In a striking shift that reflects the intensifying complexity of the fight against Houthi forces in Yemen, a U.S. Navy EA-18G Growler was filmed launching from the USS Harry S. Truman with a rarely seen heavy payload: four AGM-88E AARGM missiles, no AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS) pods, and a configuration built for maximum radar-killing precision. This setup, unveiled by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on April 21, 2025, marks a significant evolution in U.S. electronic warfare posture amid a volatile and asymmetric threat environment.
This rare loadout reveals a strategic recalibration as U.S. forces deal with the increasing sophistication of threats in Yemen, particularly from radar-guided systems, loitering munitions, and UAVs wielded by the Iran-backed Houthi insurgents.
The EA-18G Growler, assigned to Electronic Attack Squadron VAQ-144 “Main Battery,” is traditionally outfitted with a mix of two AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), three ALQ-99 jamming pods, and external fuel tanks. But in this recent mission, the Growler carried four radar-seeking missiles, three 480-gallon external fuel tanks, and two AIM-120 AMRAAMs on cheek stations—strikingly omitting its signature jamming pods.
Why this change? Analysts point to a threat environment that is increasingly unpredictable, dispersed, and technologically irregular. The omission of the ALQ-99 TJS may indicate several things: either a refined risk assessment that deems the pods unnecessary in certain missions, limitations in jamming effectiveness against specific systems, or a strategic trade-off to maximize missile payload and endurance.
Still, the Growler is not blind without its jammers. Its integrated AN/ALQ-218 wideband receivers can passively detect and geo-locate enemy radar emissions, providing the necessary data for precise targeting.
This mission is part of a broader U.S.-led campaign that ramped up in March 2025 following sustained Houthi attacks on commercial and military shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. U.S. officials report that six MQ-9 Reaper drones have been downed in the region since March, underscoring the growing lethality of Houthi air defense and counter-drone tactics.
U.S. Navy carrier strike groups, especially those centered on the USS Truman and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, have maintained high sortie rates, with daily operations targeting radar sites, missile launchers, UAV facilities, and logistics nodes inside Yemen.
The Growler’s primary task—Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)—has become more critical than ever, particularly given the nature of the threat posed by Houthi systems like the Iranian-origin “358” missile.
The 358 missile, also known as SA-67 in some intelligence circles, is a “dual-use” loitering munition capable of functioning as both a UAV and a loitering missile. First appearing around 2019, the weapon gained prominence after Iran showcased it during former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s 2023 visit.
Its use in Yemen is confirmed, and the missile has been linked to the downing of multiple MQ-9 drones. What makes the 358 particularly dangerous is its passive nature—it does not rely on ground radar guidance and instead uses an advanced electro-optical seeker, allowing it to quietly loiter until a target is identified. Its low IR signature and mobility make it a nightmare for conventional SEAD missions, which typically rely on targeting ground-based radar systems.
The 358’s man-in-the-loop potential, possibly giving operators mid-course control, further complicates engagement. Such systems reduce the radar signature and exposure time of the enemy, challenging even the best radar-seeking munitions.
The Navy’s response? Rely on the sophistication of the AGM-88E AARGM (Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile). Unlike its predecessor, the AGM-88C HARM, the AARGM boasts a multi-mode seeker—combining a passive anti-radiation homing system, GPS/INS navigation, and an active millimeter-wave (MMW) radar terminal seeker.
This gives it a powerful “counter-shutdown” capability. If a Houthi radar turns off its emissions mid-engagement (a classic anti-SEAD tactic), the missile can continue its trajectory using GPS guidance and use its onboard radar to reacquire the target.
That’s particularly valuable in Yemen, where mobile and semi-fixed radar sites frequently go dark to avoid detection, only turning on for brief scans. In effect, AARGM “remembers” where the threat was and can actively hunt it down even if it tries to vanish.
Seeing a Growler carry four AARGMs suggests that U.S. commanders are prioritizing destructive power over traditional electronic suppression in certain mission sets. It reflects an understanding that the threat now demands more kinetic solutions—hitting targets, not just blinding them.
This shift also aligns with observations of other aircraft operating in the region. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets have recently been seen carrying combinations of AGM-154 JSOWs, AGM-84H SLAM-ERs, and GBU-53/B StormBreaker smart bombs—further underlining an emphasis on standoff strike and sensor-fusion capability.
Moreover, reports suggest that Growlers may soon shift to the newer AN/ALQ-249 Next-Generation Jammer (NGJ) pods, starting with the NGJ-Mid Band (NGJ-MB). These pods, designed for broader frequency coverage and modular upgrades, are being phased into carrier deployments, replacing the aging ALQ-99 systems.
VAQ-133 “Wizards,” for instance, used NGJ-MB pods during their 2024 deployment aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln across the Indo-Pacific and CENTCOM theaters. The VAQ-144 Growlers on the Truman could be among the next to field the upgraded systems.
Interestingly, the Growler’s role in the region hasn’t been limited to radar hunting. In May 2024, a Growler from VAQ-130 “Zappers” was confirmed to have destroyed a Mi-24/35 Hind attack helicopter with an AARGM. This is unusual, given the missile’s intended role, but it shows its versatility.
The helicopter was presumably emitting a radar or other signal detectable by the Growler’s sensors, allowing the missile to home in. This also confirms what The War Zone has previously speculated: the AARGM has potential as a rapid-response weapon even beyond SEAD roles, particularly against time-sensitive or unconventional targets.
This broadens the Growler’s relevance—not just as a jammer or radar killer, but as a multi-mission strike platform in contested airspace.
The sighting of the jammer-less Growler raises questions. Were the jamming pods left off due to mission-specific constraints—such as weight limits, threat profiling, or the need for longer range and more missile load? Or is this part of a deliberate operational shift that sees the Growler used more like a precision strike asset?
Also worth noting is the potential degradation in jamming effectiveness without the ALQ-99. Though the AN/ALQ-218 receivers allow for passive detection, they don’t provide the same suppression of enemy communications or radar systems as active jamming. That may mean U.S. aircraft are relying more heavily on surprise, speed, and sensor fusion to defeat threats before they can react.
Additionally, the Houthis’ growing arsenal, increasingly resembling that of a professional, state-supported force, means U.S. planners must stay adaptive. The risk is no longer only from surface-to-air missiles, but also from drones, loitering munitions, and passive detection tools that can turn the hunter into the hunted.
The EA-18G Growler’s rare loadout of four AGM-88E AARGMs and absence of jamming pods is more than a curiosity—it’s a signal of how U.S. forces are adapting to an evolving, tech-savvy enemy in Yemen. With threats coming from unconventional weapons like the 358 missile, radar shutdown tactics, and increasingly stealthy launch platforms, the Growler’s flexibility is being tested—and expanded.
As the U.S. Navy transitions to next-gen jamming systems and refines its mix of electronic warfare and hard-kill tools, the line between fighter, jammer, and strike aircraft continues to blur. And in contested zones like Yemen, that hybrid capability may prove essential to staying one step ahead of adversaries that know how to hide, wait, and strike with precision.
