The killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, a high-profile figure in the militant organization, marks a significant development in the ongoing Israeli-Hamas conflict. While some see it as an opportunity to de-escalate hostilities and potentially negotiate for the release of Israeli hostages, others, like former U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, express skepticism about any long-term resolution. Crocker, a veteran diplomat with deep experience in Middle Eastern affairs, warns that while Sinwar’s death might create a short-term opening, history suggests a prolonged conflict may persist.
Crocker, known as “America’s Lawrence of Arabia” for his extensive experience in the Middle East, offers a sobering analysis of Sinwar’s killing. He believes that while the assassination could lead to a window for a ceasefire and negotiations, especially regarding the release of Israeli hostages, the historical context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggests that such opportunities are rarely seized. In his view, the region’s deep-rooted issues and the nature of the organizations involved make a swift resolution unlikely.
“One thing I’ve learned over years, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Crocker notes, “is that the concept of the defeat of an adversary only has meaning in the mind of that adversary. If that adversary feels defeated, he is defeated. If he doesn’t, he’s not.” This observation speaks to the nature of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which have historically rebounded from leadership losses and continued their guerrilla campaigns despite setbacks.
- Sinwar’s Role and Hamas’ Decentralized Structure
Sinwar, often seen as a symbolic leader within Hamas, was reported to be operating from hiding long before his death, coordinating efforts through couriers and the Gaza tunnel network. This, Crocker suggests, means that while Sinwar’s killing is a significant blow, it is unlikely to dramatically alter Hamas’ operational strategy. Hamas had already devolved into a decentralized guerrilla movement, with small, independent units carrying out attacks against Israel.
Crocker compares this situation to that of Hezbollah in the north of Israel. Despite Israel’s efforts to weaken both groups, including the recent assassination of senior Hezbollah commander Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah retains enough capability to continue launching rocket and drone attacks into Israel. Crocker emphasizes that both groups are deeply embedded within the local population, making them difficult to completely dismantle.
Drawing from his extensive experience, Crocker highlights the parallels between the current situation and Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which ultimately led to the creation of Hezbollah. “That invasion and the subsequent Israeli occupation created Hezbollah,” he says. “This invasion is not going to end it.” In Crocker’s view, Israel’s military operations in Gaza may have similar unintended consequences, potentially leading to the further entrenchment of militant groups.
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed that Israel now holds the “balance of power” in the region following a series of military successes, including the decapitation of Hezbollah and Hamas leadership. Crocker, however, is less optimistic. He believes such claims are premature, noting that both Hezbollah and Hamas remain capable of mounting insurgent operations and that the conflict is far from over. “They’re decentralized,” Crocker points out. “They’re certainly ground down in terms of their capability of delivering anything like a meaningful response. But I foresee a very long insurgency by Hamas.”
- The Israeli-Iranian Tension: Nuclear Weaponization on the Horizon?
Complicating matters further is Iran, which backs both Hamas and Hezbollah. Crocker warns that the killing of Sinwar and Nasrallah, coupled with continued Israeli airstrikes in Syria and Lebanon, could push Iran toward ramping up its nuclear program. Recent reports suggest that Israel may be considering strikes on Iranian military or intelligence sites, but avoiding Iran’s nuclear or oil infrastructure to prevent a full-scale war. Crocker argues that even if these strikes do not hit Iran’s most vital assets, they could still accelerate Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons.
Iran, Crocker notes, may see the fate of countries like Libya and North Korea as instructive. Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi gave up his nuclear program in 2003, only to be ousted and killed during the Arab Spring. North Korea, on the other hand, has retained its nuclear weapons and avoided regime change. “The more vulnerable the Iranians look on non-nuclear options, be they proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah, or conventional missile capability, the greater the impetus will be in Tehran to opt for that nuclear capability,” Crocker warns.
- Prospects for a Ceasefire: What Israel and the U.S. Should Do Next
Crocker believes that Israel should seize the opportunity presented by Sinwar’s death to push for a ceasefire, especially to secure the release of hostages held by Hamas. While Hamas’ military capability has been significantly degraded, Crocker argues that the insurgency is far from over, and Israel should focus on humanitarian objectives, such as freeing hostages and halting rocket fire.
In the north, where Hezbollah remains active, Crocker points to United Nations Resolution 1701, which has been on the table since 2006, as a potential framework for a ceasefire. “This may be an interval in which Hezbollah and Iran, for their own reasons, may want a ceasefire,” Crocker suggests. If Israel can secure a temporary cessation of hostilities, it may be able to return displaced citizens to their homes and begin implementing the terms of 1701, which calls for the withdrawal of Hezbollah from southern Lebanon and the disarmament of militias.
With Sinwar’s death, the future of Hamas’ leadership is uncertain. Some speculate that former Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, who resides in Qatar, could return to power, while others believe that Sinwar’s brother, Mohammed, if still alive, might take the reins. Regardless of who emerges as the new leader, Crocker emphasizes that Hamas will likely continue its insurgent activities.
“Any avenue that Sinwar’s death might open up in terms of the resolution of the hostage situation is something the Israelis should seize on,” Crocker says. However, he cautions that the inner workings of Hamas are opaque, and it is difficult to know how many hostages are still alive or who within Hamas controls them. “If I were an Israeli policymaker, I would put every resource and element of imagination I could into the return of the hostages,” Crocker advises.
- The Larger Middle Eastern Picture: A Diplomatic Solution?
The broader geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is also at play. Prior to the October 7 Hamas attack, Israel was engaged in diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. Some analysts believe that Hamas launched its attacks to derail these efforts. A year later, Israel remains dominant on the battlefield, but the question remains whether this dominance can translate into a broader diplomatic solution.
Crocker is cautious about the prospects of a meaningful Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. While Israel’s ties with certain Arab states, such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, have strengthened, the Palestinian question remains unresolved. Israeli actions in the West Bank, particularly the expansion of settlements and military operations, have further complicated the possibility of negotiations with Palestinian authorities.
“I would be very skeptical that anything meaningful is going to emerge from an Israeli-Palestinian negotiation,” Crocker says, adding that the situation in the West Bank, where Israeli settlers and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continue to displace Palestinians, does not bode well for a lasting peace.
Ultimately, Crocker sees a grim future for the Israeli-Hamas conflict. He predicts that Israel will continue its military occupation of Gaza, leading to a prolonged insurgency. “One thing that has fundamentally changed since October 7 is the Israeli willingness to accept a certain number of IDF casualties in the longer run that is greater than they would have ever dreamed of before October 7,” Crocker observes. The trauma of the Hamas attacks on Israeli civilians has shifted the Israeli government’s calculus, making it more willing to endure military losses in the pursuit of security.
Despite the ongoing violence, Crocker urges caution against declaring victory too soon. “Unless your enemy feels defeated, he’s not,” he warns. If Israel convinces itself that the deaths of Sinwar and other leaders constitute a strategic victory, it risks underestimating the resilience of its adversaries. The lessons of 1982, when Israel believed it had achieved peace in Lebanon only to see the rise of Hezbollah, loom large in Crocker’s assessment.
while the death of Yahya Sinwar presents a fleeting opportunity for diplomacy, the deeper dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coupled with the entrenchment of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, suggest that peace remains elusive. Israel, according to Crocker, must tread carefully, balancing military objectives with diplomatic initiatives to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.
