Indonesia’s Deployment KHAN Missile System Marks a Strategic Shift in Southeast Asia’s Military Landscape

Turkish-made KHAN tactical ballistic missile system

Indonesia has officially inducted the Turkish-made KHAN tactical ballistic missile system into operational service. With this move, Indonesia becomes the first nation in the region to deploy such a weapon—an achievement that propels Jakarta into the upper echelon of regional military powers and signals a significant evolution in its defense doctrine.

The milestone was revealed not through a formal government announcement, but via a series of photographs posted by local military enthusiasts on August 1, 2025. The images, shared on the Sahabat Keris Facebook page, depict the KHAN system—redesignated as the ITBM-600—mounted on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) at the Indonesian Army’s Raipur A facility, home to the 18th Field Artillery Battalion (Yonarmed 18/Buritkang Tenggarong) in East Kalimantan.

Though low in resolution, the photos confirm a new and sophisticated capability in Indonesia’s military inventory—less than three years after the November 2022 procurement deal was signed with Turkey’s Roketsan, the missile’s manufacturer.

Roketsan’s KHAN system is the export variant of Türkiye’s domestically used Bora missile, a battlefield-proven platform designed for precision long-range strikes within the limitations of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The missile is engineered to strike targets as far as 280 kilometers with an accuracy reportedly within 10 meters of its aim point.

“This is the first time the KHAN missile system, an export version of the combat-proven Bora ballistic missile system, will enter the inventory of a force other than the Turkish military,” noted Murat Kurtulus, Roketsan’s deputy general manager, during the original signing ceremony in 2022.

Measuring approximately 8 meters in length and 610 mm in diameter, each KHAN missile weighs around 2,500 kilograms and is launched from a mobile 8×8 Tatra wheeled platform. Designed to carry a 470-kilogram high-explosive or fragmentation warhead, the missile is capable of neutralizing a wide array of targets—including hardened bunkers, command-and-control nodes, radar arrays, and enemy logistics infrastructure.

KHAN’s lethality is enhanced by its dual-mode navigation system, which blends inertial navigation (INS) with GPS and GLONASS satellite corrections. This ensures high precision even in environments where jamming or electronic warfare threats may compromise external guidance signals.

In terms of maneuverability, KHAN is no ordinary straight-line ballistic missile. Equipped with aerodynamic flight control surfaces and an advanced electromechanical actuation system, the missile is capable of performing evasive maneuvers during its terminal phase—reducing interception risks and increasing the probability of kill (Pk).

Additionally, the missile system’s “shoot-and-scoot” design provides mobility and survivability, enabling rapid deployment and relocation to evade counter-battery fire. Its multi-mode fuze options—including proximity and point-detonation—further allow for operational versatility, whether the mission calls for anti-personnel effects, infrastructure demolition, or area denial.

Traditionally, Indonesia’s defense doctrine has focused on territorial sovereignty, coastal defense, and maritime surveillance—a reflection of its sprawling geography across more than 17,000 islands. Its previous arsenal consisted largely of short-range artillery and naval strike platforms, supplemented by air power.

KHAN’s induction marks a tectonic shift. With a 280-kilometer range, Indonesia can now conduct deep-strike missions against targets across the South China Sea, contested maritime routes, and even into border zones of neighboring countries in worst-case scenarios.

In effect, the system provides Indonesia with a form of second-strike capability—a credible deterrent that survives initial assaults and allows for retaliatory precision attacks. The presence of KHAN not only enhances national defense but also alters the calculus of asymmetric and hybrid threats facing Indonesia, particularly in a region rife with maritime disputes and strategic ambiguity.

The strategic implications of Indonesia’s move are profound. Southeast Asia has long been considered a ballistic missile-free zone, largely by choice. Even amid territorial disputes and rival military build-ups, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has maintained a collective preference for conventional, mostly defensive force postures.

That norm has now been broken.

KHAN’s deployment effectively opens the door to a new era—one in which regional actors may feel compelled to match or deter Indonesia’s growing capabilities. Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia, in particular, may now pursue their own missile modernization programs. The Philippines’ closer defense ties with the United States, Vietnam’s partnerships with South Korea, and Malaysia’s investment in long-range drone systems already hint at a region preparing for kinetic escalation.

If left unchecked, the region could see the beginning of a localized missile proliferation trend, with strategic doctrines shifting from defense and deterrence to preemption and denial.

Indonesia’s decision to procure KHAN from Türkiye underscores a larger strategy of maintaining strategic autonomy amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than anchoring itself within either bloc’s military-industrial ecosystem, Jakarta is cultivating diverse defense partnerships that support its independent modernization goals.

Alongside KHAN, Indonesia has expressed interest in the BrahMos cruise missile, co-developed by India and Russia, and Türkiye’s medium-range Çakır missile. These procurements align with Jakarta’s “Minimum Essential Force” (MEF) doctrine—aimed at building a modern, interoperable, and self-reliant military by 2029.

KHAN’s deployment is thus both a military and diplomatic statement. It signals Indonesia’s intent to be a self-determined security actor—not merely a geopolitical pawn in the Indo-Pacific contest, but a shaper of outcomes in its own right.

China, whose maritime claims and naval expansionism have brought it into increasing friction with Southeast Asian states, has not officially responded to Indonesia’s KHAN deployment. However, military analysts note that the development could force a strategic reassessment in Beijing, particularly around the resource-rich Natuna waters—a region Jakarta has repeatedly asserted as “non-negotiable.”

While direct confrontation between the two nations remains unlikely, KHAN’s presence adds a new layer of deterrence, complicating China’s risk calculus in areas where coercion has historically gone unchallenged.

Meanwhile, the United States and Australia—both key supporters of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” framework—may quietly welcome Indonesia’s enhanced strike capabilities. For Washington, Jakarta’s growing self-defense capacity aligns with broader goals of burden-sharing and regional balance without the need for overt alliance commitments.

Still, regional watchdogs and non-proliferation advocates are expected to raise alarms. The introduction of a tactical ballistic missile system in a region previously characterized by strategic restraint will likely generate debates about arms races, miscalculations, and crisis instability.

The KHAN missile is not a one-off acquisition. It marks the beginning of a potential long-term missile development trajectory for Indonesia. Roketsan has reportedly signed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with the Indonesian Ministry of Defence that include provisions for:

Local assembly and maintenance of KHAN systems;

  • Technology transfer and potential joint development of follow-on systems;
  • Integration of local components to boost Indonesia’s indigenous defense industry.

These agreements hint at a future in which Indonesia not only operates but also produces tactical missile systems—solidifying its status as a regional defense producer rather than a passive importer.

Jakarta is also investing in satellite-based ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) architectures to support real-time targeting and battlefield awareness. The KHAN system will likely be integrated into a broader C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) network, enabling precision-guided operations across land, sea, and air domains.

Drones, mobile radar arrays, electronic warfare systems, and battlefield management tools are all expected to form part of this growing digital warfighting ecosystem. KHAN, in this context, serves not merely as a missile but as the centerpiece of a more connected and lethal kill-chain.

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