In the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack that killed Indian security personnel and once again reignited hostilities between India and Pakistan, New Delhi is actively evaluating its options for a calibrated and effective response. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has extended full “operational freedom” to the Indian Armed Forces, allowing the military leadership to determine the mode, target, and timing of any retaliatory strike. While conventional wisdom would suggest an operation across the heavily fortified Line of Control (LoC) or the International Border (IB), India may have a less conventional and strategically potent card to play: its lesser-known overseas military presence in Tajikistan.
Pakistan has long concentrated its military might along its eastern frontier with India. The nation’s premier air defense systems, including radar stations and surface-to-air missile batteries, are heavily deployed along the LoC and IB. In contrast, the western and northern borders shared with Afghanistan remain under-secured, a strategic blind spot historically exploited by global powers.
The most glaring example of this vulnerability was in 2011 when U.S. Navy SEALs executed Operation Neptune Spear in Abbottabad, eliminating Osama Bin Laden without encountering any resistance. Fourteen years later, despite rising tensions and multiple security reviews, Pakistan’s western frontier remains largely undefended, offering India a unique and underexplored corridor for a possible incursion or surveillance operation.
Located less than 600 kilometers from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), India’s presence at the Ayni Airbase near Dushanbe, Tajikistan, represents a quiet but potent asset in its strategic arsenal. India has had a military footprint in Tajikistan for nearly three decades. Initially limited to a military hospital in Farkhor during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s, India’s presence in the region expanded significantly following the 9/11 attacks and America’s War on Terror.
The Farkhor hospital became a critical support base for the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, led by the charismatic Tajik leader Ahmad Shah Masood. After Masood’s assassination on September 9, 2001, and the global shift in strategic dynamics post-9/11, India saw the need for a more permanent and operationally capable installation in Central Asia.
The Gissar Military Aerodrome (GMA), commonly known as Ayni Airbase, was developed through a combination of Indian diplomatic will and strategic foresight. Championed by the Vajpayee government and backed by key figures like George Fernandes, Ajit Doval, and then Group Captain B.S. Dhanoa (later Air Chief Marshal), the base underwent a substantial upgrade.
With investments exceeding $100 million, the airstrip was extended to 3,200 meters to accommodate heavy transport and combat aircraft. Hangars were built, refueling and overhauling capabilities were established, and secure perimeters were set up. Though not widely publicized, Ayni was transformed into a fully functional forward-operating base, serving multiple Indian interests.
India has reportedly stationed Su-30MKI fighter jets at Ayni on a temporary basis. The airbase proved its strategic worth during the 2021 Kabul evacuation. As the Taliban swept through Afghanistan and U.S. forces made a chaotic exit, Ayni served as a crucial hub for India’s evacuation missions. C-17 and C-130J aircraft operated from Ayni to extract stranded Indian nationals from Kabul, underlining the base’s logistical value and geopolitical relevance.
This operational history establishes Ayni not just as a symbolic outpost but as a functioning military asset capable of executing high-stakes missions. With tensions now reignited in South Asia, Ayni could serve as a launchpad for surveillance, reconnaissance, and even offensive operations into Pakistan’s western and northern territories.
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Missions: Ayni’s proximity to Pakistan makes it ideal for launching ISR missions. Drones or manned aircraft can be deployed to collect intelligence on Pakistani military movements, particularly in PoK, Peshawar, and Islamabad. Afghanistan’s limited air defense infrastructure presents minimal risk to such operations.
- PsyOps and Strategic Diversion: Even the known presence of a capable Indian base in Tajikistan can force Pakistan to divert resources from its eastern front. This redistribution weakens its primary defense posture against India, creating openings along the LoC and IB.
- Covert Operations: Given the precedent of U.S. operations in Pakistan’s west, India could consider highly targeted, covert strikes against high-value terrorist infrastructure or individuals. These would be designed to send a message without triggering a full-scale conflict.
- Combat Operations: While launching full-scale combat missions from Ayni carries significant diplomatic risk and would require overflight permissions from Afghanistan, it remains a theoretical option. Precision airstrikes on terror camps in PoK or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could be executed using stealth drones or long-range missiles.
- Cyber and Electronic Warfare: Ayni could host capabilities for electronic surveillance and cyber operations targeting Pakistan’s western communication networks. Disrupting enemy communications in conjunction with physical operations could yield strategic advantages.
Using Ayni Airbase for offensive operations would undoubtedly have diplomatic repercussions. Tajikistan, while friendly with India, would face immense pressure from China, Russia, and regional Islamic states. India would need to conduct backchannel diplomacy to ensure Tajik cooperation and possibly limit overt Indian activities at the base to ISR and logistical support.
Moreover, any Indian activity from Ayni would provoke reactions not only from Pakistan but also from regional stakeholders like Iran and China, who have vested interests in maintaining stability in Central Asia.
The new Taliban regime in Afghanistan complicates the scenario. While they lack air defense capabilities, any perceived Indian military transit over Afghan airspace could provoke a response. However, covert or high-altitude missions might escape detection. India may also engage diplomatically with the Taliban to maintain an unofficial understanding, similar to how other regional powers are engaging with Kabul.
Pakistan now faces a significant strategic dilemma. It must decide whether to continue focusing the bulk of its military resources on its eastern frontier or to reallocate assets to guard against a potential western threat. Given its economic instability and stretched military budget, spreading its defenses thinner would create vulnerabilities that India could exploit.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus will now be under pressure to monitor a vastly expanded geographical scope. From merely watching the LoC and IB, it must now surveil its border with Afghanistan and even air corridors from Tajikistan.
India’s overseas military base in Tajikistan represents a significant, though underutilized, component of its regional power projection. The Ayni airbase offers New Delhi a strategic lever to reshape the military and psychological dynamics of its standoff with Islamabad.
In an era of asymmetric warfare, where perception and deterrence are as important as physical force, Ayni could serve as both sword and shield. It is a chess move that forces Pakistan to rethink its defensive calculus, potentially altering the very nature of South Asia’s security architecture.
As the Indian military weighs its options in response to the Pahalgam terror attack, one thing is clear: the battleground is no longer just at the LoC. From the high reaches of the Himalayas to the airfields of Central Asia, the arena of Indo-Pakistan tensions is expanding, and India is signaling that it’s ready to play a longer, broader game.
