
After months of intense military engagement against Yemen’s Houthi militia, the United States is pulling back some of its most high-profile war assets. The B-2 stealth bombers and the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier, both central to the now-concluded Operation Rough Rider, are returning home as President Donald Trump unilaterally declared victory earlier this month.
While the decision has drawn sharp reactions both domestically and abroad, military analysts agree on one thing: this was one of the costliest and most controversial campaigns in recent American military history.
The B-2 Spirit stealth bombers began their journey back to Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri on May 9. A video released by the Air Force on May 19 confirmed their return, showcasing the aircraft landing back on American soil. The clip, posted on social media platform X, bore the caption: “You can’t fight what you can’t see”—a reference to the bombers’ radar-evading technology.
Their deployment had been kept under wraps until OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) analysts revealed their presence at the Diego Garcia airbase through flight-tracking data in March 2025. Soon after, confirmation followed: the US had quietly stationed nearly half a dozen B-2 bombers, alongside refueling tankers and transport planes, on the remote British territory in the Indian Ocean.
With a striking range of over 6,000 kilometers, the B-2s launched repeated sorties targeting Houthi missile sites and command centers deep inside Yemeni territory. Their stealth capabilities were expected to provide the US with a decisive edge in a complex and rugged warzone. But reality proved far more stubborn.
Operation Rough Rider was launched with a singular goal: dismantle the Houthi militia’s ability to strike international shipping in the Red Sea, particularly vessels linked to Israel. The group had warned it would resume attacks if Gaza’s ceasefire unraveled. With tensions rising, President Trump greenlit a massive air campaign to “neutralize the threat.”
The strategic concept was simple: overwhelming air power, backed by cutting-edge stealth technology, would do what diplomacy couldn’t—force the Houthis to retreat. In addition to the B-2s, the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier, bristling with F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets, was stationed in the Red Sea to launch persistent airstrikes. The Truman’s deployment had already been extended due to regional volatility, but with the start of Operation Rough Rider, its role intensified.
Despite the initial confidence, the first signs of trouble emerged within two weeks. The Houthis, aided by Iranian-supplied radar and surface-to-air missiles, shot down seven MQ-9 Reaper drones—each valued at approximately $30 million. By the end of the first month, the US had burned through close to $1 billion in munitions, according to internal Pentagon estimates leaked to The New York Times.
The most alarming moment came when a near-hit was recorded on an F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter. Though the aircraft managed to evade destruction, the Pentagon viewed the close call as a potential PR catastrophe. “A downed F-35 would not only mean a $100 million loss—it would be a humiliation,” said a former CENTCOM official.
The USS Truman, a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, quickly became the centerpiece of the US naval presence in the region. But its extended deployment didn’t come without problems. In the span of just over six months, the Truman lost three F/A-18 Super Hornets.
The first incident, in December 2024, was a tragic case of friendly fire. On April 28, another fighter plunged into the Red Sea after the carrier performed an evasive maneuver to avoid what CENTCOM called a “credible missile threat.” A third Super Hornet was lost during a nighttime landing attempt—an accident under investigation by the Navy.
Each Super Hornet costs roughly $60 million. The losses totaled $180 million and raised tough questions about operational safety, overextension, and aircraft readiness. Even worse, the Truman was involved in a minor collision with a merchant vessel near Egypt, prompting further scrutiny.
With air superiority still out of reach after 31 days, the Trump administration began reevaluating the cost-benefit ratio of continued engagement. According to a May 12 New York Times report, internal Pentagon documents flagged the operation as “nonviable” without a significant troop surge—something politically untenable ahead of the 2026 midterm elections.
On May 5, Omani and Qatari diplomats helped broker a deal between Washington and the Houthis. In exchange for a cessation of US bombing, the Houthis agreed to stop targeting American naval vessels. However, they were permitted to continue attacks on ships “associated with Israel.”
President Trump publicly announced the ceasefire on May 6, during a press conference with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. In typical fashion, he declared the mission a success. “The Houthis have capitulated. We got what we wanted,” Trump told reporters. The Houthis, for their part, celebrated the truce as a victory, claiming to have “defied the world’s most powerful military.”
Over the past weekend, the USS Harry S. Truman transited the Suez Canal and entered the Mediterranean Sea, where it is currently participating in NATO’s Neptune Strike drills. Once those exercises conclude, the carrier will sail home to Naval Station Norfolk in Virginia.
The Truman’s eight-month deployment—extended multiple times due to regional hostilities—has ended without the definitive success the Pentagon initially envisioned. Although its air wing executed hundreds of sorties, the actual strategic gains appear marginal. Houthi command structures remain intact, and their threat to Red Sea shipping has merely been reduced, not removed.
Meanwhile, the USS Carl Vinson remains stationed in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, offering continued deterrence.
Though the B-2s have left Diego Garcia, four B-52 bombers remain on the island as part of a Bomber Task Force mission. They are now joined by F-15E Strike Eagles from Japan’s Kadena Air Base, keeping the US footprint in the region substantial, if less aggressive.
Diego Garcia has long been a launchpad for American power projection—from the Gulf War to the War in Afghanistan. Its strategic value remains high, but the B-2’s quick withdrawal may signal a shift toward more sustainable deployments rather than high-risk, high-cost engagements.
While President Trump has hailed Operation Rough Rider as a demonstration of American resolve, the operation has faced bipartisan criticism in Congress. Democrats argue the administration’s goals were ill-defined and execution reckless. Some Republicans, while supportive of military action, have questioned the rushed declaration of victory and the mounting costs.
“What did we accomplish? Three fighter jets gone, billions spent, and the Houthis are still standing,” said Senator Mark Kelly, a former Navy pilot, during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last week.
Public sentiment is also shifting. A recent Pew Research poll found that 58% of Americans oppose continued military involvement in Yemen, citing concerns about cost, civilian casualties, and the risk of escalation with Iran.
Operation Rough Rider began with a bold promise: destroy the Houthis, safeguard Red Sea trade, and reassert American dominance in the region. Yet as the B-2s return to Missouri and the USS Truman prepares to dock in Norfolk, the operation’s legacy remains uncertain.
The Houthis are bruised, not broken. The US suffered expensive setbacks. And President Trump is left to sell a costly stalemate as a triumph.