The evolving geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has reached a pivotal inflection point with Washington’s announcement of the United States–Saudi Arabia Strategic Defense Agreement, a sweeping pact that includes approval for Riyadh to acquire the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, the world’s most advanced fifth-generation stealth fighter.
The deal—expected to exceed USD 50–60 billion when factoring long-term sustainment, training, munitions, and infrastructure—marks the most consequential upgrade to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) since the introduction of the Eurofighter Typhoon and the F-15SA.
But buried beneath the milestone is a defining geopolitical caveat: the F-35s destined for Saudi Arabia will be significantly less advanced than those flown by the Israeli Air Force (IAF).
This gap is not accidental. It is the direct product of Washington’s legally mandated commitment to preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME)—a core principle of U.S. regional defence policy ensuring Israel maintains a decisive technological and operational advantage over all neighbors, including strategic partners.
Although the agreement elevates Saudi Arabia’s status as a major non-NATO ally, the Kingdom’s access to the F-35 comes with strict U.S. restrictions. Riyadh will receive a standard export-configured F-35A, similar to versions operated by Japan, Australia, and South Korea.
Israel, by contrast, fields the F-35I “Adir,” the only variant worldwide permitted to undergo extensive national modifications.
The resulting asymmetry reflects Washington’s balancing act in a region reshaped by Iran’s expanding missile networks, Houthi drone warfare, and the intensifying footprint of China and Russia.
Born from the Joint Strike Fighter program in the late 1990s, the F-35’s cutting-edge features combine stealth, sensor fusion, AI-enabled avionics, and multi-domain connectivity into a unified combat system.
Low observable (LO) design: enabling penetration of airspace defended by advanced SAM systems such as the S-400 or Iran’s Bavar-373.
AN/APG-81 AESA radar and Distributed Aperture System (DAS): offering 360-degree situational awareness.
Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS): enabling simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.
Pratt & Whitney F135 engine: generating 43,000 lbs of thrust and limited supercruise.
The F-35 has become the backbone of U.S. and allied airpower, with more than 20 nations integrating the platform into their defence ecosystems. Yet no operator has been granted the freedom of modification that Washington uniquely afforded to Israel.
Israel’s F-35I represents the most advanced, customised variant of the Lightning II family.
“Israel has integrated indigenous technologies that elevate the aircraft beyond standard export models.”
Developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the bespoke EW suite is tailored for threats from:
Iranian ballistic forces
Syrian and Iranian air-defence grids
Russian-supplied S-300/S-400 batteries
Hezbollah’s expanding missile architecture
The suite enables:
Jamming and spoofing
Radar manipulation
Cyber-electromagnetic offensive operations
Israel is the only F-35 operator permitted to:
Modify mission software
Integrate domestic weapons
Customise flight systems independently
This grants full sovereign control over the aircraft’s digital architecture.
Israel has developed:
Conformal fuel tanks for extended ranges
External fuel solutions
Integration of domestically designed munitions, such as Rafael Spice weapons and Popeye missiles
These features are crucial for potential deep-strike missions against Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz or Fordow.
The Adir links seamlessly into Israel’s national air and missile defence network, including:
Iron Dome
David’s Sling
Arrow interceptors
By 2025, Israel aims to operate 75 F-35Is upgraded to Block 4 standards—featuring expanded computing power, extended-range weapons, and autonomous teaming with unmanned systems like the IAI Harop.
Israel’s F-35I is not merely a fighter jet; it is an integrated multi-domain strike node optimized for Israel’s uniquely dense threat environment.
Saudi Arabia’s F-35 Entry: Transformational But Controlled
Saudi Arabia’s entry into the F-35 club follows a decade of recalibrated diplomacy involving the Abraham Accords, growing security cooperation with Washington, and shifting dynamics between Riyadh and Jerusalem.
The November 2025 pact:
Up to 48 F-35A fighters
300 M1 Abrams tanks
Nuclear energy cooperation
Over USD 1 trillion in investment partnerships
Yet the Kingdom’s F-35A will be constrained by U.S. QME policy.
Saudi Arabia Will Not Receive:
Source code access
Independent mission software control
Integration rights for indigenous weapons
Autonomous maintenance systems
Conformal fuel tanks or long-range strike modifications
Integration with non-NATO C4I networks
Instead, the aircraft will rely on the U.S.-designed EPAWSS (AN/ALQ-250) EW system—advanced, but not sovereign.
Moreover, maintenance will run through the U.S.-controlled ALIS/ODIN architecture, giving Washington leverage over updates, spares, and flight readiness—similar to measures taken against Turkey after the S-400 purchase.
Full operational capability for the RSAF’s F-35A fleet is expected only by the early to mid-2030s, given infrastructure, pilot training, and C4ISR integration requirements.
The F-35 significantly enhances Riyadh’s ability to monitor and defend the Strait of Hormuz, deter Iranian naval forces, and execute precision strikes against proxy networks in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
However, Israel’s air dominance remains uncontested due to:
Software sovereignty
EW superiority
Integrated air defence networking
Long-range strike customisation
U.S. officials have reassured Israeli counterparts that the QME framework remains “ironclad,” and Saudi Arabia’s F-35s will not threaten Israel’s qualitative advantage under any circumstance.
Washington’s Strategic Calculus: Containing China and Russia
The deal serves multiple U.S. objectives:
Preventing Riyadh from turning to Russia’s Su-57E or China’s J-20/J-31
Cementing long-term defence industrial revenue streams
Building a U.S.-aligned security architecture to contain Iran
Still, Washington remains wary of Chinese espionage via Saudi-based telecom and infrastructure networks. As a result, Chinese personnel will be restricted from all F-35-related facilities.
Looking Ahead: Saudi Arabia’s Leap, Israel’s Edge, and a Reshaped Region
Saudi Arabia’s acquisition propels the Kingdom into the elite fifth-generation airpower club, transforming its deterrence calculus and shaping future Gulf security architecture.
Yet this leap occurs under the shadow of QME, which structurally guarantees that Saudi Arabia’s F-35s—advanced as they are—will remain less capable, less autonomous, and less integrated than Israel’s Adir fleet.
As deliveries begin in the coming years, Riyadh faces the strategic challenge of integrating its new capabilities into a doctrine constrained by software restrictions, geopolitical sensitivities, and the realities of U.S. oversight.
Israel retains unrivaled regional air superiority.
Washington maintains decisive technological control.
And the Middle East enters a new era where the F-35 becomes both a symbol of military modernization and a calibrated instrument of power distribution in a region marked by flux, rivalry, and great-power competition.
