In recent months, the discussion around Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan has surged beyond military logistics into the heart of international strategic debate. The former American hub for operations in Central and South Asia is now in the spotlight again as the U.S. seeks to reassert control over it — a move that has rattled regional actors including China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and Afghanistan itself.
U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly pushed the idea that the United States should “get back” Bagram Air Base, citing its huge runway, its strategic location, and especially its proximity to China’s nuclear facilities. He claims that from Bagram, China’s nuclear weapons sites are reachable in about an hour.
This has triggered a wave of pushback: from the Taliban rejecting any foreign military presence, to a multilateral diplomatic rebuke through the so-called “Moscow Format,” where India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and several Central Asian states joined a statement opposing foreign military infrastructure in Afghanistan or neighboring states.
One of the central pillars of the U.S. argument is Bagram’s proximity to western China — especially to regions like Xinjiang, where China has been reported to have nuclear and missile-related infrastructure. Trump and others allege that from Bagram, key Chinese nuclear facilities can be reached in about an hour by modern military aircraft.
Experts are skeptical about several parts of this claim:
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Distance and flight paths: While geo-distance suggests relative closeness (western China being several hundred kilometers away), actual flight time depends on aircraft type, airspace access, refueling, and other overflight permissions. The “about an hour” narrative simplifies many operational constraints.
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Base condition and control: Since the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, the Taliban controls Bagram. The state of the airbase’s infrastructure, readiness, and ability to host foreign forces is not at the same level as when the U.S./NATO held it. Reviving it would require investment, security guarantees, and political arrangements.
U.S. Interest
While the proximity to China’s nuclear facilities is the most public justification, defense analysts identify several overlapping motives:
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Surveillance & intelligence capabilities: Bagram’s location offers a vantage point for monitoring not just China, but also Iran, Central Asia, Pakistan, and possible terrorist activity in northern Afghanistan. Having a base there amplifies signals, imagery, and other ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capacity in the region.
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Counterterrorism & regional stability: The resurgence of ISIS-K, fissures within the Taliban regime, and the continuing threat of extremist spillover across Afghanistan’s borders — especially into Central Asia and Pakistan — make a nearby base useful for fast reaction, humanitarian operations, or support missions.
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Geopolitical competition with China & Russia: As China expands its influence in Afghanistan via infrastructure, mining, and trade under the Belt & Road Initiative, and as Russia seeks to assert influence in Central Asia, the U.S. sees value in having strategic footholds. Bagram, due to its capacities, runway length, and location, is seen as one such foothold.
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Symbolism and deterrence: The U.S. presence at Bagram would be a strong signal — both to regional adversaries and allies — of U.S. capacity and intent to project power, to monitor rivals, and to remain involved in South Asian security dynamics.
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Logistical and operational reach: Large runways, existing but degraded infrastructure, proximity to mountainous, hard-to-access regions make Bagram attractive for operations that require airlift, rapid deployment, and heavy aircraft. However, using it as such would require restoring and securing the base.
Bringing back Bagram under U.S. control is not simply a matter of political will; there are serious risks and obstacles:
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Security risk and force requirement: Experts point out that to retake, secure, and maintain Bagram, a large force would be needed, plus air defense, logistics, perimeter security. It is a large facility, and its surroundings are vulnerable to attacks — rocket fire, insurgent raids, etc.
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Diplomatic pushback: Many countries in the region oppose foreign military presence in Afghanistan; doing so risks destabilizing relationships or provoking unwanted reactions. The Moscow Format statement is a clear example of collective regional opposition. India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and Central Asian states have all signaled that another foreign military base in Afghanistan is unacceptable in terms of regional stability.
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Taliban stance: The current Afghan government under the Taliban has been firm in rejecting any possibility of foreign military bases. Handing over Bagram (or allowing a foreign base) would be a major concession, which has clear implications for their legitimacy, sovereignty claims, and internal politics.
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Logistics, cost, and sustainability: Restoring, supplying, defending Bagram — given its landlocked location, weak infrastructure in many areas, and the security environment — would be an expensive, difficult undertaking. A U.S. base there would need continuous resupply, reinforcement, and protection. The question is: are the benefits worth the investment and risks?
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Strategic ambiguity by opponents: Claims about China’s nuclear weapons location and “one hour reach” are being questioned. Analysts say there’s ambiguity, possibly exaggeration, around what counts as “China’s nuclear weapons facilities,” which ones are reachable, how detection would work, airspace over flight rights, etc. That weakens the case for urgency.
India
India has taken a relatively cautious but firm diplomatic line. At the Moscow Format Consultations, India joined other regional powers in opposing attempts by any country to establish military infrastructure in Afghanistan or its neighbors. The emphasis in India’s messaging is on respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty and avoiding destabilizing foreign military interventions.
