Turkish arms manufacturer Roketsan has signed a landmark agreement with an Indonesian firm to establish a joint missile production facility. The deal, announced by Roketsan CEO Murat İkinci during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in early April 2025, covers the co-production of anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles, and smart munitions. At the heart of the agreement lies a commitment to technology transfer—a strategic move that reflects Turkey’s ambitions to grow as a global defense exporter and Indonesia’s aim to become more self-reliant militarily.
This partnership marks a turning point for both nations, each navigating complex geopolitical realities in an increasingly multipolar world. It speaks not only to shared defense goals but also to deeper ambitions of regional leadership, technological sovereignty, and economic empowerment.
Indonesia’s decision to move forward with co-producing the Atmaca missile—a modern, precision-guided anti-ship system—demonstrates how the country is evolving from a passive buyer of military equipment to an active participant in advanced weapons manufacturing. With over 17,000 islands and vital sea lanes vulnerable to foreign incursions, Indonesia has long sought to upgrade its naval deterrence. The South China Sea, particularly near the Natuna Islands, remains a flashpoint where Chinese vessels have repeatedly violated Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone.
By acquiring the capacity to produce the Atmaca locally, Indonesia strengthens not only its naval reach but its industrial base. The agreement supports Jakarta’s Defense Industry Law of 2012, which mandates that all major defense acquisitions involve local production and significant technology transfer. For a country keen to reduce dependency on foreign suppliers, the deal is a strategic win.
Originally developed to replace Turkey’s stockpile of aging U.S.-made Harpoon missiles, the Atmaca boasts features that make it attractive for a modernizing navy like Indonesia’s. It can travel over 200 kilometers (124 miles), fly low to evade radar detection, and adjust course mid-flight thanks to its data-link system. Unlike the Harpoon, the Atmaca uses advanced guidance and inertial navigation systems that make it comparable to the Russian 3M-54 Kalibr or China’s YJ-83.
This missile is not just a deterrent. It’s a symbol of technological progress and self-reliance. Integrating the Atmaca into Indonesia’s upcoming Red-White frigates will enhance maritime defense without the strings attached often found in arms deals with major powers.
Western arms suppliers, notably the U.S., often impose strict end-use monitoring, limit access to critical technologies, and resist full tech transfer. China and Russia, on the other hand, may offer more flexibility but typically tie deals to political concessions. Turkey’s approach lies somewhere in between: offering affordable, effective systems with meaningful opportunities for collaboration.
According to İkinci, the joint facility will not just assemble Atmaca missiles—it will foster engineering training, local component production, and potentially evolve into a regional hub for missile development. This openness is part of Turkey’s broader export strategy, which aims to raise defense exports to $10 billion annually by 2026. Roketsan alone contributed $400 million to Turkey’s $7 billion in defense exports in 2024 and is on track to exceed $600 million in 2025.
Indonesia’s defense relationships have historically leaned toward Western and Russian suppliers. It has F-16s from the U.S., Sukhoi jets from Russia, and recently purchased French Rafales. But dissatisfaction with delays, high costs, and limited access to critical technology has pushed Jakarta to diversify.
In that context, Turkey’s willingness to co-develop and transfer technology is a game-changer. The two countries have already collaborated on the Kaplan MT medium tank, jointly developed by Turkey’s FNSS and Indonesia’s PT Pindad. That project proved Indonesia’s ability to adapt and manufacture sophisticated systems domestically. The Roketsan agreement builds on this momentum, further integrating the two defense ecosystems.
At a strategic level, the deal reflects growing trust between Ankara and Jakarta. President Joko Widodo’s successor, Prabowo Subianto, has taken a more assertive stance on defense modernization. His recent meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan yielded several defense and trade agreements, with both leaders emphasizing a “mutual commitment to sovereignty and technological independence.”
Indonesia is the largest and most influential member of ASEAN, and its military choices carry weight across the region. By establishing a missile production line, it signals to neighbors—and rivals—that it is serious about deterring maritime threats. This move could embolden other ASEAN nations like Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines to explore similar arrangements with Turkey or other alternative suppliers.
