China’s newest and most advanced aircraft carrier, the Fujian (Type 003), has officially entered service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), marking a defining milestone in the nation’s maritime ambitions. With its induction, China becomes the first country outside the United States to deploy an aircraft carrier featuring an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), signaling the start of the PLAN’s transition into the electromagnetic launch era. The Fujian’s commissioning is more than a technological achievement—it represents a clear statement of intent from Beijing as it seeks to redefine naval power in the Indo-Pacific.
The debut of the Fujian has drawn immediate comparisons to the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), the U.S. Navy’s latest supercarrier and the most advanced warship ever built. Both ships embody their nations’ highest expressions of naval technology, doctrine, and strategic vision. Yet beneath their surface similarities lies a revealing contrast in design philosophy, operational readiness, and global intent.
The USS Gerald R. Ford represents the culmination of over seven decades of U.S. carrier experience. Displacing around 100,000 tons at full load, the ship’s 333-meter flight deck and 78-meter beam give it vast operational flexibility. Powered by two A1B nuclear reactors, the Ford can sustain speeds exceeding 30 knots indefinitely, free from the logistical constraints of conventional fuel.
The Ford’s four EMALS catapults and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) enable smoother, faster, and more efficient aircraft launches and recoveries. Its twin reactors generate more than 600 megawatts of electrical power—three times that of the preceding Nimitz class. This power surplus isn’t just about propulsion; it enables the integration of future technologies such as directed-energy weapons, advanced sensors, and expanded electronic warfare systems.
Aboard the Ford, the Carrier Air Wing (CVW) remains the ultimate expression of U.S. naval aviation. Typically, the ship operates 75 aircraft, scalable up to 90 in surge conditions.
- 40–44 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet multirole fighters
- 5 EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft
- 4 E-2D Advanced Hawkeye early warning aircraft
- 6 MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters
- 4 MH-60S utility helicopters
- 10 F-35C Lightning II stealth fighters
- Future integration of MQ-25 Stingray unmanned refueling drones
This combination grants the Ford unmatched mission versatility—from air superiority and strike operations to electronic attack, early warning, and unmanned support. The Ford’s automated weapons elevators, streamlined flight deck, and digital systems push sortie generation rates to new heights, enabling up to 160 sorties per day in high-tempo operations.
By comparison, China’s Fujian displaces between 80,000 and 85,000 tons, with a 316-meter length and 76-meter beam. It is the largest warship ever built by China and the most advanced non-nuclear carrier in the world. While it mirrors the Ford’s flat-deck CATOBAR layout, it remains conventionally powered, likely through a gas turbine or diesel-electric system. This design limits its endurance and deployment range, but also reflects China’s step-by-step approach to mastering carrier technology.
Fujian features three EMALS catapults and an indigenous arresting gear system. This marks China’s first operational use of electromagnetic launch technology. However, early assessments suggest that Fujian’s EMALS may deliver lower launch energy than the Ford’s system, reflecting differences in power generation capacity.
Open-source intelligence suggests that Fujian can host between 48 to 60 fixed-wing aircraft and 12 to 15 helicopters, forming an air group of 60 to 75 total aircraft.
- 24–30 J-15T “Flying Shark” multirole fighters (catapult-capable variant)
- 12–18 J-35 stealth fighters (still undergoing sea trials)
- 4–6 KJ-600 early warning aircraft (undergoing qualification)
- 6–8 Z-18F or Z-20 helicopters for ASW and utility roles
- Potential future addition of stealth UAVs such as the GJ-11
This air wing mirrors the American structure—fighters, early warning, ASW, and support aircraft—but many of these platforms are not yet fully operational. The J-35 and KJ-600 are still in development, and China’s rotary-wing assets lack the sophistication and battle-tested reliability of U.S. counterparts like the MH-60R/S.
The Ford’s Dual Band Radar (DBR) combines X-band and S-band AESA arrays, offering simultaneous fire control, air search, and missile tracking. It’s fully integrated with the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network, which links ships, aircraft, and satellites into a unified sensor grid. Its defensive systems include Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) Block II and Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM).
