“China’s main spy agency, the Ministry of State Security—or MSS—is now the largest and most active spy agency in the world,” declared the anchor of CBS’s 60 Minutes in a revealing broadcast on May 18. Known for its journalistic rigor, the show laid bare the covert machinations of Beijing’s global espionage ambitions.
At the center of this vast intelligence apparatus is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which, under President Xi Jinping, has elevated the MSS from a shadowy bureaucracy into a global force. The agency now extends its reach well beyond traditional espionage, weaving itself into Western academia, corporations, governments, and diaspora communities. Its aim: to extract secrets, control narratives, and silence dissent.
Established in 1983, the Ministry of State Security was born in secrecy. Its original mission centered on counterintelligence and safeguarding the Communist Party’s grip on power. But since Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2012, the MSS has transformed. Under the leadership of current director Chen Yixin, who took charge in 2022, the agency has grown increasingly visible and assertive.
Public propaganda videos now glorify the MSS as a heroic bulwark against foreign threats. One such video, circulated on Chinese social platforms, declares that the MSS “senses danger before it strikes” and “fights against evil.” These cinematic portrayals serve a dual purpose: recruiting loyal operatives and intimidating potential dissenters.
Yet behind this nationalist gloss lies a deeply aggressive agenda.
According to Jim Lewis, a former U.S. diplomat and intelligence official, the MSS’s primary target isn’t foreign states—it’s Chinese nationals living abroad. Speaking on 60 Minutes, Lewis explained: “They could be plotting—this has happened before. They might be agents of a hostile foreign power, or they could be uncovering truths Xi doesn’t want them to know.”
To the MSS, overseas Chinese are seen not as citizens of the world but as extensions of the Party’s dominion. Surveillance, intimidation, and manipulation are routinely employed to neutralize perceived risks. And when persuasion fails, coercion often follows.
In 2022, the FBI uncovered an illegal Chinese police station operating out of a Manhattan office building. Disguised as a community center, it was used to spy on and intimidate Chinese dissidents. Two men were charged with acting as unregistered agents of a foreign government.
“They’ve done it in the Netherlands, they’ve done it in Canada,” Lewis noted. “The idea that you’d open a police station in another country—that’s a signal disrespect of the sovereignty of that nation.”
The MSS is no longer confined to analog tactics. Cyber espionage is now central to its operations. The U.S. Department of Justice has indicted more than 140 individuals in the past five years for crimes linked to Chinese intelligence, including cyberattacks and harassment.
These actions have targeted everything from military secrets and corporate IP to social media narratives. In the wake of mass layoffs at major U.S. tech firms, including Elon Musk’s enterprises, former employees became targets. Intelligence officials suspect that the MSS has infiltrated the ranks of laid-off personnel from defense contractors, space exploration companies, and AI research firms.
“The MSS isn’t just stealing secrets,” said Lewis. “They’re shaping the future.”
In a bold counter-move, the CIA has launched a Mandarin-language recruitment drive. Released on Chinese social media platforms, the videos offer a lifeline to disillusioned Chinese officials, showing them how to contact the CIA securely. The campaign is aimed at turning the cracks in China’s internal control into intelligence gold.
Europe, too, is feeling the sting of China’s growing intelligence appetite. In the UK, MI5 reports that over 20,000 citizens were contacted by MSS agents posing as business professionals on LinkedIn. These contacts were attempts to gather classified or sensitive information under the guise of job offers or partnerships.
France and Germany have reported similar intrusions. In 2018, French officials found that the MSS had reached out to 4,000 citizens via professional networking sites. In Germany, more than 10,000 individuals have been targeted.
Perhaps the most disturbing case involved Jian G, a former aide to German far-right lawmaker Maximilian Krah. Jian, prosecutors allege, had been working for Chinese intelligence since 2002, relaying European Parliament documents and information on Chinese dissidents. His cover? Pretending to be a critic of the CCP.
In Asia, China’s intelligence footprint is vast and growing. Taiwan remains the most significant target. Former Taiwanese Military Intelligence Bureau director Liu Te-liang estimates that more than 5,000 MSS operatives are embedded across the island, many in deep-cover roles.
In South Korea, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported eleven incidents since mid-2024 involving Chinese nationals caught photographing sensitive military infrastructure. Although the individuals claimed to be tourists, the NIS concluded these were likely intelligence probes.
In the Philippines, a Chinese national was arrested in April 2025 carrying an IMSI catcher near the national election commission. The device can intercept mobile communications, suggesting potential attempts to disrupt or monitor electoral processes.
The MSS’s mission extends beyond surveillance and information theft. At its core, it is a psychological operation. Its goal is to assert ideological control over Chinese citizens, even beyond its borders.
“The MSS wants to control the narrative,” said Lewis. “They want loyalty. And if they can’t get it, they’ll enforce obedience through fear.”
This is not mere speculation. A growing number of Chinese students, journalists, and scholars in the West report being followed, threatened, or coerced into silence. Family members in China are often used as leverage.
This psychological pressure has a chilling effect. Dissent becomes dangerous. Self-censorship takes root. Academic freedom and journalistic integrity are the collateral damage.
In its 2025 Annual Threat Assessment, the U.S. Intelligence Community issued a stark warning: “Beijing will continue to expand its coercive and subversive malign influence activities to weaken the United States internally and globally.”
The report cautioned that China’s integration of AI into its intelligence operations would make its efforts harder to detect and counter. With the capacity to process vast troves of data and simulate human behavior, Chinese AI-enhanced espionage tools pose a new kind of threat.
Meanwhile, Western democracies are racing to adapt. Counterintelligence units are growing, public awareness campaigns are proliferating, and laws governing foreign interference are tightening.
But the challenge is systemic. The MSS is not an anomaly within the Chinese government. It is an instrument of policy, a core component of how the CCP engages with the world.
What China’s shadow war ultimately targets are not just secrets, but systems. Liberal democracies are being tested—not by brute force, but by subversion. Free speech, transparency, privacy, and pluralism are all under siege.
“One of the precedents I thought we’d learned in the 1940s is that countries that don’t respect their own citizens don’t respect their neighbors,” said Lewis. “Fundamental rights are the basis of international security. Because when they mistreat their own citizens, you’re next.”
