North Korea unveiled its most ambitious naval project to date: the commissioning of the Choe Hyon, a 142-meter-long, 5,000-ton destroyer marking the country’s first credible entry into the realm of blue-water naval operations. The ceremony, held at the port city of Nampo, was attended by high-ranking military officials including Admiral Kim Myong-sik. Named after Choe Hyon, a revered revolutionary general and former Minister of Defense, the destroyer represents a sharp departure from North Korea’s traditionally coastal naval posture. It is not merely a new ship; it is a signal of strategic ambition.
With a displacement of around 5,000 tons, the Choe Hyon is the largest surface combatant North Korea has ever constructed. Its size and sophistication set it apart from the country’s typical patrol boats and corvettes. Built in a newly erected hall at the Nampo shipyard, its commissioning was accompanied by a revealing display of onboard armaments laid out on the adjacent dock, showcasing the vessel’s integrated, multi-layered offensive and defensive systems.
At the heart of the Choe Hyon is a vertical launch system (VLS) containing 74 missile cells, split between 44 forward and 30 aft. This configuration is unusually dense for a ship of its size, indicating a focus on maximizing firepower. Satellite imagery and state media coverage suggest the forward section includes 32 compact VLS cells likely intended for anti-aircraft missiles, possibly adapted from North Korea’s indigenous SAM programs. An additional 12 cells appear configured for cruise or anti-ship missiles.
The aft section houses launchers for a diverse mix of munitions: the Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missile, a yet-unidentified supersonic land-attack missile, and the short-range ballistic missile Hwasong-11. All use cold-launch technology with lateral ejection, a safety mechanism to minimize failure risks. Lateral deck-mounted launchers likely hold Kumsong-3 anti-ship missiles, North Korea’s reverse-engineered version of the Russian Kh-35.
During the commissioning, North Korea showcased a wide array of weapon systems associated with the ship. Prominent among them were Pantsir-M turret systems armed with 57E6M missiles for air defense, cruise missiles including the Hwasal-2, and the Hwasong-11 ballistic missile. The main gun, a 127mm naval artillery piece mounted ahead of the forward missile cells, is a domestically manufactured system bearing superficial resemblance to Western models. It features manual operation, optical targeting, and external ventilation, though no clear ties to Russian platforms were evident.
For close-in defense, the destroyer fields two AK-630 30mm CIWS cannons per side and a Pantsir-M module aft, incorporating both quad missile launchers and 30mm guns. Additional armament includes decoy launchers and four quad Bulsae-4 anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) mounts, contributing to a complex, layered defense architecture.
The Choe Hyon isn’t solely a platform for missile warfare. Anti-submarine capabilities are supported by two dual torpedo tubes integrated into the ship’s structure and a bow-mounted sonar array. Though the absence of a visible towed sonar suggests limitations in long-range submarine detection, the destroyer reportedly features a system resembling the Soviet RPK-2 Viyuga (SS-N-16), capable of launching nuclear or conventional torpedoes to ranges of 100 km.
Radar and electronic warfare systems are equally comprehensive. The ship boasts a 360-degree phased array radar above the bridge, complemented by two mechanically steered fire-control radars similar to the Russian 5P-10E. The MR-36 radar, two navigation radars, IFF gear, and a series of antennas and domes scattered across the superstructure suggest capabilities in both passive and active electronic warfare. Though missile guidance methods remain uncertain, analysts speculate the use of active-seeker missiles or radar-based vectoring.
Propulsion is believed to rely on conventional diesel engines, with two bow thrusters aiding in port maneuvering. Though lacking a full hangar, the destroyer has a helicopter deck suitable for short-term operations. Two compact roller doors on the superstructure may conceal drone bays, supporting reconnaissance or target designation missions in contested environments.
The Choe Hyon’s flag was ceremonially presented to Vice Admiral Pak Kwan Sop, commander of the Eastern Fleet, suggesting the destroyer will operate in waters facing Japan. This decision is strategically significant: the East Sea (Sea of Japan) is a primary zone of tension and surveillance between North Korea and its regional adversaries. A second unit of the class is reportedly being constructed at the Cheongjin shipyard, reinforcing the long-term commitment to expanding blue-water capabilities.
South Korea, with its twelve advanced destroyers, maintains a clear technological edge. However, the Choe Hyon introduces qualitative changes to the balance. It serves as a floating missile platform, a mobile radar node, and a deterrence symbol all in one. Its capacity to carry up to 80 missiles makes it capable of saturation strikes that could overwhelm localized defenses or support broader strategic objectives.
This development reflects a wider regional trend. China has ramped up its Type 055 cruiser production. Japan has launched the Maya-class destroyers with Aegis capabilities. Even smaller players like Taiwan are investing in missile corvettes and subsurface deterrents. North Korea, long focused on asymmetric land-based threats, now seeks to project force at sea.
There is growing evidence of increased military-technical cooperation between North Korea and Russia, especially in light of Pyongyang’s alleged arms support to Russian operations in Ukraine. The Choe Hyon may be a product, at least in part, of this partnership. The ship incorporates features echoing Russian naval doctrine: layered air defenses, mixed missile loads, and cold-launch mechanisms.
While there is no confirmed presence of Russian advisers in the Nampo or Cheongjin yards, similarities in radar systems and weapons configurations suggest either knowledge transfer or at least inspiration. With sanctions impeding North Korea’s ability to source materials, collaboration with Russia—possibly in exchange for artillery shells and labor support—may become increasingly pivotal.
Between April 28 and 29, North Korea demonstrated the Choe Hyon’s operational capabilities during live-fire tests attended by leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju Ae. State media reported successful launches of supersonic cruise missiles, strategic cruise missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles, along with the deployment of electronic warfare projectiles. The 127mm main gun was also tested.
This live-fire exhibition had multiple audiences: domestic, regional, and international. For North Koreans, it was a rare demonstration of high-tech prowess. For South Korea and Japan, it raised concerns over missile saturation tactics and second-strike capabilities. For the United States, it complicates missile defense planning in the Pacific. And for Russia, it reinforced a potentially useful alliance.
The Choe Hyon does not make North Korea a naval superpower overnight. It lacks carrier aviation, deep-sea logistics support, and nuclear submarines—all hallmarks of true blue-water navies. However, its presence shifts calculations. It can threaten sea lanes, escort other vessels, or enforce blockades. It also offers North Korea a sea-based platform for strategic or even nuclear-capable strikes.
More than hardware, the Choe Hyon represents intent. North Korea is no longer content with coastal defense and ballistic missile brinksmanship. It is exploring multidomain warfare: combining naval projection, electronic disruption, and layered missile offense in one vessel. The destroyer may be a prototype, but it is also a statement.
In East Asia’s volatile balance, even a single new capability can have outsized effects. The Choe Hyon, with its fusion of old Soviet tactics, new missile technologies, and North Korea’s unique political calculus, marks the beginning of a more assertive maritime chapter. Its impact will depend not just on its weapons, but on how and where Pyongyang chooses to use them.
