North Korea’s KN-25 Rocket System Enters Mass Production, Artillery System Capable of Nuclear Payloads Redefines Battlefield Threats

North Korea's KN-25 Rocket System

In a development that is rapidly altering the strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has initiated full-scale serial production of its KN-25 “super-large calibre” rocket artillery system. The move signals not just an evolution in Pyongyang’s military capabilities, but a shift in its deterrence and warfighting doctrine as it leans heavily into precision-strike systems that blur the lines between conventional artillery and ballistic missile technology.

Photographs released in early 2025 by North Korean state media showed Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un inspecting a sprawling manufacturing complex devoted exclusively to the KN-25 platform. These images, which featured rows of the massive 600mm rockets and their tracked and wheeled launch vehicles, underscored the importance the regime places on this weapon. Analysts believe the photo op was carefully orchestrated to send a signal: the KN-25 is no longer experimental. It is operational, in mass production, and central to North Korea’s evolving military doctrine.

“The KN-25 gives North Korea a high-volume, precision-strike capability with a cost-effective footprint,” said Joseph Dempsey, a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Its range and payload capacity bring it closer to the realm of short-range ballistic missiles than any conventional multiple launch rocket system.”

The KN-25 first made headlines in 2019, when it was introduced as a “super-large calibre” MLRS. With each rocket measuring around 600mm in diameter and nearly 8 meters in length, the system quickly stood out from traditional artillery. Its sheer size and the use of individual launch tubes suggest that while it is categorized as an MLRS, it operates more like a series of short-range ballistic missiles.

Each projectile weighs close to 3,000 kilograms, making the KN-25 one of the heaviest artillery-delivered munitions in active use anywhere in the world. Comparatively, Russia’s Tornado-S and China’s AR-3 MLRS systems pale in terms of warhead size and range.

With an operational range approaching 380 kilometers, the KN-25 can hit virtually any target in South Korea from launch positions well behind the DMZ. This makes it a potent strike tool for suppressing South Korean and U.S. forces’ forward-deployed assets like airbases, logistics depots, and radar stations without requiring deployment close to the front lines.

Military experts point to the KN-25’s use of inertial navigation systems (INS) and possibly satellite-aided guidance (such as Beidou or GLONASS) as a leap forward in North Korean artillery capabilities. With these enhancements, the rockets can reportedly achieve impact accuracy within a few dozen meters—a performance threshold typically associated with operational-tactical missiles.

The system’s design also incorporates shoot-and-scoot capabilities, enabled by its deployment on both tracked and wheeled chassis. This tactical mobility makes it harder to detect and destroy before it can fire, increasing its survivability in the face of surveillance and counter-battery fire.

“This is not your grandfather’s artillery system,” said Dr. Rachel Minyoung Lee, a North Korea specialist at the Stimson Center. “The KN-25 is part of Pyongyang’s strategy to create a distributed, survivable strike network that can operate under intense pressure and still deliver precision firepower.”

While early tests and deployments of the KN-25 featured high-explosive warheads, in 2022 Pyongyang announced that the system had been modified to carry tactical nuclear payloads. This adaptation dramatically increases the strategic value of the KN-25, making it not just a battlefield weapon, but a tool of political coercion and deterrence.

South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies believe North Korea has already produced nuclear-capable variants of the KN-25 and stationed them in concealed sites across the country. The regime’s emphasis on mobility and distributed deployments further complicates efforts to neutralize the threat in a preemptive strike.

Some Western analysts have also suggested the KN-25 may be adaptable for chemical payloads, although no direct evidence supports this claim. Nevertheless, its warhead capacity and modular design theoretically allow for such versatility, raising the specter of multi-domain WMD use.

As the Russia-Ukraine conflict grinds on and Russia’s munitions stockpiles deplete, North Korea has stepped up its military cooperation with Moscow. There is credible evidence of artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles (such as the KN-23 and KN-24) being shipped to Russia, fueling speculation about whether the KN-25 could be part of future arms transfers.

