More than three weeks into a U.S. air campaign targeting Yemen’s Houthi rebels, Washington is confronting a hard truth: the strikes have failed to significantly degrade the group’s capabilities. Despite an arsenal of precision-guided missiles and cutting-edge drones, the Houthis continue launching attacks on U.S. warships and disrupting global shipping in the Red Sea. The operation has already cost taxpayers nearly $1 billion—and there’s no end in sight.
According to CNN, the U.S. military’s campaign, which began in mid-March and is now being dubbed Operation Rough Rider, has inflicted limited damage on the Houthis’ leadership or operational capacity. Despite dozens of airstrikes, the group remains defiant, continuing to threaten international shipping and fire on Israeli and American targets.
One U.S. official speaking to CNN admitted that resources for the operation are “nearing exhaustion.” With advanced weapons like the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) fired almost daily, the costs have spiraled. And while the U.S. Air Force and Navy have leveraged state-of-the-art systems, the campaign’s lack of decisive results raises questions about its sustainability—and strategy.
From B-2 stealth bombers launching long-range cruise missiles to Reaper drones conducting surveillance and strikes with Hellfires, the operation has relied heavily on technology. JASSMs, with their 230-mile range and GPS targeting, are designed to strike without putting pilots at risk. TLAMs, launched from destroyers and submarines, carry a 1,000-pound warhead and have been U.S. staples since the Gulf War.
However, as sophisticated as these weapons are, they haven’t made much of a dent in the Houthis’ capacity to operate. Why? The answer lies in the rebels’ tactical evolution.
Emerging in the 1990s as a Zaidi Shia revivalist movement, the Houthis have morphed into a hardened guerrilla force. They took control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014 and have since learned to survive continuous aerial bombardment—first by Saudi Arabia and now by the United States.
Backed by Iran, they’ve developed a decentralized network of weapons caches, mobile missile launchers, and fortified bunkers. Their leadership operates underground, and their operations are spread across Yemen’s mountainous terrain, making them difficult to target with conventional airstrikes.
The Pentagon’s frustrations echo those of Saudi Arabia, which from 2015 to 2022 flew tens of thousands of airstrikes without defeating the Houthis. According to The New York Times, U.S. forces have struggled to locate missile stockpiles and command centers—many of which are either mobile or hidden in remote areas like Saada province.
“They’re not an army with uniforms and bases,” one defense analyst told CNN. “They’re an insurgency. And air power alone rarely wins against an insurgency.”
This lesson isn’t new. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq—each showed the limitations of air superiority when fighting determined insurgents embedded within local terrain and populations. The Houthis, having fought a brutal war against a far richer and better-equipped Saudi coalition, have adopted tactics designed to outlast technologically superior foes.
They quickly move equipment after launching strikes, use decoys, and shield high-value assets in bunkers and civilian areas. Their structure is designed not to collapse when a few leaders are taken out. In short, they’re built to endure.
The current campaign was triggered by Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, launched in solidarity with Palestinians amid Israel’s war in Gaza. Since late 2023, they’ve targeted over 190 vessels, sunk two ships, and killed at least four civilian sailors, according to Al Jazeera.
These attacks prompted a massive rerouting of global shipping away from the Suez Canal and around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. The Economist estimates this disruption has cost global trade nearly $200 billion. Maersk, among other shipping giants, halted operations in the Red Sea, causing transit times and costs to spike.
In response, Operation Rough Rider was launched on March 15 following the expiration of a temporary ceasefire in Gaza. President Donald Trump, returning to office in January, vowed to end Houthi attacks with “overwhelming force.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has reiterated that mission—but so far, the group hasn’t backed down.
What makes the situation particularly alarming for U.S. planners is the asymmetry in cost. A single JASSM costs about $1.2 million. A Tomahawk is closer to $2 million. Each MQ-9 Reaper drone costs around $30 million, with Hellfire missiles priced at roughly $100,000 each.
Compare that to the Houthis’ arsenal. Iranian-designed missiles like the Quds-1 and Toofan are crude by U.S. standards, but they get the job done. The Quds-1 can hit targets up to 500 miles away. The Toofan, a ballistic missile variant, can reach 1,200 miles. Their drones, such as the Samad-3, lack precision but cost as little as $20,000 to produce. They can force a U.S. warship to expend a $150,000 interceptor missile, flipping the economics of modern warfare on its head.
