for a comprehensive and binding code of conduct has never been greater. Without it, the potential for further conflict looms large, threatening regional stability and global trade.