While no confirmed transfers of the KN-25 have occurred, a major missile test in May 2024—featuring a salvo of ten short-range ballistic projectiles—was widely interpreted as a demonstration of capability meant for international audiences, including potential buyers.

“There’s a dual logic here,” said Bruce Klingner, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation. “North Korea uses these tests to validate operational performance and signal strength to enemies. But they’re also showcases, marketing events for customers like Russia or even Iran.”

If exported, the KN-25 would significantly raise proliferation concerns. Its hybrid characteristics make it attractive to nations looking for low-cost, high-impact deterrents that don’t require full ballistic missile infrastructure.

Compared to traditional SRBMs, the KN-25 likely has a lower per-unit cost due to its simpler rocket design and modular construction. This cost efficiency allows North Korea to produce and field large numbers of launch units and rockets, creating a dispersed and redundant strike network capable of overwhelming enemy missile defenses.

Its salvo-launch capability compounds this threat. By firing multiple guided rockets in quick succession, the KN-25 can saturate advanced air defense systems like THAAD and Patriot, reducing their effectiveness. In a crisis scenario, such saturation strikes could disable key command-and-control nodes and reduce South Korea’s ability to coordinate a response.

Operational flexibility is another hallmark of the KN-25. The system is deployed on both tracked and wheeled platforms, enabling it to operate across a wide range of terrains. Its launch vehicles are designed for speed and agility, with the ability to fire and relocate within minutes.

This mobility significantly enhances the system’s survivability, making it harder for enemy reconnaissance and drone systems to track and destroy launch units before they can be reloaded or repositioned. In practical terms, this turns the KN-25 into a persistent threat that forces adversaries to commit disproportionate resources to tracking and countering it.

The mass production of the KN-25 represents more than just a military enhancement; it’s a doctrinal shift. North Korea has traditionally relied on its ballistic missile force and nuclear program as the main pillars of its deterrence posture. The KN-25 offers a third leg: a conventional, yet quasi-strategic, strike system that can be used flexibly across a range of scenarios.

From peacetime signaling to preemptive first strikes, the KN-25 is now likely embedded in North Korea’s playbook for escalation management. Its ability to deliver accurate, high-volume fire makes it useful in both conventional conflict and nuclear signaling.

Moreover, the system could play a key role in any North Korean attempt to impose a “fait accompli” on South Korea—a rapid, overwhelming first strike that cripples response capabilities and creates new facts on the ground before allied forces can regroup.

South Korea and the United States are already adjusting their force postures in response to the KN-25. South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense has confirmed plans to accelerate the deployment of counter-artillery radar and to enhance its Kill Chain preemptive strike doctrine to account for mobile rocket systems like the KN-25.

The U.S., meanwhile, has increased joint drills with South Korea and Japan, focusing on missile defense and counter-battery operations. But the nature of the KN-25—particularly its cost-effectiveness, mobility, and precision—makes it a hard target to eliminate.

Some analysts argue that the emergence of the KN-25 will push the region further toward an arms race. Japan has announced it will double its defense budget over the next five years and invest in long-range strike capabilities. South Korea is developing indigenous missile systems and exploring space-based surveillance assets to counter new threats.

As North Korea moves forward with serial production of the KN-25, it is not just fielding a new weapon—it is redefining how we think about the boundaries between rocket artillery and ballistic missiles, between tactical strikes and strategic deterrence.

The KN-25 is a culmination of North Korea’s drive for asymmetric capability: a weapon that is mobile, affordable, hard to intercept, and capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear payloads with high precision. In the broader strategic picture, it serves as both sword and shield—an instrument of war, and a tool of political leverage.

Whether Pyongyang’s intent is deterrence, coercion, or eventual conflict, the KN-25 will be central to its military planning in the years ahead. And for South Korea, the U.S., and the broader Indo-Pacific region, it represents a new and deeply challenging variable in an already complex security environment.

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