- Historic rivalries, doctrinal rifts, and political pragmatism shape an uncertain pre-election landscape
Bangladesh is heading toward its 13th parliamentary election, expected in February 2026, amid growing speculation over whether the country’s Islamist parties can finally overcome decades of doctrinal and strategic division to forge a united front. The question has gained urgency since Sheikh Hasina’s dramatic flight from the country in August 2024, following months of anti-government protests and an eventual popular uprising that toppled her 15-year rule.
In the power vacuum that followed, Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus, who heads the interim administration, pledged during an interview on 29 September 2025 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly that elections will take place in early February 2026. But as the election timetable firms up, Bangladesh’s Islamist parties — long fragmented by theological rifts and strategic mistrust — remain unsure whether to enter the polls under a unified banner or to contest separately, as they have in nearly every election since independence.
The challenges before Bangladesh’s Islamist forces are not new. The country’s post-1971 political history is littered with failed attempts at Islamist unity, usually derailed by ideological purism, leadership rivalries, and shifting tactical priorities.
In 1976, the first significant effort came when the Democratic Party, Nezame Islam Party, Khilafat-e-Rabbani Party, and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) formed the Islamic Democratic League (IDL) — a loose coalition that crumbled by 1979. Later, Qawmi madrasa-based clerics, representing traditional religious schools outside the state curriculum, regrouped under Hafezzi Huzur’s Ulama Front in 1981. Yet this too disintegrated after his death in 1987, due partly to disagreements over the theological doctrines of Abul A‘la Maududi, Jamaat’s founding ideologue.
A third attempt emerged in December 1990 with the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) — a six-party alliance ahead of the 1991 election — which again failed to endure. These episodes reveal a recurring pattern: short-lived tactical cooperation that collapses under the weight of doctrinal suspicion.
Today, Bangladesh’s Islamist spectrum remains split between two broad tendencies. The ‘reformists’, led by BJI, seek to operate as a mainstream political force. Despite its Islamist origins, Jamaat has tried to broaden its image, participating in elections, addressing social issues, and even attempting gestures of religious pluralism. In October 2024, BJI’s ameer extended greetings to the Hindu community during Durga Puja — a symbolic move that drew fierce criticism from conservative quarters.
Opposite them stand the ‘reactionists’, spearheaded by Islami Andolan Bangladesh (IAB), who view the current political order as jahili — a term denoting ignorance and moral decay. IAB’s stated aim is to “transform the existing jahili social order and establish Islamic ideals to build Bangladesh into a welfare state modeled after the Khilafat-e-Rashida.”
The Qawmi clerical establishment, including groups like Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh (HIB) and Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, often sides with the reactionist bloc, maintaining theological reservations about BJI’s Maududist ideology. As HIB’s ameer, Shah Muhibbullah Babunagari, warned during a September 2025 gathering: “If Jamaat comes to power, the existence of Qawmi, Deobandi and Sunniyat madrasas will not remain.”
Such statements underscore a deep-rooted suspicion: that Jamaat’s doctrinal positions dilute traditional Sunni orthodoxy and threaten Qawmi authority.
Following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Bangladesh’s Islamist parties sense an opportunity to expand their political footprint in a more open landscape. In January 2025, hopes for coordination briefly brightened when the ameers of BJI and IAB met in Barishal and pledged to cooperate before the polls — their first such gesture in years.
But the fragile rapprochement soon faltered. In July 2025, IAB’s ameer met with other Islamist factions — including Nezame Islam Party, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, and Khelafat Majlis — to establish a four-party liaison committee that notably excluded Jamaat. For BJI, this was an unmistakable signal that theological distrust still trumped electoral pragmatism.
Even so, the parties have not abandoned all forms of cooperation. On 18 September 2025, six Islamist parties — BJI, IAB, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, Khelafat Majlis, Khelafat Andolan, and Nezame Islam Party — staged simultaneous rallies across Dhaka. Their shared demands included elections under the July National Charter, proportional representation in parliament, fair electoral administration, and the prosecution of corruption and abuses by the former ruling alliance.
These rallies marked a rare instance of coordinated action — what analysts call “demand-based cooperation” — without the institutional baggage of a formal alliance. Such coordination, even if temporary, reflects a shared calculation: that visible unity around issues of governance and accountability could boost public appeal ahead of the 2026 polls.
According to insiders within the Qawmi networks, both domestic clerical councils and international actors — notably some Gulf-based scholars and charities — have quietly urged Islamist parties to form a joint electoral front. They argue that without unity, Islamist forces risk fragmentation of their base, benefiting secular and centrist blocs.
However, BJI’s leadership faces a delicate balancing act. On one hand, it seeks to rebrand as a democratic, inclusive party fit for participation in a post-Hasina political order. On the other, it must avoid alienating conservative Islamists who view any compromise as theological dilution.
Meanwhile, reactionist leaders face their own constraints. IAB and Qawmi groups derive their legitimacy from opposition to “secular corruption” and “compromised Islamists.” Aligning too closely with Jamaat could undermine their religious authority and grassroots credibility.
Given these cross-cutting pressures, analysts outline three potential alliance scenarios before the February 2026 election:
- A Formal Electoral Alliance
The most direct but least likely option is a broad, convenience-based coalition bringing together BJI, IAB, and smaller Islamist factions. Such an alliance would not be ideological but pragmatic — aimed at seat maximisation and vote consolidation. Its durability would likely depend on post-election results rather than doctrinal reconciliation. - A Looser, Demand-Based Coordination
This middle-ground approach, already visible in September’s rallies, would allow Islamist parties to cooperate on shared platforms — electoral reform, proportional representation, anti-corruption — without merging organisationally. They could field separate candidates but avoid direct competition in certain constituencies through informal seat adjustments and joint mobilisation. - A Qawmi-Only Bloc
The most ideologically coherent option would exclude BJI altogether. A Qawmi coalition, reminiscent of the 1990–91 Islami Oikya Jote, could focus on specific regions and madrasa-dominated constituencies. While this would preserve theological purity, it would also fragment the Islamist vote and limit national reach — especially given Jamaat’s significant urban and student base.
Each scenario carries trade-offs. The first maximises seats but risks doctrinal backlash. The second balances coordination with autonomy. The third preserves ideological clarity but concedes electoral strength.
History offers sobering lessons. Every attempt at Islamist unity since 1976 has unraveled within months or years, undone by leadership rivalries, accusations of ideological deviation, and tactical disagreements. The present moment, though politically fluid, may not be different.
Still, the electoral landscape has shifted since Sheikh Hasina’s fall. The old Awami League–BNP duopoly has fractured, and public frustration with corruption, unemployment, and governance failures has opened new space for alternative political currents. Islamist parties, commanding an estimated 12–15 percent of the national vote when combined, sense an unprecedented chance to shape the next parliament — if they can avoid repeating history.
The question of Islamist unity in Bangladesh is less about theology and more about political timing. A formal coalition, if it emerges, would likely be a product of seat bargaining and survival calculus rather than shared ideology. As one senior Islamist strategist privately remarked, “Unity is a slogan before elections and a memory after results.”
Bangladesh’s Islamist landscape remains in flux — its factions torn between pragmatism and purity, ambition and suspicion. With only months left before the 2026 polls, whether they choose cooperation or competition will help determine not only their electoral fate but also the future balance of religion and politics in post-Hasina Bangladesh.