Fujian, meanwhile, mounts Type 346A AESA radars similar to those used on China’s Type 055 destroyers, along with HQ-10 short-range missiles and Type 1130 close-in weapon systems. While modern, these systems lack the demonstrated interoperability and combat validation of their U.S. equivalents. Fujian’s combat management system remains undisclosed, though it likely forms part of China’s ongoing effort to digitize its fleet under a network-centric doctrine.
Propulsion remains a key differentiator. The Ford’s nuclear power enables it to operate for 20–25 years without refueling, with logistics limited mainly to aviation fuel, food, and munitions. Supported by an extensive network of replenishment ships and global bases, U.S. carrier strike groups can sustain worldwide operations.
Fujian, however, relies on conventional fuel and PLAN supply ships. Estimates suggest it can remain at sea for 90 to 100 days before requiring replenishment. While China is rapidly expanding its blue-water logistics capabilities, including overseas bases such as Djibouti, it still trails the U.S. Navy’s global reach.
Carrier warfare depends as much on experience as on hardware. The U.S. Navy has spent decades refining carrier aviation through combat, exercises, and coalition operations. American Carrier Air Wings routinely train alongside NATO and Indo-Pacific partners, ensuring interoperability across joint-force networks.
The PLAN’s carrier force, by contrast, is still maturing. The Liaoning and Shandong provided early testbeds for carrier aviation, but neither uses catapults. Fujian introduces a steep learning curve: electromagnetic launches, more complex flight operations, and multi-mission integration. Developing the institutional knowledge to operate such a carrier effectively will take years of sustained deployment and training.
Beyond technology, the most telling difference between Ford and Fujian lies in strategy. The U.S. Navy’s carrier model is global, designed for sustained expeditionary operations, power projection, and alliance reassurance. Its nuclear-powered supercarriers serve as mobile airbases capable of striking anywhere on the planet.
China’s approach is regional, oriented toward establishing maritime dominance within the First and Second Island Chains. Fujian enhances China’s ability to control air and sea lanes in the South and East China Seas and deter foreign intervention around Taiwan. But until China develops nuclear propulsion, extensive overseas logistics, and hardened combat experience, its carriers remain regionally constrained.
China’s naval ambitions do not end with Fujian. Reports indicate a fourth carrier, potentially nuclear-powered, is already under construction. By the early 2030s, analysts expect China to operate at least six carriers, with two possibly nuclear. This would give the PLAN numerical parity with U.S. carriers in the Indo-Pacific theater.
However, numbers alone do not equal parity. The U.S. Navy operates 11 nuclear-powered carriers, each with a proven combat record and integrated support network. In addition, nine U.S. Marine Corps amphibious assault ships can launch F-35B fighters, effectively functioning as light carriers. Together, they form a flexible and distributed maritime strike force unmatched by any other navy.
Perhaps the most significant U.S. advantage lies in integration. The Ford doesn’t operate in isolation—it’s the centerpiece of a fully networked C4ISR architecture linking satellites, Aegis-equipped destroyers, submarines, drones, and allied platforms. This digital backbone provides real-time targeting data, shared situational awareness, and coordinated defense across domains.
The PLAN is building a similar ecosystem, integrating satellites, data links, and phased-array sensors across its fleet. Yet its systems have not been stress-tested under combat conditions, nor does China possess the same degree of joint and allied interoperability that the U.S. has built over decades.
The commissioning of the Fujian marks the beginning of a new chapter in naval competition. For the first time, a nation other than the United States operates a carrier with electromagnetic launch technology—a symbolic and practical leap forward. This development underscores China’s determination to field a navy capable of projecting power beyond its shores.
Yet, for all its symbolism, the Fujian is not yet a peer to the Ford. Its systems remain untested in extended operations. Its air wing is still forming. Its logistics chain is regional. And its crew, though well-trained, lacks the cumulative experience that comes only from decades of carrier warfare.
