New nuclear flashpoint, Meir Masri—a senior figure in Israel’s Labour Party and former Deputy Defence Minister—has issued a statement that reverberated far beyond its 280-character limit. Writing in both Arabic and Urdu on his verified X (formerly Twitter) account, Masri declared: “After Iran’s campaign, we may seek to dismantle Pakistan’s nuclear programme.”
While no longer holding a cabinet post, Masri’s political reach remains intact within Israel’s central decision-making circles. As a member of the Labour Party’s Central Committee and a longtime advocate of Israeli security doctrine, his comments are not being dismissed as fringe rhetoric. Rather, they signal a dangerous expansion in Tel Aviv’s threat perception—one that may now include Islamabad.
This rhetorical detonation, referencing the already explosive situation between Israel and Iran, has stoked fears of a broader regional war—this time pulling in a nuclear-armed South Asian power.
Masri’s remarks are significant not just for what they say, but for what they imply. His message: “Pakistan is not far from Iran. Your understanding is sufficient,” carried an unmistakable undertone. It suggests an emerging Israeli framework that lumps Iran and Pakistan together as existential nuclear threats requiring preemptive mitigation.
Coming amidst Israel’s dramatic escalation against Iran—including precision airstrikes on nuclear and missile infrastructure—Masri’s threat hints at a broader strategic horizon for Israeli defense planning. This isn’t merely rhetorical posturing; it may reflect evolving assessments within Israeli intelligence and military establishments.
For Tel Aviv, the arc of potential threats now appears to extend far beyond its traditional adversaries—Palestinian militant factions, Hezbollah, and Iran—to encompass a nuclear Pakistan.
Islamabad responded with unequivocal clarity. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar wasted no time in condemning Masri’s remarks. “Our message is very clear for Israel: Dare not look at Pakistan,” Dar said during a press conference in Islamabad, adding that Pakistan was on high alert and ready to “respond with full force” against any hostile moves.
The country’s armed forces echoed this posture. Though Pakistan’s military leadership has avoided hyperbole, the signal from Rawalpindi is clear: Any perception of a direct threat to its nuclear program will be met with overwhelming retaliation.
The storm of online speculation following Masri’s comments only worsened the geopolitical atmosphere. Rumours—never officially confirmed—suggested that Pakistan had issued private warnings to Israel, allegedly threatening nuclear retaliation should Tel Aviv employ atomic weapons against Iran.
While Pakistan’s civilian and military officials have dismissed these claims, they gained traction when Iranian state media amplified comments by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General Mohsen Rezaei.
Rezaei, a senior figure in Iran’s National Security Council, claimed during a live broadcast that “Pakistan has told us that if Israel uses nuclear missiles, we will also attack it with nuclear weapons.” Though the statement lacks corroboration, it reflects the deepening bond between Tehran and Islamabad in a moment of regional crisis.
Rezaei’s comments came days after Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif addressed the National Assembly, warning: “Israel has targeted Iran, Yemen, and Palestine. If Muslim nations don’t unite now, each will face the same fate.”
The minister called on Muslim-majority states to sever diplomatic ties with Israel and support Iran, declaring that “Pakistan stands behind Tehran… and will support them at every international forum.”
These declarations, while couched in diplomatic terms, signal a dangerous pivot: Islamabad may now be reconsidering the traditional confines of its nuclear doctrine, previously centered almost exclusively around India.
For decades, Pakistan’s nuclear posture has been defined by the “Full-Spectrum Deterrence” doctrine—a flexible framework allowing for a range of responses from tactical to strategic nuclear weapons.
As of early 2025, international intelligence assessments estimate that Pakistan possesses approximately 170 nuclear warheads, a number expected to reach 200 by year’s end and potentially 250 within five years. This growth places it among the fastest-expanding nuclear arsenals globally, overtaking India and inching toward parity with the UK and France.
Crucially, Pakistan does not adopt a “No First Use” policy, unlike India or China. This strategic ambiguity allows it to maintain psychological deterrence by keeping adversaries guessing—particularly when facing superior conventional forces.
But now, with Israel in the crosshairs of political rhetoric and religious solidarity, the question arises: Could Pakistan apply its deterrent umbrella westward, in defense of Iran or the broader Islamic bloc?
