As Chinese President Xi Jinping prepares for an official visit to Brazil on November 20, the South American nation has stirred significant international attention by formally rejecting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With this move, Brazil becomes the second BRICS country, following India, to resist joining the multi-billion-dollar infrastructure project, signaling a strategic turn in the BRICS bloc’s approach to China’s expansive venture. This decision also mirrors broader trends as countries reconsider their partnerships with Beijing’s ambitious global initiative.
The BRI, launched in 2013, has drawn over 150 countries, including 22 in Latin America, into China’s vision of a global trade and investment network reminiscent of the Silk Road. However, as the initiative ages, countries are increasingly weighing its risks against its rewards, with concerns mounting over debt sustainability, environmental impacts, and sovereignty.
Under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s approach has been cautious yet assertive. His administration, while seeking enhanced bilateral ties with China, has shown restraint in making formal commitments that could compromise Brazil’s strategic autonomy. Brazilian leaders have voiced concerns about potential pitfalls of BRI, particularly the rigidity of infrastructure deals and implications for Brazil’s relations with other global powers.
Celso Amorim, Brazil’s special presidential adviser for international affairs, emphasized this stance in an interview with O Globo, stating, “We aim to elevate our relationship with China to a new level without signing an accession contract.” Amorim clarified that Brazil does not consider the BRI an essential or exclusive framework for collaboration with China, emphasizing that the country seeks selective, strategic projects rather than broad, binding agreements with Beijing. “They can call it the Belt [and Road] and give it whatever name they want, but the important thing is that there are projects Brazil has prioritized that may or may not be accepted by Beijing,” Amorim remarked.
Brazil’s decision to reject BRI membership does not necessarily indicate a distancing from China. In fact, Brazil and China’s economic relationship has flourished for over a decade. In 2023, bilateral trade volume reached $181.53 billion, with Brazilian exports to China surpassing $122 billion, reflecting a steady year-on-year growth of 11.9%. Yet, while Brazil remains closely tied to China as its primary trading partner, it is keen to retain an independent stance on global issues.
China’s BRI pitches global integration, offering infrastructure financing to developing countries seeking economic growth. However, such agreements often come with high interest rates and repayment terms that critics argue lead to “debt traps.” Developing nations, in particular, find themselves indebted to Beijing, increasing Chinese political leverage. Recognizing these risks, Brazil has opted for a more selective approach to Chinese partnerships, prioritizing flexibility and alignment with national objectives.
Brazilian officials, including Amorim and Rui Costa, President Lula’s chief of staff, had previously visited Beijing to explore BRI membership possibilities. However, they returned with reservations, pointing to challenges that underscore a shift in global attitudes toward the BRI.
BRICS, an alliance of five emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—recently expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. China’s economy constitutes around 70% of the combined BRICS GDP, underscoring its dominance within the bloc. However, despite this economic disparity, China’s expansive BRI efforts remain its independent initiative and not a collective endeavor of BRICS nations.
India’s stance is a testament to this independence. As the first BRICS country to reject BRI, India has consistently voiced concerns about the initiative’s transparency, sustainability, and geopolitical implications. Indian officials have cited an uneven playing field for its businesses and national security concerns, especially due to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) running through disputed territories in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). This route infringes on India’s territorial sovereignty, making BRI an unviable option.
Brazil’s alignment with India’s approach represents a broader assertion of strategic autonomy within BRICS, indicating that members can foster China ties without sacrificing their sovereign interests. Brazil’s decision to sidestep BRI, like India’s, highlights an increasing preference among developing nations to mitigate dependence on China’s economic might and maintain balanced relationships within multipolar global frameworks.
Brazil’s relationship with the United States plays a critical role in its strategic calculus. As the world’s eighth-largest economy, Brazil is well-integrated into global trade networks, with the United States standing as its second-largest trading partner. Trade between Brazil and the U.S. amounted to $74.8 billion in 2023, with Brazilian exports reaching nearly $38 billion. For Brazil, maintaining a stable partnership with Washington is key, particularly given that American administrations have voiced concerns over China’s expanding influence through the BRI.
Looking forward, Brazil’s stance on BRI could become a flashpoint in relations with a potential future U.S. administration under former President Donald Trump. Trump has been outspoken about countering Chinese influence and may press Brazil and other countries to reject Chinese financing mechanisms like the BRI. Consequently, by opting out of the BRI, Brazil can avoid frictions with the U.S., maintaining leverage for trade and investment opportunities across both sides.
Brazil’s decision to distance itself from the BRI comes on the heels of Italy’s withdrawal from the initiative in December 2023. Italy, the only G7 country to have signed onto the BRI, terminated its participation, citing unfulfilled promises and the increasing strain of debt associated with Chinese projects. This European shift underscores broader skepticism in Western nations toward China’s model of debt-driven infrastructure deals, a sentiment increasingly echoed among Latin American and African nations that joined early but now grapple with financial strain.
The BRI’s mixed track record has amplified scrutiny from global institutions, non-governmental organizations, and countries around the world. The initial enthusiasm for China’s infrastructure funding has increasingly been tempered by environmental, economic, and political concerns, with some countries reconsidering or even withdrawing from projects. While China touts the BRI as a pathway to growth, critics argue it has devolved into a tool for projecting Chinese influence, often with adverse local impacts.
India’s rejection of BRI was based on both strategic and economic concerns, perceiving the initiative as a conduit for China’s geopolitical ambitions in South Asia. The BRI includes the CPEC, a network linking Pakistan’s Gwadar Port with China’s Xinjiang region. The route crosses PoK, a point of contention as India claims territorial rights over this area, marking BRI as unacceptable to Indian policymakers.
India’s stance on BRI has also been shaped by economic considerations. Many Indian businesses feel that BRI fails to create equal opportunities for trade and investment, citing examples where Chinese firms dominate project bidding and ownership. Additionally, environmental concerns and accusations of “debt trap diplomacy” have been significant deterrents for New Delhi. Projects like Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, which was leased to China on a 99-year basis after Sri Lanka struggled to service Chinese loans, illustrate the financial hardships that can accompany BRI participation.
India’s criticisms of BRI have resonated with like-minded countries wary of China’s influence, creating a ripple effect that has reached Brazil. As developing economies within BRICS continue to grow, they are recalibrating their policies to safeguard national interests, protect sovereignty, and sustain balanced international relations.
Brazil’s rejection of the BRI may catalyze reevaluation across Latin America. Many countries in the region have embraced BRI in pursuit of infrastructure development, yet concerns about long-term viability and debt sustainability persist. China’s extensive trade with Latin America is predominantly focused on Brazil, which was the first Latin American country to surpass $100 billion in annual trade with China. Given Brazil’s influence in the region, its stance on BRI may prompt neighboring countries to scrutinize their own commitments, potentially reshaping Latin America’s economic relationship with China.
With strategic autonomy as a priority, Brazil is exploring ways to diversify its partnerships beyond China. This approach is evident in Brazil’s trade policies, emphasizing collaboration with a variety of economic powers, including the European Union and the U.S. By fostering multilateral relationships, Brazil reduces its dependency on any single nation, ensuring its economic interests remain secure amid shifting global alliances.
