An unexpected twist in the Middle East’s defense landscape is unfolding as reports surface that Turkey may follow India’s lead in seeking second-hand combat aircraft from the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) — a move that could reshape the region’s aerial balance and expose the growing urgency in Ankara’s airpower modernization plans.
According to a Middle East Eye report dated October 7, Turkey is in advanced discussions with Qatar for the possible acquisition of used Eurofighter Typhoon jets, signaling a pragmatic short-term solution to fill the Turkish Air Force’s growing capability gap. The report cites informed sources who suggest that the negotiations are “underway” and that a deal may be “imminent,” although neither Ankara nor Doha has issued an official confirmation.
The Asia Live could not independently verify these claims. Both the Turkish Ministry of Defense and the Qatari Defense Ministry have remained silent on the matter, as speculation continues to swirl around the nature and urgency of Ankara’s interest.
For Turkey, the potential acquisition of second-hand Eurofighter Typhoons represents both a stopgap measure and a symbolic breakthrough.
The Turkish Air Force has long grappled with the consequences of its expulsion from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in 2019 — a direct fallout of Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. The loss of access to fifth-generation fighter technology left Turkey’s air modernization plans in limbo, forcing it to rely on an aging fleet of F-16C/Ds, many of which are nearing the end of their service life.
While the indigenous KAAN stealth fighter (formerly TF-X) is progressing under Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), it is still in the prototype testing phase and unlikely to become operational before the early 2030s. In the meantime, Turkey faces a strategic vacuum — one made more acute by Greece’s acquisition of French Rafales and American F-35s, which tilt the Aegean airpower balance sharply against Ankara.
The Eurofighter Typhoon, though not stealthy, offers a formidable alternative. With high agility, advanced avionics, and multirole capabilities, it’s seen as one of the most capable fourth-generation-plus fighters in service. For Turkey, acquiring even a limited number of Tranche 3A Typhoons could bridge the capability gap until the KAAN becomes combat-ready.
“Given the time-sensitive nature of Turkey’s airpower deficit, second-hand Typhoons from Qatar could serve as an interim solution,” said a senior defense analyst familiar with Turkish procurement programs. “It wouldn’t be ideal, but it’s a realistic move that balances time, cost, and political feasibility.”
The Qatar–Turkey defense partnership is not new. Over the past decade, Doha and Ankara have cultivated a robust military and political alliance built on shared interests, regional alignment, and economic interdependence.
Since 2015, Turkey has maintained a military base in Tarqiya, Qatar, hosting up to 3,000 Turkish troops. This deployment is a direct symbol of mutual trust — particularly during Qatar’s 2017 diplomatic blockade by its Gulf neighbors, when Turkey stood as one of Doha’s few steadfast allies.
Beyond troop presence, both countries have intensified cooperation in defense manufacturing, with Qatar purchasing Turkish drones, armored vehicles, and small arms, while also investing in Turkish defense firms. The two nations share a strategic worldview, often aligning their foreign policies across regional crises — from Libya and Somalia to support for certain factions in Syria.
That shared vision may now extend into combat aviation.
In early October 2025, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler and Air Force Commander General Ziya Cemal Kadıoğlu visited Doha. Officially, the visit was to “deepen defense collaboration.” However, multiple regional outlets suggested the trip was primarily aimed at negotiating a deal for 10–15 Tranche 3A Eurofighter Typhoons currently in QEAF service. The potential seller? Qatar’s Air Force, which operates one of the most diversified and modern fighter fleets in the Gulf.
Qatar’s approach to airpower diversification has been unusually ambitious for a small nation. In less than a decade, it has amassed an enviable mix of Western multirole fighters, each sourced from a different supplier bloc — the UK, France, and the US.
- 24 Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3A aircraft (in service),
- 12 additional Tranche 4 Typhoons on order,
- 36 F-15QA “Ababil” jets, a Qatari-specific variant of the F-15EX Eagle II, and
- 36 Dassault Rafales from France.
This tri-supplier strategy ensures logistical resilience and political flexibility — no single power holds total leverage over Qatar’s air defense capability.
However, such diversity comes at a cost. Maintaining three advanced fighter lines places heavy logistical and training demands on a relatively small air force. According to defense analysts, this may have motivated Qatar to streamline parts of its older fleet, particularly if newer Tranche 4 Typhoons and F-15QAs are now taking on a larger operational role.
Selling some of the Tranche 3A Typhoons to a trusted partner like Turkey would not only bring in financial returns but also strengthen bilateral ties and contribute to regional deterrence stability in line with Doha’s broader diplomatic strategy.
Despite apparent mutual interest, any transfer of Eurofighter jets is far from straightforward. The Eurofighter Typhoon program is jointly owned by Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain through a multinational consortium, meaning that any resale — even of used jets — requires unanimous approval.
Turkey’s path to acquiring new Typhoons has already been long and politically fraught. Germany, in particular, had blocked Ankara’s attempts for years due to concerns over human rights and regional military operations in Syria and Libya.
That blockade was only lifted in July 2025, following months of lobbying and a breakthrough in Turkey’s rapprochement with European capitals. Subsequently, Ankara and London signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to pave the way for future Typhoon procurement.
Yet, analysts caution that even with Germany’s approval restored, negotiations over pricing and configuration could take years, and the delivery timeline may stretch into the 2030s. This makes Qatar’s second-hand Typhoons a uniquely appealing short-term solution for Ankara — assuming the consortium signs off on the resale.
“Technically, the sale is possible,” said a European defense industry expert based in Berlin. “But politically, it depends on the same consortium members who only recently allowed Turkey to resume discussions. If the aircraft are to be transferred via Qatar, that still triggers the export-control mechanisms.”