From a technical standpoint, the answer is yes.
The Shaheen-III, Pakistan’s longest-range ballistic missile, boasts a reach of 2,750 kilometers. Launched from western Pakistan, it theoretically brings Israeli territory within striking distance. The missile is solid-fueled and road-mobile, increasing survivability and reducing launch preparation time—crucial factors in a fast-evolving crisis.
Additionally, Pakistan is developing the Ababeel MRBM, equipped with MIRV (Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle) technology. This would allow one missile to target several locations simultaneously, overwhelming even Israel’s sophisticated Arrow-3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome systems.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Babur-1B and Babur-3 cruise missiles offer land and sea-based precision strike options, some of which are assumed to be nuclear-capable. Though an operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability has not yet been confirmed, the trajectory is clear: Pakistan is pursuing a nuclear triad to guarantee second-strike capability.
This gives Pakistan, for the first time, the potential to project nuclear force beyond South Asia—specifically, into the volatile Middle East.
For Israel, this is a new and deeply unsettling equation.
Already facing existential threats from Iran’s missile and drone arsenals, the addition of Pakistan into the threat matrix demands strategic recalibration. Israeli war-gaming—long focused on deterring Iranian nuclear breakout—must now factor in a second, geographically distant, and religiously aligned nuclear adversary.
Israeli analysts are reportedly divided. Some argue that Pakistan’s leadership is too rational to risk annihilation over Iranian solidarity. Others point out that political and religious pressures could create an unpredictable calculus—especially under a right-wing or Islamist government.
This is where Masri’s comment gains renewed urgency. If Israel believes that a nuclear-armed Pakistan could be persuaded—whether by ideology, diplomacy, or coercion—to join forces with Iran in a conflict scenario, preemptive planning may no longer seem far-fetched.
The doctrine of “Begin Doctrine 2.0”—referring to Israel’s historic strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981—may be resurrected in strategic circles as an option of last resort.
What we are witnessing is the potential birth of a new nuclear triangle, rivaling the Cold War’s classic U.S.–Russia–China axis.
The three vertices—Tel Aviv, Tehran, and Islamabad—form a volatile strategic triad:
- Israel: Nuclear-armed and regionally dominant, but facing simultaneous threats from Iran’s missiles and proxy networks.
- Iran: Cornered and increasingly reliant on regional solidarity, yet inching closer to nuclear breakout capability.
- Pakistan: Well-armed, ideologically aligned with Iran, and now strategically mentioned in the same breath by Israeli security figures.
This triangle is not based on Cold War-style balance of power. Instead, it is animated by religious identity, asymmetric warfare, and rapidly shifting political alliances.
Such a construct defies the traditional deterrence models. Its instability lies in the fact that ideological or religious triggers could replace rational strategic calculations. Escalation could be prompted not by troop movements or territory, but by events like the storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque or a drone strike in Damascus.
Middle Eastern nations are watching with trepidation. Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE—traditionally suspicious of both Iran and Pakistan—are caught in a dilemma. While some maintain informal relations with Israel, domestic public opinion heavily favors the Palestinian and Iranian causes.
India, for its part, has remained largely silent, but it is unlikely to view Pakistani nuclear assertiveness with indifference. Strategic analysts in New Delhi are recalibrating risk profiles and considering scenarios where Pakistan’s deterrent is no longer India-exclusive.
Meanwhile, Washington has found itself in an awkward position. As a key Israeli ally and Pakistan’s former patron, the U.S. may soon be forced to engage in nuclear diplomacy on two fronts: one with Tehran, the other with Islamabad.
Meir Masri’s comment may go down in history as a moment that catalyzed the redrawing of nuclear redlines. Whether it was a calculated warning or an offhand threat, its implications have been anything but fleeting.
Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella—once tightly stitched around its eastern front—is showing signs of expansion westward. Israel, meanwhile, is grappling with the prospect of being in the crosshairs of not one, but two nuclear adversaries aligned by ideology and enmity.
As theatres of war converge and geopolitical boundaries blur, nuclear deterrence can no longer be confined by geography. Instead, it is shaped by a convergence of intent, capability, and identity politics.
