- Dhaka’s pursuit of China’s J-10C “Vigorous Dragon” signals a turning point for its military aviation, reshaping South Asia’s air balance and deepening geopolitical fault lines.
Bangladesh is preparing for one of the most consequential military aviation shifts in its history as Dhaka signals clear intent to acquire China’s J-10C multirole fighter jet. If realized, the move would catapult the Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) into a new tier of capability while injecting fresh volatility into South Asia’s already tense aerial balance.
Interim Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus reportedly raised the prospect of a purchase directly with Chinese President Xi Jinping during his March 2025 visit to Beijing. Multiple diplomatic sources later confirmed to Dhaka-based media that talks had already begun before Yunus’s trip, highlighting the seriousness of the plan.
“At a meeting in Beijing, the chief adviser raised the government’s plan for the modernisation of the Bangladesh Air Force. He expressed interest in purchasing 12 J-10C fighter jets from China, to which the Chinese president responded positively,” said senior representatives close to policymaking circles.
Since then, negotiations have moved into more formal channels. Beijing is said to be receptive, while Dhaka views the J-10C as the natural centrepiece of its next-generation fighter fleet.
The BAF’s modernization roadmap, known as Forces Goal 2030, has long prioritized replacing its aging F-7 interceptors and a small contingent of MiG-29 Fulcrums. These aircraft, though maintained with care, are increasingly outclassed by India’s expanding fleet of Rafales, Su-30MKIs, and the indigenous Tejas Mk1A.
The J-10C represents a generational leap. Often described as China’s most mature 4.5-generation platform, the single-engine fighter combines advanced aerodynamics with indigenous sensors and weapons, bridging the gap between affordability and sophistication.
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Delta-canard design for high manoeuvrability.
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Diverterless supersonic intakes and reduced radar signature.
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Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, electro-optical sensors, and datalinks for networked combat.
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WS-10B/C engines producing thrust in the 135–144 kN class, ending reliance on Russian powerplants.
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11 hardpoints supporting up to 5.6 tonnes of ordnance.
The package places Bangladesh on the cusp of true network-centric warfare, an area in which it has lagged behind regional peers.
Perhaps most crucially, the J-10C integrates China’s next-generation air-to-air missiles.
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PL-10 short-range dogfight missile gives pilots high off-boresight targeting comparable to Western IRIS-T and AIM-9X systems.
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PL-15 and PL-15E long-range missiles extend engagement ranges to the 200 km class, placing Bangladesh in the same beyond-visual-range (BVR) league as India’s Rafales armed with Meteor missiles.
“The J-10C in Bangladeshi service would effectively neutralise the asymmetric edge India gained with its Rafale fleet, especially if paired with airborne early warning systems,” noted one regional defence analyst.
The ability to contest BVR battles is transformative. It grants Dhaka a deterrent capacity that stretches well beyond its borders and complicates India’s long-standing air superiority in the eastern sector.
The J-10C is not just a fighter for dogfights. Its mission profile extends to precision strikes and maritime operations:
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KD-88 standoff land-attack missiles enable deep-strike options.
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Anti-ship capabilities bolster Dhaka’s security across the Bay of Bengal.
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Electronic warfare pods improve survivability in contested environments.
For a country with rising offshore energy interests and an expanding maritime zone, these capabilities have strategic value. They support not only air defence but also a broader “air-sea denial” posture, deterring adversary operations in Bangladeshi waters.
Bangladesh’s path would closely mirror Pakistan’s, which inducted the J-10CE in 2022. Islamabad touted the aircraft as a counter to India’s Rafales and rapidly integrated them into a modern doctrine:
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AEW&C pairing: Saab 2000 Erieye and ZDK-03 aircraft provide long-range targeting data.
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Networked kill chain: Pakistani J-10CEs can act as shooters based on off-board cues, maximizing PL-15E effectiveness.
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Operational validation: Exercises in 2023–24 showcased coordinated BVR engagements.
The J-10CE’s baptism in combat during the 2025 Pakistan-India clashes further boosted its reputation, showing Chinese fighters could hold their own in high-intensity scenarios.
For Dhaka, adopting a similar path could mean interoperability with Pakistan and, by extension, a deeper alignment with China’s regional strategy.
The BAF currently fields around 81 combat aircraft.
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F-7BG/BGI interceptors (Chinese variants of the MiG-21).
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Eight MiG-29 Fulcrums.
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Training/light attack platforms such as FT-7s and K-8 Karakorums.
The transport arm has recently modernized with five C-130J Super Hercules from the UK, while helicopters range from Mi-17s to AW139s. Air defence relies on FM-90 surface-to-air missiles and a network of radars.
Yet the fleet’s backbone is dated. Without a modern fighter, Dhaka risks sliding further behind its neighbours. The J-10C would mark a shift from survival to deterrence, offering the BAF a credible presence in contested skies.
Bangladesh has been preparing the ground for such a leap. Strategic bases at Bangabandhu, Cox’s Bazar, and Sylhet now anchor air defence and maritime coverage. These facilities support both fighter operations and humanitarian missions, reflecting Bangladesh’s dual role as a security force and a global peacekeeping contributor.
The J-10C would fit neatly into this framework, enhancing both deterrence and rapid response across the Bay of Bengal.
Dhaka’s pursuit of the J-10C extends far beyond the technical. It is about signalling where Bangladesh positions itself amid great-power competition.
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For China: A sale validates Beijing’s defence exports and strengthens its South Asia footprint.
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For India: The move is seen as a direct challenge, undermining its air dominance and raising the spectre of a “Chinese axis” in the Bay of Bengal.
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For the US: It complicates Washington’s attempts to bring Bangladesh into Indo-Pacific security frameworks.
“Bangladesh’s acquisition of J-10Cs would not just be a military upgrade. It would be a geopolitical alignment—cementing Dhaka inside Beijing’s defence-industrial ecosystem,” one South Asia analyst observed.
India’s likely response will be twofold: accelerate Rafale deliveries and deepen partnerships with Western manufacturers. New Delhi could also intensify outreach to Dhaka, framing Chinese fighters as a dependency trap.
The United States may counterbalance with expanded maritime cooperation and disaster-response initiatives—areas where Dhaka values Western expertise.
Yet neither India nor Washington can ignore the symbolic power of Dhaka visibly tilting toward Beijing in such a high-profile procurement.
The Bay of Bengal is emerging as a crucial theatre in Indo-Pacific competition. China has invested in ports, infrastructure, and naval access points under the Belt and Road Initiative. India sees the waters as its natural backyard. The US frames the area as vital to global sea lane security.
By operating J-10Cs, Bangladesh enhances its ability to defend offshore resources, secure sea lanes, and integrate into Chinese-backed security networks. This creates a layered deterrent posture extending well beyond the nation’s borders.
Talks are still underway, and obstacles remain. Financing, training, and logistical support must all be resolved. Integrating such an advanced platform into a modestly resourced air force will demand both political will and sustained investment.
But the momentum is unmistakable. The J-10C is no longer just an option—it is the centerpiece of Dhaka’s emerging vision of airpower.
Bangladesh’s potential purchase of the J-10C is about far more than hardware. It represents a conscious decision to redefine deterrence, expand strategic reach, and align more closely with Beijing in a contested Indo-Pacific.
