The mere prospect of the Islamic Republic of Iran acquiring China’s advanced J-10C “Vigorous Dragon” fighter jet has sent shockwaves through the volatile Middle Eastern security environment. In military strategy rooms from Tel Aviv to Riyadh, the potential procurement has ignited fresh debate — not just about aircraft capabilities, but about the long-term regional power balance, the future of arms embargo regimes, and China’s evolving role in the global defence market.
At the heart of this geopolitical ripple is Iran’s long-languishing air force. For decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) has operated under a punishing regime of sanctions and embargoes, relying on an increasingly fragile and outdated fleet of Cold War-era aircraft. Yet with reports emerging of quiet negotiations between Tehran and Beijing over a J-10C acquisition, the IRIAF may be on the cusp of a transformation that could challenge Israeli air dominance and recalibrate Gulf airpower calculations.
Iran’s air force is, in many ways, a time capsule. The core of the IRIAF’s fleet remains composed of American-built fighters acquired during the Shah’s reign — including the F-4 Phantom II, F-5 Tiger II, and the legendary F-14 Tomcat. These aircraft, some dating back to the 1960s and 70s, have been kept operational through a combination of cannibalisation, reverse engineering, black-market purchases, and homegrown innovation.
Despite the ingenuity of Iranian aerospace engineers, the limitations of these platforms are glaring. Most IRIAF aircraft lack modern avionics, digital cockpits, AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radars, and the BVR (Beyond Visual Range) capabilities necessary to challenge adversaries flying fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft.
With the Israeli Air Force operating stealthy F-35I Adir jets, and Gulf Arab states fielding F-15SA, Eurofighter Typhoons, Rafales, and F-16 Block 70s, Iran’s air force has been increasingly outclassed both in terms of technology and tactics. This gap has turned Iran’s air force into a symbolic — rather than strategic — arm of its military power.
The Chengdu J-10C could change that.
A product of China’s drive to become a global aerospace power, the J-10C is a modern 4.5-generation fighter equipped with many of the technological features typically associated with fifth-generation jets. It features a digital fly-by-wire system, AESA radar, sensor fusion capabilities, datalink integration, and robust electronic warfare systems.
Most significantly, the J-10C is capable of firing the PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile, which is believed to have a range exceeding 200 kilometers — potentially even surpassing the American AIM-120D AMRAAM and challenging the European Meteor in raw reach. This single capability could revolutionize Iran’s air combat doctrine, providing it with credible deterrence against intrusions into its airspace by Israeli or Gulf reconnaissance and strike platforms.
While still lacking the stealth profile of the F-35, the J-10C offers a more accessible and politically feasible path for Iran to acquire modern airpower — at roughly $40–$45 million per unit, without entangling the regime in Western procurement red tape.
The potential sale is a product of deepening Sino-Iranian ties under a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement signed in 2021. The agreement spans multiple domains — from infrastructure and energy to military collaboration. While specifics remain opaque, Iranian and Chinese sources have indicated that defence cooperation is a key pillar.
For China, the sale of J-10Cs to Tehran would be a bold declaration of its willingness to defy U.S.-led arms embargo regimes. Beijing has long walked a tightrope in the Middle East, balancing economic ties with the Gulf states and Israel against its strategic courtship of Iran. But in recent years, especially under the weight of rising tensions with Washington, China has shown a growing readiness to deepen its military relationships in defiance of Western norms.
Tehran, meanwhile, has few alternatives. Russia’s arms industry, once Iran’s go-to source for advanced platforms, has been overstretched by the war in Ukraine, depleting inventories and slowing delivery timelines. The Su-35 deal, long discussed between Moscow and Tehran, appears stalled indefinitely.
Against this backdrop, China — flush with production capacity and eager to assert its relevance — emerges as the only viable supplier of advanced fighter jets unconstrained by Western pressure.
Observers point to Pakistan’s recent acquisition of the J-10C as a case study in the jet’s operational viability and geopolitical signaling. Inducted into the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in 2022, the J-10C has been portrayed as Islamabad’s answer to India’s Rafale and Su-30MKI fleet. PAF has already conducted integrated exercises showcasing the PL-15 missile’s long-range targeting capabilities — signaling a potential shift in South Asia’s airpower equation.
