Just after midnight on May 7, 2025, the Pakistan Air Force’s central operations room in Rawalpindi lit up in crimson—a wall of red pulses that indicated dozens of Indian fighter jets had crossed into striking range. What unfolded over the next hour would become the most intense air battle in decades, reverberating far beyond the subcontinent and reshaping global perceptions of Chinese military hardware, Western air power, and modern aerial warfare itself.
The seeds of the confrontation were sown weeks earlier, when militants carried out a deadly attack in the Indian-administered region of Kashmir, killing 26 civilians. New Delhi, without hesitation, blamed Islamabad, citing intelligence intercepts and captured weapons allegedly bearing Pakistani origin. Islamabad issued vehement denials, but the message from Delhi was clear: retaliation was inevitable.
Indian military officials began preparing for punitive strikes. The target, they insisted, would be terror camps and infrastructure, but there were whispered fears that a broader escalation could follow. Pakistan, aware of India’s intent, entered a heightened state of alert.
In Rawalpindi, Pakistan’s Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu took up temporary residence near the central operations center, sleeping on a mattress just off the command room floor. He expected war—and he was right.
On May 7, at 12:14 AM, India launched a series of coordinated airstrikes across the Line of Control. Using satellite guidance and advanced jamming systems, Indian Air Force (IAF) jets aimed at what Delhi labeled as terrorist training centers in Balakot and elsewhere in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Among the aircraft deployed were India’s most prized assets: the French-made Rafale multirole fighters.
According to Indian defense sources, 70 aircraft participated in the operation—nearly double the size of the 2019 Balakot strikes. But unlike that earlier operation, this time, Pakistan did not limit itself to symbolic retaliation. It engaged immediately.
When the alarms triggered, Marshal Sidhu wasted no time. He ordered a scramble of Pakistan’s most advanced fighters—the Chinese-made Chengdu J-10C “Vigorous Dragon” jets. Equipped with AESA radar and armed with the PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile, the J-10Cs were primed for a fight.
Sidhu’s instruction was explicit: target the Rafales. He wanted to puncture India’s crown jewel and, in doing so, shake the foundations of its air superiority narrative. The Rafale, until that moment, had never been downed in combat.
Pakistan’s response wasn’t just aggressive—it was calculated. A senior PAF official, present in the operations room, told Reuters: “We ambushed them. They weren’t expecting to be fired upon at those distances.”
The result: one Rafale destroyed, confirmed by multiple independent sources, including France’s Air Chief and a top Dassault Aviation executive who later told French lawmakers India had indeed lost one of its Rafales. Two more Indian aircraft—a Sukhoi Su-30MKI and a MiG-29—were also lost.
What shocked Indian strategists wasn’t merely the loss of a Rafale—it was how it happened. Indian intelligence assessments had previously judged the PL-15 missile, China’s latest beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air weapon, to have an operational range of roughly 150 kilometers—the published range of its export variant.
But the missile that struck the Rafale was fired from nearly 200 kilometers away, Pakistani officials claim. Indian sources believe the strike came from even farther.
This discrepancy exposed a crucial flaw in Indian operational planning: underestimating the reach of adversary weapons. Rafale pilots reportedly believed they were flying outside the J-10C’s engagement envelope. They were wrong.
Justin Bronk of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) described it bluntly: “The Indians weren’t expecting to be shot at. The PL-15 is clearly very capable at long range.”
Pakistan’s ability to strike with such precision didn’t rest on firepower alone. It relied on something more modern: situational awareness.
According to four Pakistani and two Indian officials, Islamabad had successfully constructed a sophisticated “kill chain”—a seamless network linking air, land, and satellite-based surveillance to combat aircraft. At the heart of this effort was Data Link 17, a domestically developed integration platform that allowed Chinese, Swedish, and Pakistani systems to work as one.
A Swedish-made Erieye AEW&C aircraft flying at high altitude relayed targeting data to the J-10Cs without requiring them to turn on their own radars—keeping them stealthy and untraceable.
India, by contrast, had no such fully integrated system in place. With its air force drawing aircraft from multiple foreign sources—France, Russia, the U.S.—integration remained patchy at best. The result: Indian pilots were not operating with a complete picture of the battlespace.
As RUSI’s Greg Bagwell observed, “The winner here was the side that had the best situational awareness.”
Another aspect of the battle was invisible to the naked eye: electromagnetic warfare.
Pakistani officials claim they launched a full-spectrum electronic attack to degrade Indian radar and communications systems. Rafale pilots reportedly experienced intermittent disruptions, though Indian sources deny they were “blinded.”
Indian Sukhoi pilots, however, did face jamming, which limited their ability to detect threats or engage targets. In response, India has since begun upgrading its Su-30MKI fleet with newer electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) and avionics systems.
The extent of Pakistan’s jamming success remains debated. But the mere presence of an electronic threat was enough to reduce Indian confidence and effectiveness.
The May 7 air battle was only the beginning. Over the next three days, the skies over South Asia remained active and tense.
On May 8 and 9, India recalibrated its tactics, shifting to more aggressive air patrols and longer-range standoff strikes. The IAF also began deploying its BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles—domestically produced in collaboration with Russia—against Pakistani air bases, radar facilities, and logistics hubs.
According to officials from both sides, at least nine Pakistani air bases and radar sites were hit. On May 10, a major blow was delivered when an Indian missile struck and destroyed a surveillance aircraft inside a hangar in southern Pakistan.
That same day, after urgent talks mediated by Washington, a ceasefire was agreed to and hostilities halted.
The aerial skirmishes sent shockwaves through capitals far beyond Delhi and Islamabad.
Dassault Aviation’s stock fell after initial reports of the Rafale loss. Meanwhile, Indonesian officials, already in negotiations to purchase Rafales, began reassessing their procurement strategy. Jakarta is now reportedly considering the Chinese J-10C—a potential watershed moment for Beijing’s defense export ambitions.
India’s Deputy Army Chief Lt. Gen. Rahul Singh accused Pakistan of receiving “live intelligence” from China, including satellite feeds and radar tracking. Though no concrete evidence has been made public, the visit of Chinese Air Force Chief Lt. Gen. Wang Gang to Pakistan in July lent weight to the theory of close collaboration.
Wang reportedly discussed the Rafale takedown with Pakistani counterparts and expressed “keen interest” in Pakistan’s Multi-Domain Operation (MDO) architecture—confirming Beijing’s strategic involvement at some level.
In the aftermath, analysts have been quick to emphasize that this was not merely a contest of aircraft specifications.
The battle proved that modern air combat is no longer about who has the best jet—it’s about who can see first, shoot from farther, and operate within a seamlessly connected digital environment.
The J-10C, previously dismissed as a Chinese imitation of Western fighters, proved its mettle not just because of its avionics or weapons, but because it was part of a coherent, integrated system that worked.
India, meanwhile, is doubling down on its efforts to build an indigenous command-and-control infrastructure that can fuse data across its diverse air fleet. The Indian Air Force is also reevaluating its doctrines regarding range estimation, radar coverage, and rules of engagement under electronic interference.