This strategy—using cheap weapons to bleed a superior power—mirrors tactics used by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006. It’s attrition by economics.
Part of the problem is intelligence. According to a U.S. official quoted by Reuters, several Houthi leaders have been killed. But the group’s key figures, including Abdul Malik al-Houthi, have gone dark—cutting communications and moving frequently.
This operational opacity makes them hard to track and harder to kill. And their leadership structure, while hierarchical, is robust enough to continue operating even when individual commanders are eliminated.
The Houthis’ resilience isn’t just military. It’s psychological. Much like the Taliban in Afghanistan, they’ve learned that surviving is winning. As long as they can keep striking—even sporadically—they project power.
CNN’s report hinted at the possibility of a ground operation if the air campaign continues to stall. But such a move would be risky and potentially disastrous. Yemen’s terrain is among the harshest in the world. The western highlands, where the Houthis are strongest, rise over 12,000 feet, filled with narrow valleys and dense fortifications.
Coalition forces, including elite Saudi and Emirati troops, were bogged down for years trying to make headway in this environment. Any U.S. ground incursion would face ambushes, IEDs, and a population hardened by years of war.
Moreover, a U.S. ground war risks dragging Iran more directly into the conflict. While Tehran has officially denied involvement, arms smuggling and logistical support are well documented. If U.S. troops enter Yemen, Iran could ramp up support or unleash regional proxies like Hezbollah.
The Telegraph recently reported that Iran has pulled back some operatives in Yemen to avoid further escalation. But a ground war could reverse that calculation, escalating tensions from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz and beyond.
The financial burden is becoming harder to ignore. In just over three weeks, the U.S. has spent nearly $1 billion—much of it on munitions and the deployment of aircraft carriers, bombers, and advanced jets like the F-35 Lightning II. Operating one carrier strike group can cost over $6 million per day, not including aircraft and personnel.
CNN noted that the Pentagon has already raised concerns to Congress about dwindling stocks of precision munitions. The U.S. is also supplying weapons to Ukraine, reinforcing Taiwan, and maintaining a global military posture. The strain is beginning to show.
For context, the 1991 Gulf War, a swift and decisive conflict against Iraq’s conventional army, cost $61 billion in today’s dollars. Saudi Arabia’s failed war against the Houthis burned through $100 billion over seven years. If Operation Rough Rider continues at its current pace, it could rival those figures in less than a year.
The implications of the Houthis’ resilience go far beyond Yemen. If one of the world’s most advanced militaries can’t suppress a relatively small, poorly funded rebel group, what message does that send to other U.S. adversaries?
Groups like Hezbollah, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, and even Iranian-backed militias in Syria may view this as a green light to challenge U.S. interests. If the Red Sea, a vital artery for global trade, can be shut down by a militia for months without consequence, the precedent could destabilize other chokepoints around the globe.
National Security Adviser Mike Waltz claimed in a recent ABC interview that multiple high-ranking Houthi officials had been eliminated. But the reality on the ground suggests otherwise. The group is not only surviving—it’s still striking.
So where does the U.S. go from here? The choices are stark. One option is escalation—more airstrikes, potentially supported by special forces or even ground troops. But that risks further entanglement, a spiraling regional war, and enormous costs in lives and dollars.
Another option is a diplomatic off-ramp—perhaps negotiating a ceasefire through Oman or the U.N., offering the Houthis some recognition in exchange for halting Red Sea attacks. But that would be politically difficult and risk legitimizing a group responsible for killing civilians and attacking international shipping.
A third, less satisfying option is disengagement: declaring limited success and shifting the burden back to regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But that could damage U.S. credibility and encourage further aggression.
Perhaps the most troubling outcome is symbolic. The Houthis have survived. They’ve resisted. They’ve forced the U.S. to burn through nearly $1 billion in weeks, while continuing to shape events on their terms.
Much like the Taliban, their survival in the face of overwhelming force is a propaganda victory. It boosts morale, strengthens recruitment, and sends a powerful message to their supporters and enemies alike: you may have the bombs, but we have the will.
As the Biden administration before it discovered in Afghanistan, and the Bush administration before that in Iraq, military might doesn’t guarantee strategic success. Yemen is proving once again that wars of endurance are not won by airstrikes alone.
And so, 25 days into Operation Rough Rider, the U.S. is left facing a familiar dilemma: double down, back out, or find another way. What’s clear is this—bombs alone won’t end this war.