Iran may seek to emulate Pakistan’s model. A hypothetical IRIAF fleet of 24 J-10Cs, equipped with PL-15 missiles and operated from upgraded airbases, could provide defensive air cover for high-value strategic targets like Fordow, Natanz, and the underground Qom enrichment site.
Such a development would force Israeli mission planners to consider a more contested airspace — complicating scenarios for potential preemptive strikes on nuclear infrastructure. While the J-10C is not expected to equal the F-35I’s stealth, it could still effectively engage Israeli support aircraft like tankers, AWACS, and electronic warfare platforms — thereby raising the operational cost and risk of any attack.
The ripple effects would not end with Israel. Gulf Arab states, already engaged in an arms race with Iran, would likely respond by accelerating procurement of advanced missiles, surveillance assets, and EW systems.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both seeking access to the F-35 and investing heavily in Typhoon and Rafale fighters, would view the J-10C deal as a signal to bolster their air forces’ survivability. Expect renewed calls for greater Meteor and AIM-120D stocks, increased integration of electronic warfare pods, and perhaps even interest in the next generation of drone swarms and air-launched interceptors.
In Washington, the potential J-10C transfer is seen through the lens of great power competition. A sale would underscore China’s growing role as a military powerbroker and erode the decades-long Western monopoly on advanced air combat systems in the region.
Congressional hawks are likely to use the deal as justification for new sanctions — not just on Iran, but on Chinese aerospace firms and subsidiaries involved in the transaction. Already, companies like AVIC and CETC have been blacklisted under U.S. export controls; the Iran deal would only heighten scrutiny.
From a strategic standpoint, the U.S. must now reckon with the reality that Middle Eastern skies are becoming more diverse, less predictable, and more difficult to dominate through technology alone.
However, acquiring the J-10C is only the first step. Integrating and maintaining the jet is an entirely different challenge.
Unlike Iran’s current fleet of relatively low-tech analog fighters, the J-10C demands a high level of operational sophistication. Fly-by-wire controls, networked systems, and AESA radars are maintenance-intensive, requiring a steady flow of spare parts and technical expertise.
Here, Chinese contractors would become indispensable, likely establishing long-term advisory teams on Iranian soil. Training Iranian pilots, many of whom have never flown jets with digital cockpits or true BVR capabilities, would take years — involving flight simulator programs, instructor rotations, and possibly pilot exchange schemes.
This dependency could fundamentally alter Iran’s military doctrine, introducing Chinese tactics and philosophies rooted in “informatised warfare” and integrated network-centric operations.
At an estimated cost of $1 billion for two dozen fighters, the price tag would be steep for sanctions-strapped Iran. However, the broader Iran-China agreement provides mechanisms — including oil-for-equipment swaps and deferred payments — that could make the purchase feasible.
Some sources suggest that financing may be structured similarly to other Chinese arms deals, involving barter trade or credit lines linked to future energy shipments. With China remaining one of Iran’s top oil customers despite U.S. sanctions, the financial architecture is already in place.
A stronger IRIAF would have regional implications extending far beyond Persian skies. Iranian power projection — especially through the Quds Force, IRGC, and regional proxies — could now operate under more credible air cover. In Syria, a forward-deployed squadron of J-10Cs could deter Israeli overflights, elevating the risk of air-to-air skirmishes.
A confrontation between Iranian J-10Cs and Israeli F-35Is over the Golan Heights or central Syria would be unprecedented — and dangerous. Deconfliction channels, already strained between Russia, Israel, and Iran, would be tested to their limits.
For Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other Iranian allies, improved Iranian air cover might embolden more aggressive supply lines and operations. For Israel, the window to act preemptively against Iran’s strategic build-up could narrow significantly.
For Beijing, this sale could become a landmark in its emergence as a global arms exporter of high-end systems. While China has found markets in Africa and South Asia, it has yet to break into the high-stakes Middle East theatre with top-tier platforms. A successful Iranian deployment of the J-10C — and its possible operational impact — would provide a compelling advertisement for other interested parties, potentially even opening doors for future FC-31/J-35 or J-20 exports.
Whether Iran ultimately takes delivery of the J-10C or not, the conversation has already changed. The days of dismissing the IRIAF as a relic of the past may be over. With Chinese help, Iran could begin its evolution into a modern airpower player — not equal to its rivals, but dangerous enough to impose costs, risks, and hesitation.