India’s concerns are manifold:
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Risk of increased militant or extremist activity near its borders if foreign military bases become targets or provoke insurgent responses.
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Losing influence in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development if foreign strategic players dominate the military and security agenda.
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China’s potential proximity and influence are already major concerns; a U.S. base might represent one check, but also could escalate tensions in ways that India would have to manage carefully.
China
China appears to be worried about U.S. resurgence so close to its western periphery. Beijing has denied claims that it has overtaken or plans to take over Bagram. However, analysts suggest China is sensitive to the strategic implications of U.S. presence near Xinjiang and its nuclear/missile infrastructure.
China’s engagement with the Taliban (economic, infrastructural), its investments in regional connectivity under the Belt & Road Initiative, and its trade/mineral deals with Afghanistan are parts of its strategy to assert influence without overt military deployment that could drag it into diplomatic conflict.
Russia, Pakistan, Central Asian States
These nations are also wary. For Russia and many Central Asian republics, stability in Afghanistan is essential to avoid spillover – from refugees to terrorism – and to maintain their security buffer. They are cautious of any moves that could re-militarize or reintroduce foreign powers into Afghanistan, which might upset the balance of power in the region. Pakistan has its own interests: access, influence in Afghanistan, countering Indian influence, and managing its tricky relationship with both the U.S. and China.
Afghanistan / Taliban
The Taliban government has firmly rejected handing over Bagram or permitting foreign forces to deploy there. Sovereignty is central to their legitimacy and political narrative. Any foreign military presence is politically sensitive for them, internally and with their supporters.
What Experts Think: The Reality vs. the Rhetoric
Interviews, analyses, and assessment by regional and international defense experts point to several conclusions:
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The U.S. interest in Bagram is not new; many of the logistical, surveillance, intelligence-gathering advantages are real. But the political, financial, and security costs may be higher than what is being publicly acknowledged.
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The “one hour” claim, while attention-grabbing, is likely over-simplified. It works well as a rhetorical device, but operational realities (airspace permissions, refueling, readiness, etc.) complicate the picture.
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Political opposition both inside and outside Afghanistan makes the idea of U.S. reoccupation or even partial control uncertain. Taliban resistance, combined with resistance from regional powers, suggests that any attempt will need strong diplomatic groundwork, possibly new treaties or agreements.
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If the U.S. push is realized, it could lead to heightened tensions: Chinese countermeasures, increased militarization near borders, reactions by Pakistan and India, and possibly an arms or base competition in Central Asia and South Asia.
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There is also the risk of unintended consequences: insurgent backlash, domestic Afghan opposition, crises if base functions are attacked, and complications if the base is used in a way that is perceived as threatening by neighbors.
What Could Happen Next: Scenarios
To understand what might happen in the months and years ahead, here are several possible scenarios and their implications:
| Scenario | What Happens | Implications |
|---|---|---|
| Full U.S. control over Bagram | The U.S. reestablishes a military presence, repairs infrastructure, and begins operations (surveillance, possibly staging). | Strong U.S. visibility in the region, clear signal to China and Russia. But high costs, potential diplomatic isolation, security risks, and possible retaliation or escalation. |
| Partial agreement | Some sort of partnership: U.S. uses parts of the base under Afghan permission; joint operations or leased facilities. | Less risky, more politically viable. Gives Afghanistan some control, but still allows U.S. strategic reach. Could alleviate some regional concerns. |
| Taliban refusal continues; U.S. blocks unplugged | No U.S. presence; base remains under Afghan hands; perhaps over time leased usage for civilian or dual use. | U.S. must rely more on other bases (in Pakistan, Central Asia, via allies). China’s influence likely increases. The balance might shift more in favor of regional powers who oppose U.S. basing. |
| Diplomatic compromise/regional framework | U.S., China, Russia, and regional actors agree to a format where Bagram is used for humanitarian, counterterrorism, or surveillance under multilateral oversight. | This might reduce the antagonism, provide some U.S. access without overt military occupation, but it might also limit what U.S. can do operationally. |
Assessing the U.S. Claims vs. Evidence
Let’s test the main claims often made in favor of U.S. control of Bagram:
| Claim | Supporting Evidence | Gaps / Counterpoints |
|---|---|---|
| China’s nuclear weapons are “one hour away” from Bagram | Western China is relatively nearer than many U.S. bases; runways at Bagram can handle large aircraft. Public statements by Trump. | Lack of credible confirmation of which specific nuclear sites; flight path constraints; overflying nations; aircraft speed vs readiness; extent to which Bagram is operational and secure enough to host such capabilities. |
| Surveillance reach over Central Asia, Pakistan, Iran | The geography supports this; historical U.S. ISR operations have used Afghanistan bases. | Taliban controls airspace and base; security risks; need for overflight permissions; diplomatic pushback from countries whose territory is being flown over. |
| Counterterrorism tool | Renewed activity of ISIS-K; instability in northern Afghanistan; past U.S. operations used Bagram. | Taliban control complicates U.S. ability to conduct operations without cooperation; risk of backlash; whether U.S. would want to be directly exposed militarily inside Afghanistan again. |
The Strategic Stakes for China
China perceives U.S. efforts around Bagram as part of a broader return to “encirclement” or surveillance risk. Key concerns include:
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Xinjiang and nuclear/missile facilities: Any military base near these regions could allow the U.S. to observe or monitor China’s nuclear posture more closely; this is something Beijing has historically guarded fiercely.
