In a fresh diplomatic and maritime dispute, the Indonesian Navy and Coast Guard recently confronted Chinese vessels that had entered Indonesian waters near the Natuna Islands. This incident has sparked intense scrutiny of China’s maritime actions in Southeast Asia and Indonesia’s evolving stance toward its northern neighbor. Beijing’s intrusion is being seen by some analysts as a test for Indonesia’s newly installed government, led by Prabowo Subianto, while others speculate that it signals a potential shift in Indonesia’s diplomatic strategy regarding Chinese incursions.
China’s assertion of its territorial claims near the Natuna Islands is not new; Beijing’s vessels have frequently entered these waters during the administration of former President Joko Widodo, despite Indonesia’s repeated protests. Yet, under Widodo, Jakarta’s responses fluctuated between assertive actions in his early years to a quieter, less publicized stance as his presidency wore on. Now, with Prabowo at the helm, Indonesia’s response appears poised to return to a more overtly assertive posture, potentially signaling a recalibration of its approach to China.
The Natuna Islands sit at the southern edge of the South China Sea and fall within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). However, they also lie adjacent to the so-called “nine-dash line” — a vaguely defined demarcation China claims encompasses its traditional fishing grounds, including regions far from its own coastlines.
China’s incursions in the Natuna waters during Widodo’s presidency highlighted a complex tug-of-war between maintaining national sovereignty and managing diplomatic relations. Indonesia’s early confrontations under Widodo were markedly tough. In 2016, the Indonesian Navy fired upon a Chinese fishing boat in the region, detained several crew members, and later adopted a public display of deterrence by sinking Chinese vessels caught fishing illegally. This initial show of force appeared designed to protect Indonesian waters and assert Indonesia’s refusal to recognize the nine-dash line’s legitimacy within the Natuna EEZ.
However, by the latter half of Widodo’s administration, Indonesia’s confrontational approach softened considerably. Analysts speculate that Widodo’s economic priorities — particularly his focus on securing Chinese investment for infrastructure projects under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative — prompted Jakarta to adopt a quieter approach. While Indonesia continued patrolling the Natuna waters, it avoided high-profile confrontations that might escalate tensions. As one Indonesian foreign ministry official described, the aim was to “win the war without shaming the enemies,” reflecting a preference for diplomacy over direct confrontation.
In the wake of the recent incident, which saw a Chinese Coast Guard vessel enter the Natuna waters and confronted by the Indonesian Coast Guard, observers are weighing whether Prabowo’s government may pursue a different approach toward China. Prabowo, who previously served as defense minister under Widodo, is well-acquainted with the range of diplomatic and strategic measures available to deal with Beijing’s incursions. Yet the government’s decision to publicize the incident marks a noticeable change from Widodo’s quieter methods in recent years.
Indonesia’s Coast Guard took the unusual step of releasing video footage detailing the encounter, an assertive move that highlights Prabowo’s willingness to shine a public spotlight on China’s behavior. This transparency is reminiscent of recent moves by the Philippines, which has also increased documentation and public reporting of Chinese incursions in its maritime territories, in an effort to rally both domestic and international support. The Indonesian government’s decision to release footage suggests an emerging trend toward what some analysts describe as “assertive transparency.”
However, Prabowo’s approach may not signal a wholesale break from China. Shortly after the Natuna incident, Indonesia’s new defense minister met with China’s ambassador to discuss upcoming joint military exercises, indicating that Jakarta remains open to military cooperation with Beijing. This nuanced diplomacy highlights Prabowo’s strategy of balancing assertiveness in safeguarding Indonesian sovereignty with pragmatic engagement to maintain amicable ties with Beijing.
China’s presence near the Natuna Islands is part of its larger strategy in the South China Sea, where Beijing has consistently sought to establish a dominant position. While the islands are outside the official nine-dash line, they are adjacent to areas China views as traditional fishing grounds, a position that frequently brings Chinese vessels into waters also claimed by other Southeast Asian nations.
Beijing has expanded its maritime presence throughout the South China Sea by deploying an array of coast guard vessels and maritime militia to protect what it considers its territorial interests. This aggressive stance has drawn diplomatic and military responses from countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and now, potentially, Indonesia under Prabowo. For Beijing, establishing a continuous presence in these disputed waters serves several strategic purposes:
- Military Positioning: China’s coast guard and naval deployments reinforce its strategic foothold, providing a defensive buffer and increasing its surveillance capacity.
- Economic Interests: The South China Sea is rich in natural resources, including fish stocks and potential oil and gas reserves, making it economically lucrative.
- Diplomatic Leverage: Frequent patrols enable China to assert its territorial claims while simultaneously testing the resolve of other claimants, thereby assessing how far they are willing to go to defend their sovereignty.
For Prabowo’s government, the challenge lies in managing this tension without jeopardizing Indonesia’s broader economic and diplomatic objectives with China.
The release of the video documenting the encounter between Indonesian and Chinese vessels underscores Prabowo’s strategy to heighten awareness of Chinese encroachments without directly escalating tensions. Publicizing the confrontation serves multiple purposes, including signaling to Beijing that Jakarta will not back down in protecting its EEZ. It also appeals to a domestic audience that is increasingly vocal about Indonesia’s sovereignty over its waters.
By adopting a strategy of assertive transparency, Prabowo’s government has signaled a potential shift from Widodo’s more reticent stance. This approach allows Indonesia to:
Build Regional Solidarity: By aligning its strategy more closely with that of other Southeast Asian nations like the Philippines, Indonesia could foster stronger regional collaboration to counter China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.
- Bolster International Support: International actors, particularly the United States, Japan, and Australia, who are wary of China’s growing influence in the South China Sea, could view Prabowo’s actions as evidence of a stronger regional front against Beijing’s expansionist moves.
- Reassert Sovereignty Publicly: The public release of the encounter serves as a bold assertion of Indonesia’s sovereignty, catering to both domestic sentiment and broader nationalist pride.
- Increase Diplomatic Leverage: By openly highlighting Chinese incursions, Indonesia may gain additional bargaining power in negotiations and discussions with China over other strategic issues.
Prabowo’s response to China’s presence in the Natuna waters underscores his attempt to position Indonesia as a regional leader in maritime security, but he also appears cautious of alienating Beijing completely. The planned joint military exercises between the two countries reflect Jakarta’s interest in maintaining a functional relationship with China while clearly delineating its territorial limits.
As tensions rise in the South China Sea, Prabowo’s approach appears to be one of maintaining Indonesia’s longstanding principle of non-alignment, ensuring that Jakarta remains friendly with all major powers while avoiding entanglement in their rivalries. Prabowo’s government is thus likely to continue participating in regional forums like ASEAN, where Jakarta can advocate for a unified Southeast Asian position on China’s maritime policies.
