In a rare and revealing moment of military candor, a report from deep within Russia’s defense establishment has thrown unexpected light on the state of the country’s armored vehicle fleet—and its vulnerabilities. The 38th Research Institute of Armored Vehicles, operating under the Russian Ministry of Defense and based in Kubinka near Moscow, recently published a study that delivers a surprising verdict: the U.S.-designed Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) significantly outperforms Russia’s own BMP-3 in key areas of protection, firepower, and crew survivability.
The report, titled “Results of Research Tests of the BMP ‘Bradley’ M2A2 ODS SA [USA],” was authored by Russian researchers A.V. Mushin and V.V. Konyuchenko. It analyzed a captured M2A2 Bradley IFV previously operated by Ukrainian forces. Armored vehicle expert Andriy Tarasenko first shared details of the study on his Telegram channel, where it quickly made waves among military analysts and defense observers.
For American audiences, the admission offers a rare window into internal Russian military thinking—and underscores the enduring utility of U.S. armored design, particularly in the grueling and tech-intensive environment of modern warfare.
The U.S.-built M2A2 Bradley ODS SA is no stranger to global military analysts. First developed in the early 1980s, the Bradley was designed to shuttle infantry into combat zones while supporting them with powerful onboard weaponry. The ODS SA (Operation Desert Storm Situational Awareness) variant incorporates improvements derived from battlefield experience in the 1991 Gulf War. These upgrades include enhanced thermal optics, modernized communications, and better protection systems.
Weighing in at approximately 30 tons and powered by a 600-horsepower Cummins VTA-903T diesel engine, the Bradley is designed for battlefield endurance. Its standard armament includes a 25mm M242 Bushmaster chain gun, a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun, and a TOW missile launcher, giving it anti-tank capabilities far beyond many of its contemporaries.
In contrast, Russia’s BMP-3 IFV was adopted in the late 1980s and reflects a very different design philosophy rooted in Soviet-era battlefield doctrine. Produced by the Kurganmashzavod factory, the BMP-3 weighs about 18.7 tons and prioritizes mobility and amphibious capability. It can reach speeds of up to 43 miles per hour on roads and 6 miles per hour in water, a feature the Bradley lacks.
On paper, the BMP-3 boasts impressive firepower: a 100mm rifled gun capable of firing both high-explosive rounds and guided missiles, a 30mm autocannon, and a 7.62mm machine gun. But the Russian study reveals that these specifications don’t tell the whole story.
The Russian researchers were unambiguous in their evaluation of the Bradley’s superior survivability. The report highlights the American IFV’s multi-layer armor design—an aluminum hull with steel overlays, augmented by a polymer anti-mine mat and energy-absorbing seating—as key advantages in mine and projectile resistance.
According to Tarasenko’s summary of the findings, the Bradley’s frontal armor could withstand direct hits from 30mm 3UBR8 armor-piercing rounds—standard issue for many Russian IFVs and autocannons. The BMP-3, by contrast, cannot reliably endure the same level of punishment, especially without additional armor packages, which are not standard issue.
Side protection was another standout area. The Bradley, equipped with BRAT (Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles), successfully resisted attacks from rocket-propelled grenades like the PG-9VS and, in some cases, the more powerful PG-7VL. A real-world example from March 2024 is cited in the report, where a Ukrainian-operated Bradley withstood two anti-tank missile hits—one glancing off the turret’s reactive armor and another impacting the side—without disabling the vehicle.
By contrast, the BMP-3 is notably vulnerable to such threats. Without dynamic protection add-ons, which are often absent on frontline units, the vehicle is susceptible to catastrophic damage from modern munitions—a point the Russian study bluntly acknowledges.
The report doesn’t deny the BMP-3’s impressive firepower on paper. Its 100mm gun and missile-launching capability provide versatility unmatched by the Bradley. But in practical battlefield conditions, especially those seen in Ukraine, the edge goes to the American vehicle.
The M242 Bushmaster chain gun delivers roughly twice the rate of fire of the BMP-3’s 30mm autocannons, with more consistent accuracy over range. The Bradley’s fire control system—featuring thermal imaging, laser rangefinders, and modern optics—enables rapid target acquisition and engagement, even under poor visibility conditions.
The report notes that the Bradley’s 25mm armor-piercing discarding sabot rounds penetrate twice as effectively as the BMP-3’s 30mm rounds. Combined with superior target-tracking and faster response time, this makes the Bradley a more lethal opponent in direct-fire engagements.
Even the TOW missile system, with its longer range and proven battlefield performance, outclasses the BMP-3’s 100mm gun-launched missiles in terms of effectiveness against modern tanks and fortified targets.
