India’s potential acquisition of Russia’s Su-57E fifth-generation fighter have reignited one of the most consequential debates within defence and strategic circles. At a time when the Indian Air Force (IAF) grapples with a chronic shortage of fighter squadrons and faces intensifying regional threats, the Russian aircraft is being evaluated not merely as a stopgap solution, but as a platform that could shape the IAF’s long-term doctrine.
Reports suggest that India is actively considering a direct purchase of two squadrons—36 to 40 aircraft—from Russia, with the possibility of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) assembling a handful more at its Nashik facility. This comes as the IAF waits on the delayed Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) tender and the longer-term development of India’s indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).
Yet, beyond procurement numbers and production logistics, a more fundamental question is being raised: what role does the Su-57E actually serve in India’s evolving force structure? Will it be positioned as a true stealth fighter, capable of surviving in contested airspace against advanced Chinese and Pakistani defences, or as a heavy strike platform—akin to the Su-30MKI—optimized for firepower and long-range attack missions, even at the expense of low observability?
The answer to this question could have profound implications for India’s airpower strategy well into the 2030s.
The Indian Air Force is officially sanctioned to operate 42 fighter squadrons. In practice, it fields barely 30, a deficit that leaves it stretched against a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. The rapid modernization of both adversaries has only heightened the urgency.
China now operates an estimated 200-plus J-20 stealth fighters—aircraft designed explicitly to outmatch U.S. and allied air assets in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing is also expanding its arsenal of advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, including the HQ-9B and Russian-origin S-400 batteries, which complicate any potential Indian offensive operations.
Pakistan, though not at China’s level, continues to modernize through a mix of Chinese fighters like the JF-17 Block III and new-generation sensors and missiles. With the prospect of a two-front war no longer hypothetical but a recurring war-game scenario, the IAF has been forced to rethink its doctrine, equipment, and procurement priorities.
This context explains why the Su-57E is suddenly back in serious contention.
India’s relationship with Russian aircraft is long-standing, but what makes the Su-57E proposition particularly compelling is the precedent set by the Su-30MKI.
Originally inducted as an air superiority fighter in the early 2000s, the Su-30MKI has undergone a remarkable transformation. Through iterative upgrades, integration of indigenous and foreign weapons, and doctrinal innovation, the IAF has turned the platform into a formidable multi-role workhorse.
Most notably, the Su-30MKI has become the IAF’s primary heavy strike asset. Its ability to carry the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile—a weapon weighing over 2.5 tons—has given India a standoff strike capability unmatched in the region. The fighter can now launch deep-penetration missions without crossing the border, delivering crippling blows to enemy infrastructure and air defences.
The Su-57E, with its 10-ton payload capacity and advanced weapons carriage options, offers the potential to take this doctrine further. Analysts believe the IAF may not be evaluating it as a Western-style stealth-first aircraft, but rather as a “mini-bomber” capable of carrying heavy payloads—including hypersonic missiles—at long ranges, while still enjoying moderate stealth advantages compared to current fourth-generation jets.
The Su-57, developed by Sukhoi, represents Russia’s first foray into fifth-generation combat aviation. The export variant, Su-57E, is positioned as a multi-role stealth fighter with capabilities spanning air superiority, strike, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.
-
Payload: Up to 10 tons of ordnance, carried internally or externally. This includes long-range air-to-air missiles such as the R-37M (400 km range) and air-launched ballistic/hypersonic weapons like the Kinzhal.
-
Maneuverability: Incorporating thrust-vectoring engines, the aircraft boasts supermaneuverability, a hallmark of Russian design philosophy.
-
Sensors: An advanced suite of AESA radar, infrared search and track (IRST), and electronic warfare systems designed to provide situational awareness in contested environments.
-
Stealth: Designed with reduced radar cross-section (RCS), radar-absorbent materials, and internal weapons bays.
Yet, the aircraft remains controversial.
The most persistent criticism of the Su-57E concerns its stealth performance. Independent estimates place its RCS between 0.1 and 0.5 square metres—an improvement over legacy fighters like the Su-30MKI (10-20 m²), but far higher than the American F-35 Lightning II (0.0015 m²).
