As the United Nations celebrates its 79th anniversary on October 24, calls for reform in the Security Council have reignited, led by the G-4 nations: Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. These four influential countries are urging for an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats in the Security Council, aiming to gain permanent membership to reflect their global standing and contributions.
However, achieving this goal under the current UN framework, which grants veto power to five countries (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China), faces significant challenges. Although most of the P-5 (Permanent Five) support the idea of expanding permanent membership, China remains steadfast in its opposition, particularly against adding Japan and India, dimming prospects for immediate change. This article examines the G-4’s efforts, the current landscape, historical missed opportunities for India’s membership, and potential paths forward for Security Council reform.
The Group of Four (G-4) has long pushed for changes to the Security Council, contending that the current structure, established in 1945, no longer reflects contemporary geopolitical realities. On September 23, 2024, the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan convened during the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to underscore the need for Security Council reform ahead of the UN’s 80th anniversary next year. The ministers highlighted the imbalance within the Council and sought global support for a more representative structure.
The G-4 argues that the Council’s makeup should align with the world’s shifting power dynamics and ensure fairer geographic representation. Unlike in 1945, Germany, Japan, and India now stand among the most influential countries globally, both economically and politically, and their absence as permanent members, the group asserts, is a glaring gap in global governance.
During the recent UNGA, leaders from the U.S., U.K., and France expressed support for Security Council reform. President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and French President Emmanuel Macron each advocated for expanding the Council’s permanent membership to include the G-4 nations, also recommending the addition of a permanent African representative. For these leaders, restructuring the Council is essential for maintaining its relevance in a multipolar world. However, despite this public endorsement, practical change remains elusive due to procedural hurdles and, notably, China’s opposition.
Under Article 108 of the UN Charter, amending the Charter requires a two-thirds majority in the UNGA and ratification from all P-5 members. This clause effectively means any of the P-5 can block proposals to alter the Council’s composition. Thus, even if most nations favor G-4 inclusion, a single veto, particularly from China, is enough to prevent progress.
China’s opposition is rooted in historical and regional tensions. While it consistently resists Japan’s inclusion, citing unresolved grievances from World War II, its stance on India appears strategically motivated. As India and China continue to compete for regional influence, Beijing remains wary of India’s elevation to permanent membership, which would likely shift Asia’s balance of power.
India’s journey toward Security Council permanent membership has been marked by lost opportunities. In the early years post-independence, global powers, including the United States and the Soviet Union, showed openness to India’s inclusion. Notably, in 1950, the U.S. considered replacing China with India following the Communist takeover in Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of Nationalist China, who had retreated to Taiwan, even signaled acceptance of this plan, as revealed in a letter from India’s Ambassador to the U.S., Vijayalakshmi Pandit, to her brother, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. However, Nehru rejected the offer, citing a desire not to offend China and advocating instead for China’s admission to the UN.
In 1955, the Soviet Union made a similar offer, proposing India as the sixth permanent member. Again, Nehru declined, prioritizing China’s admission over India’s own ascension. This stance, viewed retrospectively, underscores the complexities of India’s foreign policy during the early Cold War period but has since led to lingering frustrations over India’s exclusion.
The current Council structure, some argue, no longer serves the interests of a rapidly changing world. The Security Council’s composition has remained almost unchanged since 1945, while global membership has more than tripled, from 51 to 193 member states. In 1965, the number of non-permanent seats was increased from six to ten, but the permanent membership has remained static, causing what many view as an anachronistic imbalance.
Africa, for instance, lacks permanent representation altogether, despite being one of the most populous continents with considerable stakes in global security. Asia, too, is disproportionately represented, given its size and population, as only China serves as a permanent member from the continent.
The G-4’s claim to permanent seats is grounded in their economic and diplomatic clout. Brazil leads Latin America and has made significant contributions to peacekeeping missions. Germany, as Europe’s largest economy, is a major donor to the UN. India, the world’s most populous democracy, brings strategic stability and a strong peacekeeping record. Japan, the third-largest economy globally, is a major donor to UN activities and actively promotes human security and development.
To overcome the challenges posed by veto power, some scholars and policymakers advocate for a veto-free Security Council. They argue that the rationale for giving the P-5 veto rights in 1945 no longer holds. Back then, the veto was meant to secure the participation of powerful nations, particularly the U.S. and the USSR, to avoid the fate of the League of Nations, which had failed partly due to the absence of the U.S. However, today, all major powers are UN members, and the organization’s universal membership no longer hinges on veto rights.
A veto-free Council, some argue, would be more democratic and would prevent the stalling of critical resolutions. Over the years, the veto has often been exercised not for international peace but to shield the interests of the P-5, creating diplomatic gridlock and frustrating smaller nations. A reformed Security Council without veto power could operate on consensus and majority voting, allowing a broader representation of global perspectives.
Despite broad support for reform among member states and three of the P-5 countries, the pathway forward remains challenging. Even if China eventually reconsiders, other hurdles remain, including differing visions among the G-4 and broader UN membership. Some member states worry that admitting new permanent members with veto powers would merely shift the power imbalance rather than solve it.
As an alternative, G-4 nations could push for permanent seats without veto power, a model that has gained traction among some diplomats. Additionally, a proposal by the African Union calls for two permanent African seats, each with veto power, though this idea faces similar obstacles.
The U.S., while supportive of India’s permanent membership, has also hinted at a preference for new members without veto rights. This stance reflects concerns that expanding veto power could dilute the Council’s decision-making efficiency.