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Belt & Road Initiative (BRI): China has invested heavily in infrastructure in Afghanistan and the region. A U.S. base nearby could complicate or counterbalance China’s influence.
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Diplomatic balance with the Taliban: China has sought to maintain working relations with Afghan authorities under Taliban control. It wants to avoid overt confrontation, but U.S. moves could force it to respond more explicitly.
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Regional security narrative: Chinese military modernization has been accompanied by pushback when U.S. or other states seek access near its western front. The symbolism of Bagram matters as much as any actual military utility.
India faces a complex calculus:
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It shares concerns about China’s rising military and nuclear capabilities, and arguably has some reason to welcome U.S. checks on Chinese power.
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But it is also wary of foreign military bases in its vicinity (or nearby countries) because of potential blowback: militant infiltration, destabilization, or diplomatic pressure.
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India’s foreign policy has emphasized sovereignty, non-intervention, and regional stability. It sees foreign bases in Afghanistan as potentially destabilizing unless carefully regulated.
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India also has extensive development, diplomatic, and economic interests in Afghanistan (mining, infrastructure, humanitarian aid). Any militarization or foreign occupation risks undermining these interests or complicating India’s leverage.
Although much of the discussion is external, the decisions are deeply internal for Afghanistan:
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The Taliban’s legitimacy rests heavily on sovereignty. Allowing a foreign military presence would be a major compromise, yielding political cost.
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There are internal divisions within the Taliban over how much cooperation with foreign powers is acceptable. Some factions may favor more pragmatism if it brings aid, infrastructure, recognition; others are more ideologically opposed to foreign military presence.
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Security on the ground is fragile: ISIS-K, local warlords, border tribes, and other groups remain active. Holding and protecting any facility is nontrivial.
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Afghanistan is economically weak; foreign aid, investment (like in mining, infrastructure) are critical. The Taliban might use Bagram as a bargaining chip in negotiations for financial support, diplomatic recognition, or relief.
What the U.S. Could Gain — And What It Risks Losing
Potential Gains:
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Enhanced surveillance and intelligence reach into China’s western regions.
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Increased capacity for fast reaction in South and Central Asia.
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Symbolic reassertion of U.S. involvement in Asia and counterbalance to China / Russia.
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Improved ability to coordinate counterterrorism operations with regional partners.
Potential Losses or Costs:
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Enormous financial, logistical, and political capital needed to re-establish, secure, and maintain the base.
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Risk of diplomatic fallout with regional powers, possible alliances consolidating against U.S. presence.
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Security risk: vulnerability to attacks, terrorism, insurgency from surrounding territory.
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Domestic political cost if operations involve U.S. forces suffering casualties without clear objectives.
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Damage to U.S. reputation if promises made in rhetoric (e.g. one-hour proximity) are shown to be exaggerated.
The Moscow Format Consultations in October 2025 show a rare alignment among countries that are often in competition (India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and Central Asian states). The joint statement criticized attempts to deploy foreign military infrastructure on Afghan soil as detrimental to peace and stability.
This points to a collective regional concern: that Bagram, being large, capable, and symbolically significant, represents not just a strategic military asset but also a geopolitical lever. Many countries in the region worry that if one outside power regains control over Bagram, it could recalibrate the power balance in unpredictable ways.
On balance, Bagram Air Base has emerged as one of the pivotal symbols of modern great-power competition in South Asia. For the U.S., it’s a chance to sharpen its strategic posture; for China, a signal to guard peripheries; for India, a subject of careful hedging; for Afghanistan, a test of its sovereignty and negotiation capacity; for regional nations, a question of whether it will become a source of tension or cooperation.
But the evidence so far suggests that while U.S. interest is real, operationalizing control over Bagram under current conditions is unlikely without a major diplomatic, military, and financial commitment. The rhetoric is strong; the path to execution is steep.
