China’s Entry into South Asia’s Skies: How J-10Cs and PL-15Es Are Reshaping the Subcontinent’s Security Dynamics

Pakistan's China-made J-10C fighters jet

Recent aerial engagements between India and Pakistan over Kashmir have led to significant losses for India, including the downing of multiple frontline combat aircraft—among them, the French-made Rafale, Russian-built Su-30MKI and MiG-29 fighters, as well as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). While official confirmations remain partial, the implications of these losses are already being parsed by defense analysts and military strategists worldwide. If accurate, the outcome represents a dramatic challenge to assumptions about India’s long-presumed airpower advantage over Pakistan.

The incidents have also drawn sharp attention to the underlying technological platforms involved, with analysts pointing to the possible superiority of Chinese-designed fighters and missiles, particularly the J-10C aircraft and PL-15E beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missile, over India’s current mix of Western and Russian systems. If so, the consequences could extend well beyond South Asia—reshaping global perceptions of Chinese defense exports and aerial combat capabilities.

At the center of Pakistan’s apparent tactical success is the Chinese-manufactured PL-15E missile, reportedly used in the recent skirmishes. Wreckage believed to be from a PL-15E was recovered in India’s Punjab region, marking what may be its first use in actual combat. The PL-15E, the export variant of the PL-15, is designed for long-range, beyond-visual-range engagements and is paired with China’s advanced J-10C fighter.

Defense analyst Justin Bronk of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has previously noted that the PL-15 family rivals the American AIM-120 AMRAAM and surpasses Russia’s R-77 missile in multiple performance categories. The PL-15 is equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar seeker and powered by a dual-pulse solid rocket motor, granting it a range of up to 200 kilometers. Its export variant, PL-15E, is capped at approximately 145 kilometers, according to Chinese sources.

Douglas Barrie of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) adds that the PL-15 achieves faster burnout speeds than the MBDA Meteor missile carried by India’s Rafales, thanks to its solid-propellant propulsion system. However, the Meteor’s ramjet sustainer offers longer mid-course endurance, providing consistent thrust throughout its flight path. In real-world combat, missile effectiveness is determined not just by raw specs but also by situational use, radar cueing, and data link integration.

The fighter responsible for deploying the PL-15E, Pakistan’s J-10C, also warrants close scrutiny. This Chinese fourth-generation-plus aircraft is equipped with a modern AESA radar, infrared search and track (IRST), missile approach warning systems (MAWS), and electronic support measures (ESM). Bronk argues that the J-10C is competitive with Western single-engine jets like the F-16 and Swedish Gripen and offers better radar and thermal stealth than legacy Russian Su-27 platforms, including derivatives like India’s Su-30MKI.

Most critically, the J-10C’s compatibility with networked data link systems enables it to operate in conjunction with Pakistan’s airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, creating a battlefield environment where pilots can engage threats without relying solely on onboard sensors.

Analyst Sebastien Roblin, writing in 1945, highlights that Pakistan’s Erieye-equipped Saab 2000 AEW&C aircraft are capable of tracking aircraft at ranges up to 450 kilometers—even those flying at low altitudes. When integrated with platforms like the J-10C, this allows for mid-course guidance of BVR missiles like the PL-15E. The result is a combat scenario where an Indian fighter might never detect a missile launch until it’s too late to evade.

Roblin emphasizes that this “network-centric warfare” model lets Pakistan deploy fighters with their radars turned off, increasing stealth and survivability. By contrast, India’s airborne surveillance capability remains limited. According to analyst Swaim Singh at the Center for Air Power Studies, India has only three Russian A-50EI Phalcon units and three indigenous Netra Mk 1 platforms, insufficient to cover its vast airspace in depth.

The reported loss of Indian aircraft—particularly the Rafale and Su-30MKI—raises uncomfortable questions for the Indian Air Force (IAF). While the Rafale has been widely praised for its agility and sensors, it lacks stealth features and specialized suppression-of-enemy-air-defense (SEAD) capabilities. A January 2025 report from the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) notes that French pilots have struggled in joint exercises when flying Rafales against stealthy fifth-generation opponents. French officers reportedly describe such scenarios as “very difficult to win,” suggesting potential weaknesses in high-intensity combat settings.

India’s Su-30MKI fleet, meanwhile, faces more than technological obsolescence. A 2023 article by Rajorshi Roy in the MGIMO Review of International Relations states that readiness rates for the Su-30MKI were hovering around 60% at the time—primarily due to supply chain issues with Russian spare parts. These logistical challenges have only intensified amid ongoing global disruptions and geopolitical tensions affecting Russia’s defense exports.

The loss of a MiG-29, though perhaps less surprising given the aircraft’s age, further compounds the issue. It underscores India’s overreliance on legacy Soviet platforms and delays in fielding modern indigenous alternatives like the Tejas Mk 2 or AMCA, both of which are still years from operational maturity.

Beyond tactical losses, the real takeaway may lie in the effectiveness of Pakistan’s integrated approach to aerial combat. By pairing modern, cost-effective aircraft like the J-10C with robust AEW&C support and long-range BVR missiles, Pakistan created conditions for air superiority without numerical or technological parity. The result is an asymmetric doctrine that counters India’s presumed edge in fighter quality and quantity.

The battle-tested success of Chinese systems in Pakistani hands may also change the global military procurement landscape. China has long struggled to export its high-end fighters, with clients generally limited to nations like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sudan, and North Korea. But Pakistan’s apparent battlefield success could become the most persuasive marketing campaign yet for Chinese fighters.

In a Forbes article, defense analyst Paul Iddon points to renewed interest from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in Chinese fighter platforms. If such deals materialize, China could use fighter diplomacy as a tool of geopolitical influence, mirroring the strategic relationships the U.S. has long cultivated via defense sales. With each fighter deal comes maintenance contracts, training programs, spare part dependencies, and in some cases, political alignment.

India and Pakistan’s recent aerial exchange seems to reflect the strategic adjustments both countries have made since the 2019 Balakot airstrikes. Back then, India struck a target deep in Pakistan’s territory in response to a terrorist attack in Pulwama. Pakistan retaliated by shooting down an Indian MiG-21, capturing its pilot—who was later returned in a gesture of de-escalation.

According to a 2024 analysis by Muhammad Faisal and Huma Rehman for South Asian Voices, Pakistan’s leadership learned from Balakot that military responses to sovereignty violations could be normalized, as long as diplomatic communication channels remain open. For India, a 2022 Stimson Center piece by retired Lt. Gen. Deependra Hooda argues that Balakot proved airstrikes can remain below the nuclear threshold—allowing for coercive signaling without triggering full-scale war.

This new dynamic, a kind of managed escalation, may be shaping current events. Both sides appear to have absorbed lessons from past confrontations and are calibrating their actions to avoid a nuclear flashpoint, while still flexing conventional capabilities.

Perhaps the most consequential winner in this latest round of air combat is not directly involved—at least not overtly. If Pakistani pilots flying Chinese aircraft, firing Chinese missiles, and relying on Chinese-compatible networked systems can defeat modern Western and Russian jets operated by India, it signals a new era in global military balance.

For China, the battlefield is also a showroom. The success of the PL-15E and J-10C may validate years of investment in indigenous military research and development and present Beijing as a credible competitor to Washington and Moscow in the global arms trade. It may also lay the groundwork for deeper security ties between China and states seeking alternatives to Western or Russian military suppliers.

As defense planners and intelligence agencies digest the implications of these skirmishes, one thing is clear: the sky over Kashmir has once again become a proving ground—not just for two rival nations, but for the future of air combat itself.

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