For missions requiring internal carriage only, the Su-57E enjoys a reduced signature. However, once external pods, heavy ordnance, or large missiles are mounted, the RCS increases substantially, eroding stealth advantages and leaving the aircraft closer to modern 4.5-generation fighters such as the Rafale.
India’s past reservations stem directly from this issue. In 2018, New Delhi withdrew from the joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program, citing dissatisfaction with the Su-57’s stealth profile, immature engines, and development delays.
The IAF’s interest in employing the Su-57E for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) adds another layer of complexity. SEAD missions are inherently dangerous, requiring aircraft to penetrate heavily defended zones, neutralize radar and missile sites, and survive long enough to complete follow-up strikes.
While the Su-57E’s sensors and agility may provide some survivability, critics argue that without near-F-35-level stealth, the aircraft may face unacceptable risks against cutting-edge systems like China’s S-400 or HQ-22.
Why, then, is India considering the Su-57E again? Analysts point to several converging factors:
-
Squadron Shortfall: With the MRFA tender delayed and AMCA unlikely to enter service before the early 2030s, the IAF needs a near-term solution to plug gaps.
-
Heavy Strike Doctrine: Building on the Su-30MKI experience, the Su-57E could act as a next-generation strike aircraft rather than a true stealth penetrator, delivering long-range, high-payload attacks.
-
China’s Lead in Stealth: With the J-20 fleet expanding rapidly, India needs at least some fifth-generation aircraft to keep pace, even if not at parity.
-
Industrial Synergy: HAL’s Nashik facility, already familiar with Russian aircraft, could assemble a small number, ensuring local expertise and partial technology transfer.
In essence, the Su-57E is being viewed less as a silver bullet and more as an interim capability enhancer—buying time until the AMCA matures.
The prospect of Su-57E induction has split India’s defence community.
Supporters Argue:
-
Flexibility: Even with moderate stealth, the Su-57E offers a unique combination of payload, speed, and range unmatched by alternatives.
-
Deterrence: Its ability to launch hypersonic or long-range missiles could dissuade adversaries from aggressive posturing.
-
Cost-Effectiveness: Russian platforms generally come at a lower price point compared to Western equivalents like the F-35 or Eurofighter.
-
Doctrine Alignment: The IAF has already proven adept at repurposing platforms like the Su-30MKI for strike roles; the Su-57E could continue this trajectory.
Critics Warn:
-
Stealth Deficit: Without world-class stealth, the Su-57E risks being a compromised fifth-generation platform.
-
Operational Risks: In SEAD missions, survivability remains questionable against Chinese and Pakistani defences.
-
Past Lessons: The FGFA withdrawal highlighted serious deficiencies in the platform—issues that may not have been fully resolved.
-
Opportunity Cost: Funds spent on Su-57E could divert resources from indigenous projects like AMCA or delay MRFA acquisitions.
At the heart of this debate lies a deeper question: what does India truly need from its next-generation fighter?
If the priority is survivability in contested airspace—particularly against Chinese integrated air defence networks—then a platform with stealth on par with Western designs is essential. If, however, the immediate need is for a heavy, long-range strike platform capable of delivering strategic payloads, the Su-57E may offer a pragmatic, if imperfect, solution.
India’s defence planners must also weigh long-term industrial and strategic considerations. Investing heavily in the Su-57E could undermine political and financial support for AMCA, India’s homegrown stealth fighter program. On the other hand, rejecting the Su-57E entirely leaves the IAF with a glaring capability gap for the next decade.
India’s renewed interest in the Su-57E reflects the strategic compulsions of an air force under pressure. With squadron numbers dwindling and adversaries fielding increasingly sophisticated aircraft and defences, the IAF is being forced into hard choices.
The Su-57E is unlikely to emerge as a stealth peer to the F-35 or even the J-20. Its RCS, design philosophy, and reliance on external payloads constrain its role as a pure fifth-generation platform. But as a heavy strike fighter—a “mini-bomber” with stealth advantages over legacy aircraft—it could provide India with a valuable interim capability, especially for long-range SEAD and standoff strike missions.
Ultimately, whether India proceeds with the acquisition will depend on a careful balancing of short-term needs and long-term vision. The decision is not merely about buying aircraft—it is about defining the future shape of Indian airpower in an increasingly contested region.