With China continuing its military buildup in the South China Sea, Indonesia’s move to acquire and potentially export precision-guided munitions from a domestic facility could add a new layer to the regional arms race. It could also shift alliances. Countries uncomfortable with Chinese or American dominance may see the Turkey-Indonesia model as a viable third way: a partnership built on mutual benefit rather than strategic debt.
The United States may need to reassess its policies toward Southeast Asia. While still the region’s dominant arms supplier, Washington’s reluctance to share sensitive technologies has limited deeper industrial cooperation. If the U.S. wants to remain a preferred partner, it may need to adopt a more flexible approach, especially as competitors like Turkey make inroads with more adaptive offers.
Australia, too, is watching closely. Tensions between Canberra and Jakarta have occasionally flared, especially regarding Indonesia’s flirtations with Russian defense technology. The Atmaca deal, while not provocative on its own, adds complexity to the regional balance, especially as Australia deepens its own military commitments under the AUKUS pact.
For NATO, Turkey’s moves could be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the alliance benefits from the export of NATO-standard weapons. On the other, Turkey’s independent foreign policy—evident in its S-400 purchase from Russia and now its pivot to Southeast Asia—continues to test the alliance’s cohesion.
Beyond geopolitics, the economic rationale behind the deal is strong. Indonesia spends billions on defense imports every year, a strain on its budget and a missed opportunity for domestic industry. By producing weapons like the Atmaca locally, Indonesia can retain a larger share of the value chain—jobs, skills, infrastructure, and spin-off industries in electronics, metallurgy, and software.
The production facility is expected to employ hundreds of engineers and technicians, with additional roles in logistics, testing, and component supply. For Turkey, the deal opens a gateway to Southeast Asia—a fast-growing defense market that could help it weather economic challenges at home.
Still, challenges abound. For Turkey, one risk lies in intellectual property leakage. China, which has close ties to Indonesia, could indirectly gain access to Turkish missile technologies. Ankara will likely implement safeguards to protect proprietary components and sensitive algorithms.
For Indonesia, the test will be execution. Building and sustaining a high-tech defense facility requires more than blueprints—it demands skilled labor, supply chain reliability, and policy stability. Previous joint ventures have succeeded, but missile systems are a step up in complexity.
There’s also the question of consistency. A future Indonesian administration could alter course, jeopardizing continuity in defense partnerships. That said, Subianto’s defense doctrine has bipartisan support and reflects long-standing concerns about maritime security and foreign dependence.
At its core, the Roketsan deal is about more than the Atmaca missile. It represents a bet by two rising powers on their ability to shape a multipolar order—one where emerging economies do not have to choose sides between Washington and Beijing but can forge their own paths through cooperation, innovation, and mutual respect.
Indonesia gets a sophisticated weapon tailored for its maritime defense needs. Turkey gets a foothold in a strategically vital region. Both enhance their global standing and reduce their vulnerability to supply chain shocks or diplomatic pressure.
Whether this agreement becomes a template for future partnerships remains to be seen. But what’s clear is that the era of passive arms importing may be coming to a close. In its place is a new model of co-production and shared capability—one that challenges the old hierarchies of the global defense industry.
The coming years will determine how successful this partnership becomes. Much depends on implementation: training Indonesian engineers, sourcing local components, ensuring quality control, and navigating export controls. If the facility produces its first batch of Atmaca missiles by 2026, it would be a landmark achievement.
Other possibilities loom. Indonesian officials have floated joint development of cruise missiles and even submarines with Turkey. Meanwhile, Roketsan may use the Indonesian base to explore deals in Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines—all nations with strategic coastlines and rising defense budgets.
As missile technology continues to evolve, the demand for flexible, accurate, and affordable systems will only grow. Countries like Indonesia want more than arms—they want autonomy. And nations like Turkey are increasingly willing to offer it, provided there’s mutual gain.
In a world of shifting alliances and unpredictable threats, the Turkey-Indonesia missile pact is a sign of things to come: a new axis of defense cooperation that might just redraw the map of military power in the Indo-Pacific.
