Azerbaijan may have significantly increased its procurement of JF-17 “Thunder” multirole fighter jets. What began as a confirmed order of 16 units now appears poised to expand dramatically to 40, in a deal allegedly valued at US$4.2 billion (RM18.48 billion). While none of the involved governments—Azerbaijan, Pakistan, or China—have issued an official confirmation, the sheer scale of the reported increase is already sending ripples through the international arms trade.
If verified, the order would mark a historic breakthrough for Pakistan’s aerospace sector. The JF-17, a 4.5-generation fighter co-developed by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, has matured into a linchpin of Islamabad’s defence diplomacy and a symbol of its ambitions to become a serious player in the global arms export market. This would be Pakistan’s largest-ever fighter jet export deal, eclipsing prior sales to Nigeria and Myanmar.
The significance of this potential contract extends far beyond numbers. It signals the evolution of Pakistan’s defence production capabilities from primarily domestic consumption to competitive international sales. For PAC, fulfilling a 40-unit order would catalyze investment in production capacity, generate thousands of skilled jobs, and enable deeper investment into research and development.
The JF-17 Block III, the variant in question, is widely regarded as a technological leap over its predecessors. Integrating elements from China’s fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter, it boasts a modern avionics suite, advanced weapons systems, and most crucially, an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar.
The KLJ-7A AESA radar system developed by China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) is the centerpiece of the Block III’s capabilities. With a detection range of 170-200 km and the ability to track 20 targets simultaneously, it offers battlefield awareness previously restricted to more expensive platforms. It supports low probability of intercept (LPI) functions and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) modes for precision ground mapping and moving target tracking.
In the weapons department, the Block III is configured to carry China’s PL-10 and PL-15 missiles, giving it high off-boresight targeting and beyond-visual-range superiority. Additionally, reports suggest that Azerbaijan may integrate Turkish Gökdoğan and Bozdoğan air-to-air missiles, reflecting an emerging defence-industrial triangle between Baku, Islamabad, and Ankara.
This interoperability with Turkish and potentially NATO-compatible systems underscores Azerbaijan’s broader goal: military diversification. Historically reliant on Russian military hardware, Azerbaijan is rapidly shifting its procurement strategy in response to the geopolitical consequences of Moscow’s war in Ukraine, including deteriorating supply chains and mounting costs.
The move away from Russian MiG-29 fighters, many of which are aging and increasingly difficult to maintain, illustrates a significant pivot. Azerbaijan is not only diversifying its arsenal but also making a strategic statement about its alliances and autonomy.
The official handover of the first 16 JF-17 Block III fighters in 2023 was a high-profile event, complete with televised coverage and the personal involvement of President Ilham Aliyev, who was photographed in the cockpit of a newly delivered aircraft. A presidential statement declared the aircraft fully integrated into the national air force.
This acquisition, now potentially expanding, places Azerbaijan in a unique position within the region. Should the 40-unit deal materialize, Azerbaijan will become the single largest export customer of the JF-17 series. It will also gain a formidable air deterrent in a region marked by periodic volatility, particularly in areas like Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan’s reported decision to lean heavily into the JF-17 program throws into sharp relief the ongoing competition in the light fighter market. India’s Tejas, a domestically developed platform under the HAL umbrella, has struggled to gain international traction despite being technically impressive.
India’s recent loss to South Korea’s KAI FA-50 in the Royal Malaysian Air Force tender underscores its export challenges. Factors like price, political alignment, and delivery timelines often outweigh technical specifications, and on these counts, the JF-17 appears to hold the upper hand.
The FA-50’s success and the JF-17’s expanding footprint suggest that countries in the market for light fighters are leaning toward pragmatic choices that balance cost-effectiveness with operational versatility. The JF-17 Block III, with its advanced systems and affordable price tag, presents itself as a compelling “middle power” solution.
This potential mega-deal fits neatly into Pakistan’s larger defence export strategy. Islamabad has been aggressively marketing the JF-17 to countries in Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia. With many nations facing Western arms embargoes or reluctant to depend on Russian equipment, Pakistan and China offer an alternative that’s free from such constraints.
Moreover, the inclusion of Turkish systems in Azerbaijan’s JF-17s reflects not just bilateral cooperation but a possible blueprint for trilateral defence-industrial ventures. This modular approach, wherein client countries can tailor subsystems to suit their strategic needs, increases the platform’s attractiveness.
Beyond military implications, the alleged $4.2 billion deal would have massive economic consequences for Pakistan. Such an influx of defence revenue could relieve fiscal pressures and reduce reliance on foreign military aid. It also projects Pakistan as an emerging player capable of high-value, high-tech exports.
Politically, the deal could strengthen Islamabad’s ties with both Baku and Beijing, and potentially pave the way for deeper regional cooperation in defence, logistics, and intelligence.
Despite the optimism, challenges remain. PAC must demonstrate the ability to deliver large-scale orders on schedule and meet rigorous quality standards. Any production delays or performance issues could harm Pakistan’s credibility.
Furthermore, potential Western sanctions on Chinese components, or a change in regional alliances, could impact future JF-17 exports. Nonetheless, the platform’s growing list of capabilities, combined with its low cost, gives it a competitive edge in an increasingly fragmented market.
If the expanded order is confirmed and successfully fulfilled, Azerbaijan’s JF-17 acquisition will become a case study in how smaller nations can leverage smart procurement to achieve significant strategic gains. It demonstrates how middle-tier powers can bypass traditional arms suppliers and co-create tailored solutions with newer players.
For Pakistan, it is a moment of validation. The JF-17, once dismissed by critics as a second-tier fighter, is now at the heart of a transformative deal that could redefine its defence exports for decades to come.