Adding a surprising layer to Qatar’s evolving defense footprint, the United States recently announced that Doha will be allowed to build an air force facility at Mountain Home Air Base in Idaho. The base will host a contingent of Qatari F-15s and pilots, serving as a long-term hub for joint training and operations.
The announcement, made by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth alongside Qatari Defense Minister Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, emphasized the strength of the bilateral military relationship.
“The location will host a contingent of Qatari F-15s and pilots to enhance our combined training and increase lethality and interoperability,” Hegseth said.
“It’s just another example of our partnership. And I hope you know, Your Excellency, that you can count on us.”
This development came shortly after President Trump’s executive order pledging to defend Qatar, following Israeli airstrikes in Doha that targeted Hamas figures. The U.S. move underscores Washington’s confidence in Doha as both a security partner and a regional mediator, particularly in the wake of Qatar’s key role in brokered ceasefire and hostage-exchange deals between Israel and Hamas.
This deepening U.S.–Qatar partnership may also indirectly complicate Turkey’s potential acquisition, as Washington maintains a strong voice within the Eurofighter export framework through its transatlantic allies.
Turkey would not be the first country to explore second-hand jet acquisitions from Qatar. In June 2024, India initiated discussions to acquire 12 used Mirage 2000-5s — nine single-seat and three twin-seat variants — from the QEAF.
Originally delivered to Qatar in the mid-1990s, these aircraft saw limited use, leaving them with substantial airframe life. The deal, estimated at around ₹5000 crore (US$600 million), was attractive to the Indian Air Force (IAF) as the jets shared engines and avionics compatible with India’s upgraded Mirage 2000I/TI fleet.
Indian defense officials confirmed that Qatari representatives made a detailed presentation on the aircraft’s condition, describing them as being in “very good shape” with “a lot of life left.” For the IAF, which has long relied on the Mirage platform for precision strikes — including the 2019 Balakot operation — the acquisition offered an affordable way to extend the fleet’s operational relevance until Rafales and Tejas Mk1A units fully replace older fighters.
However, the absence of updates in recent months suggests that the IAF–Qatar Mirage deal may have stalled, possibly due to shifting procurement priorities or pricing disagreements. If that deal quietly fades away, Turkey could effectively succeed where India paused, acquiring Qatar’s surplus jets for a more pressing operational need.
For Ankara, timing is critical. The Hellenic Air Force’s rapid modernization, bolstered by Rafales, F-35s, and upgraded F-16Vs, has left Turkey increasingly vulnerable in a potential confrontation over the Aegean or Eastern Mediterranean.
The Turkish Air Force currently fields around 240 F-16s, but many are Block 30/40 variants in need of deep modernization. Efforts to secure new F-16 Block 70s and upgrade kits from the U.S. have been delayed by Congress, largely due to political friction over NATO issues and human rights concerns.
Meanwhile, Greece’s airpower renaissance is changing the operational equation. The Rafale, with its Meteor long-range air-to-air missiles, and the F-35’s stealth capabilities, create a two-tiered superiority threat that Turkey’s current fleet cannot easily counter.
This dynamic may explain the urgency behind Ankara’s Typhoon pursuit — whether from new orders or from Qatar’s used inventory.
A small squadron of second-hand Typhoons could immediately bolster Turkey’s deterrence, signaling to NATO allies and rivals alike that Ankara is intent on restoring its aerial edge — even if through unconventional routes.
The reported Turkey-Qatar negotiations also highlight the growing trend of “intra-allied defense recycling” — the transfer of high-value military assets between friendly states seeking mutual advantage without triggering the lengthy red tape of original manufacturer sales.
For Qatar, such transactions offer soft power leverage and strategic reciprocity. Its decision to part with the Mirages for India, or possibly the Typhoons for Turkey, is less about profit and more about building durable security partnerships with major regional powers.
“Qatar uses arms diplomacy to amplify its geopolitical voice,” notes a Gulf-based defense strategist. “By transferring capable but surplus aircraft to key allies, it buys influence, trust, and future cooperation — all while optimizing its own force structure.”
Turkey, in turn, benefits from a politically neutral acquisition path, avoiding potential direct procurement roadblocks from European suppliers. A second-hand sale framed as a bilateral government-to-government transaction with Doha may bypass the harsher scrutiny applied to direct arms exports.
Despite the mounting speculation, no formal announcement has been made. Turkish defense insiders have emphasized that no agreement has been finalized, and details will only be shared “once the contract stage is reached.”
Still, the convergence of recent events — Germany lifting its veto, the Turkish defense delegation’s visit to Doha, and Qatar’s increasing military cooperation with both the U.S. and Turkey — suggests that something significant is indeed in motion.
- A lifeline for the Turkish Air Force, bridging the gap until KAAN or new F-16s arrive.
- A political signal of deepening Turkey-Qatar defense unity.
- A precedent-setting transaction in the evolving practice of second-hand fighter diplomacy.
Whether the reports prove accurate or not, the notion of Qatar as a secondary supplier of advanced combat jets underscores a shifting pattern in global arms dynamics. Smaller but wealthy states like Qatar — once mere buyers — are now turning into brokers of strategic assets, redistributing cutting-edge platforms to allies facing political or logistical barriers to acquisition.
For Turkey, the urgency is existential. Airpower defines not just deterrence, but prestige and sovereignty. If Ankara does succeed in acquiring Qatar’s Typhoons, it will mark a clever workaround to years of geopolitical constraints and a reaffirmation of its determination to stay militarily competitive in a turbulent region.
In contrast, for Qatar, offloading surplus jets while expanding its U.S. training presence signals confidence and maturity — the transition from client to collaborator in the global defense order.
