China and Russia’s third joint anti-missile defence exercise, conducted in early December 2025 on Russian territory, marks one of the most consequential developments in their expanding military partnership. Far more than a routine drill, the exercise signals the steady maturation of a strategic alignment aimed at reshaping the global deterrence landscape and challenging the missile-defence dominance of the United States and its allies.
Announced by China’s Ministry of National Defense on December 7, the drills unfolded against a backdrop of intensifying systemic rivalry among major powers. As Washington accelerates its own missile-defence initiatives under the second Trump administration—including the ambitious “Golden Dome” national strategic shield—Beijing and Moscow are moving to fortify the survivability of their nuclear deterrents through unprecedented levels of coordination.
The timing and structure of the exercise were not accidental. Although both sides publicly framed the drills as routine, defensive, and non-targeted, the scale, sophistication, and doctrinal emphasis reveal a deliberate message: China and Russia will not allow expanding U.S. missile-defence capabilities, especially space-based early-warning and interception systems, to erode their second-strike credibility.
The decision to hold the entire exercise on Russian soil underscores Moscow’s desire to showcase its role as the senior partner in strategic missile defence, while signalling robust political confidence in hosting drills involving sensitive nuclear-related simulations. The activities brought together the PLA Rocket Force and the Russian Aerospace Forces in a series of integrated operational scenarios designed to test real-world responsiveness to ballistic-missile threats.
A major component of the exercise focused on early-warning fusion—specifically, integrating Russia’s long-range radar networks with China’s increasingly capable air- and missile-defence architecture. This included systems centred around the HQ-9 and China’s emerging HQ-26 platforms.
The HQ-9, already a mainstay of China’s layered air-defence network, offers long-range engagement capability against aircraft, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles. It is roughly analogous to Russia’s S-300 family and has become central to the PLA’s defensive posture across China’s most sensitive regions.
The HQ-26 represents a more significant technological leap. Designed for high-altitude and exo-atmospheric interception, it can theoretically engage intermediate-range—and potentially even intercontinental—ballistic missiles during the vulnerable mid-course phase of flight. Its development reflects Beijing’s intention to field a missile-defence system comparable to the U.S. THAAD platform, while also strengthening its ability to respond to hypersonic glide vehicles and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles.
During the drills, both sides simulated multiple interception timelines and coordination cycles under compressed decision-making windows, reflecting an emphasis on operational realism. Joint command-and-control simulations required Chinese and Russian officers to practice integrated threat assessments, highlighting the evolving sophistication of bilateral military-technical communication.
While the exercise avoided live-fire components—an intentional move to prevent escalation—the scale of scenario-based simulations marked a significant step beyond previous iterations in 2016 and 2017, which were largely confined to computer modelling and conceptual planning.
Despite official insistence that the drills were not directed at any third party, statements surrounding the exercise reveal a clear strategic subtext. Chinese and Russian officials repeatedly invoked concepts such as “strategic balance” and “parity,” signalling deepening anxiety that U.S. missile-defence advancements could undermine mutual assured destruction frameworks that have underpinned global stability for decades.
Unofficial commentary from Chinese analysts was even more pointed. Several referenced President Trump’s renewed rhetoric on nuclear testing—after a hiatus of more than 30 years—and the prospective Golden Dome system, framing these U.S. initiatives as direct threats to global stability.
Western governments responded cautiously but with increasing concern. Diplomats from several Indo-Pacific states warned that enhanced Sino-Russian missile-defence cooperation risked further destabilising an already fragile security environment, particularly given ongoing tensions in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and along the NATO-Russia frontier.
Such statements underscore a widening perception gap: while Beijing and Moscow frame the drills as enhancing global strategic stability, Western capitals interpret them as tools for coercive signalling, aimed at deterring U.S. alliances from expanding missile-defence coverage.
The December 2025 drills are the culmination of a two-decade shift in China–Russia military relations. During the 1990s, their defence cooperation was transactional—Russia supplied advanced combat aircraft, submarines, propulsion technologies, and air-defence systems to support China’s modernisation drive. The relationship deepened with the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, which laid the institutional foundations for sustained defence collaboration.
Joint military activities initially centred on multilateral counterterrorism training under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. By the mid-2010s, however, exercises expanded to air and naval domains, culminating in the first joint anti-missile defence simulation in 2016. These early drills laid the groundwork for increasingly ambitious cooperation.
After the February 2022 declaration of a “no-limits partnership”—issued on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—the pace of strategic coordination accelerated dramatically. Regular joint bomber patrols over the Sea of Japan, cooperative naval deployments in the Pacific, and shared exercises in Russia’s Far East now form an integrated menu of bilateral deterrence activities.
Missile defence has become one of the most strategically sensitive components of this evolving partnership, reflecting mutual concern that advances in U.S. interception systems could degrade Chinese and Russian nuclear forces.
The drills took place amid an extremely turbulent global security environment. Russia continues to wage war in Ukraine, deepening its reliance on China for diplomatic and technological support. China, facing intensifying rivalry with Washington in the Indo-Pacific, benefits from Russian expertise in hypersonic systems, electronic warfare, and aerospace defence.
The United States, for its part, is reshaping its missile-defence ambitions under the Trump administration. The Golden Dome project—which aims to provide nationwide protection against ballistic and hypersonic threats—has been interpreted in Beijing and Moscow as a direct attempt to neutralise their nuclear forces. Meanwhile, U.S. consideration of resuming nuclear testing increases strategic uncertainty, particularly with the New START treaty set to expire in 2026.
NATO allies are accelerating ballistic-missile defence deployments, while Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia are expanding their interception and early-warning capabilities. The resulting cycle of action and counter-action risks shortening crisis-decision timelines, heightening the possibility of miscalculation.
Chinese military officials, reflecting on the December drills, described them as “natural and inevitable,” emphasising the strategic vision shared by the two countries’ leadership. That phrasing suggests missile-defence cooperation is now a structural, enduring pillar of Sino-Russian relations rather than a tactical response to short-term geopolitical pressures.
Future iterations of the exercise are likely to incorporate space-based early-warning systems, joint hypersonic interception concepts, and AI-enabled command-and-control mechanisms. The possibility of expanding such drills into a multilateral format—potentially involving states aligned with China or Russia—cannot be ruled out.
As missile defence becomes a central arena of strategic competition rather than a tool of defensive reassurance, the margin for miscalculation narrows. The December 2025 drills highlight that China and Russia are preparing for a prolonged era of confrontation with the United States, one defined by contested technologies, fluid deterrence postures, and eroding arms-control norms.
In this environment, the latest joint anti-missile defence exercise is not merely another entry in the growing list of Sino-Russian military activities—it is a milestone in a deeper realignment of global power, signalling a world where deterrence is increasingly complex, technologically driven, and ever more fragile.