Beyond weapons and armor, the Russian researchers devoted significant attention to crew ergonomics and vehicle maintenance—areas often overlooked in favor of raw firepower.
The Bradley’s internal layout benefits from its front-mounted engine and rear ramp design, allowing for safer and more efficient troop ingress and egress. Its roomier interior allows crew and passengers to operate more effectively, particularly during long missions.
The BMP-3’s rear-engine layout forces troops to exit through top hatches, exposing them to enemy fire. The confined interior, while aiding compactness and amphibious capability, limits movement and makes long-term operations more taxing.
On maintenance, the Bradley again scores higher. The Russian study praises its accessibility, noting that critical components like the engine, generator, and gun barrel are easier to repair or replace compared to the BMP-3. This translates into less downtime and faster redeployment—a major factor in high-intensity combat environments.
Why did Russia choose to publish such a frank assessment now? That’s the question Western analysts are still grappling with. For years, the BMP-3 was promoted as a “best-in-class” IFV by Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms exporter. But battlefield reality has cast a long shadow over that narrative.
Since the invasion of Ukraine, open-source intelligence group Oryx has documented over 760 BMP-3 losses as of early 2025. Many were destroyed by loitering munitions, anti-tank missiles, and artillery—weaponry the Bradley has proven better equipped to survive.
The report’s publication may reflect a push within Russia’s defense sector for modernization. Under Western sanctions and facing war attrition, Russia’s defense industry has struggled to maintain production levels, let alone innovate. The 38th Institute’s recommendations—such as adopting Western-style armored screens, upgrading 30mm ammunition, and redesigning crew layouts—hint at growing recognition that change is needed.
This wouldn’t be the first time Russia has borrowed from its adversaries. During World War II, the USSR reverse-engineered the U.S. B-29 bomber. The Cold War saw similar efforts, from radar systems to missile technology. The Bradley report may mark a return to this old pattern.
But analysts warn that mimicking Western hardware won’t be easy. Sanctions have cut Russia off from many high-end components, including microelectronics essential for modern fire control and optics. Meanwhile, Kurganmashzavod is reportedly operating around the clock to replenish BMP-3 losses, stretching its production capacity to the limit.
What’s especially striking is how closely the Russian study aligns with real-world battlefield footage. Drone videos and frontline reports from Ukraine’s 47th Assault Brigade—one of the first to operate the Bradley—show the vehicle taking multiple hits and continuing to fight or evacuate troops.
In one widely circulated clip from January 2024, a pair of Bradleys destroyed a Russian T-90M tank near Avdiivka. Using their Bushmaster cannons and TOW missiles, the IFVs coordinated to ambush the tank, reportedly disabling it before it could return fire.
Another video from November 2024 shows a Bradley under fire, absorbing three RPG hits while extracting infantry from a contested position. Despite the damage, the vehicle drove off without losing mobility.
These accounts echo the report’s praise for the Bradley’s design: survivable, maintainable, and lethal. By contrast, video evidence of BMP-3s destroyed or abandoned after minor hits has become all too common in the Ukrainian conflict.
The contrast between the Bradley and the BMP-3 reflects deeper doctrinal divides. American IFVs emphasize protection and firepower, supporting a professionalized force with long deployment times and high casualty aversion. Russian IFVs, dating back to the Soviet era, prioritize speed, amphibious capability, and mass deployment—at the cost of protection and crew comfort.
But that Soviet doctrine is running into modern realities. The proliferation of drones, smart munitions, and urban combat means lighter armor is increasingly a liability.
Other nations have found middle ground. Sweden’s CV90, Germany’s Puma, and the UK’s Warrior all balance mobility with protection and advanced sensors. China’s ZBD-04A, while similar to the BMP-3 in layout, incorporates upgraded electronics and survivability enhancements.
The Russian study appears to acknowledge that the BMP-3, once hailed as versatile and cutting-edge, is now lagging behind. Whether the Russian defense industry can respond meaningfully, however, remains unclear.
For American readers, this report is more than a flattering review of a domestic vehicle—it’s a rare insight into how Russia views its own limitations. The Bradley, long a staple of U.S. armored units, is earning grudging respect from its rivals. Its track record in Ukraine, backed by both Russian analysis and combat footage, affirms its role as one of the most battle-tested IFVs of the modern era.
But this isn’t just about American success—it’s about a potential pivot point for Russia. Will Moscow try to modernize its armored fleet? Can it, under current economic and industrial constraints? The answers to those questions may shape not only the future of IFV design, but also the outcomes of conflicts far beyond Ukraine.
