In a significant step toward defining the future of military operations beyond Earth, the United States Space Force (USSF) has released a new operational manual titled “Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners”, outlining a bold strategy to achieve and maintain space superiority. The document, made public on Thursday, offers the clearest articulation yet of how the U.S. intends to confront emerging threats in orbit and ensure dominance in what military officials now call the “most critical warfighting domain.”
The manual marks a doctrinal turning point for the newest U.S. military branch, which was established in 2019. It provides a comprehensive framework for offensive and defensive operations in space, with a strategic focus on protecting American assets, supporting the broader Joint Force, and countering adversarial capabilities across multiple interconnected warfighting domains—land, sea, air, cyber, and space.
According to the USSF, space superiority is not just about controlling satellites or preventing enemy launches. It involves achieving a “degree of control that allows forces to operate at a time and place of their choosing without prohibitive interference from space or counterspace threats, while also denying the same to an adversary.” In short, space must be a secure, dependable platform for the U.S. military to conduct its operations—and a contested, unreliable one for adversaries.
This control could involve a range of options—from deception and jamming to the outright destruction of enemy spacecraft and networks. The manual doesn’t mince words: “Space superiority may involve seeking out and destroying an enemy’s spacecraft, systems, and networks.”
General B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations, makes the stakes clear in his foreword to the manual: “Space superiority is not only a necessary precondition for Joint Force success but also something for which we must be prepared to fight.”
The document identifies three primary mission areas that define the Space Force’s operational focus:
Orbital Warfare – This involves direct action in orbit, including the maneuvering and potential engagement of satellites or spacecraft. Orbital warfare might involve intercepting or disabling enemy satellites, deterring hostile maneuvers, or deploying countermeasures against attacks.
Electromagnetic Warfare – A field long familiar to terrestrial forces, electromagnetic warfare in space deals with the control of radio frequency (RF) and directed energy. Space assets are particularly vulnerable to jamming, spoofing, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects, making dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum crucial.
Cyberspace Warfare – Space systems rely heavily on complex software and data networks, creating opportunities for cyberattack. The Space Force emphasizes protecting command and control networks from intrusion and sabotage while also maintaining the capacity to disrupt enemy systems.
These domains are tightly interlinked. A cyberattack can compromise a satellite’s function just as easily as a missile can destroy it. Similarly, jamming communications or blinding sensors with directed energy can render space systems ineffective without kinetic action.
The manual outlines a spectrum of offensive and defensive capabilities that planners must consider. Offensive counterspace options include:
Orbital strikes – Kinetic attacks from space on other orbital targets.
Terrestrial strikes – Earth-based weaponry used against satellites or launch infrastructure.
Space link interdictions – Disrupting communication channels through jamming or hacking.
Defensive tactics are broken into two categories: passive and active.
Passive defense might include hardened satellite construction, maneuverability, stealth technologies, redundancy, or deception measures like decoys and false signals.
Active defense could involve jamming an enemy’s sensors, deploying countermeasures, or preemptively disabling a known threat.
The framework insists that operational planning must account for both the protective and preemptive aspects of space warfare. It also reflects a more aggressive posture than previous U.S. policy documents, underlining a growing recognition of space as an active combat domain.
Lt. Gen. Shawn Bratton, Deputy Chief of Space Operations, told Defense One that the new framework “introduces a common lexicon that we can use in our training and in our education programs.” This common language and structure are essential for integrating space operations with the broader Joint Force and for building a professional cadre of “space warfighters.”
Given the high-speed, data-intensive nature of orbital combat, training will emphasize decision-making through automated systems, artificial intelligence, and machine learning. The manual notes the “decreased reliance on human decision-making,” favoring autonomous tools capable of reacting in real time.
Space Force operators must also become fluent in cyber and electromagnetic operations, reinforcing the service’s hybrid identity at the intersection of physical and digital battlefields.
Although the manual does not name specific countries, it is implicitly aimed at addressing the capabilities of peer and near-peer adversaries—namely, China and Russia—who have both demonstrated increasingly sophisticated counterspace technologies. China’s development of co-orbital satellite weapons, anti-satellite missiles (ASAT), and electronic warfare systems have raised serious alarms in U.S. defense circles.
The manual emphasizes that “space superiority becomes especially complex when confronting peer and near-peer adversaries,” identifying such confrontations as “Very High Risk” scenarios. The complexity arises not only from advanced enemy capabilities but also from the potential for rapid escalation across domains—from space to Earth and back.
At the core of the document is a recognition that space superiority is not just a side mission—it is foundational to every other branch of the U.S. military. GPS-guided weapons, satellite reconnaissance, encrypted global communications, missile early-warning systems—all of these rely on a secure and functioning space infrastructure.
In modern warfare, “long-range kill chains and global power projection” are meaningless without reliable space-based support. The manual makes it clear: space is not an isolated arena but the connective tissue that holds the entire American military machine together.
While the manual is a planning document and not a policy declaration, its contents inevitably raise questions about escalation and the potential militarization of space. Critics argue that by emphasizing offensive capabilities, the U.S. may further normalize the idea of space as a battlefield, increasing the likelihood of actual conflict in orbit.
There are also legal and ethical concerns. International treaties, including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, prohibit the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and encourage the peaceful use of space. The U.S. maintains that it is acting within these bounds, but the line between defensive readiness and militarization is increasingly blurred.
As the U.S. Space Force seeks to mature its doctrine, capabilities, and operational culture, the publication of “Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners” marks a pivotal moment. It acknowledges the changing reality of space—from a benign environment for exploration and observation to a contested, congested, and increasingly weaponized domain.
While many Americans may not yet fully grasp the strategic importance of space, the new manual makes clear that U.S. military planners are taking it very seriously. Whether through orbital strikes or cyber sabotage, the future of warfare is being shaped above our heads—and the United States wants to be prepared.
