The 1823 proclamation effectively positioned the United States as the political gatekeeper of Latin America, setting in motion nearly two hundred years of interventions, military occupations, regime changes and covert operations across the region.
For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, this doctrine guided U.S. action south of its borders. Nearly a third of the roughly 400 known American interventions worldwide took place in Latin America — from the invasion of Mexico in 1846 to CIA-backed coups in Guatemala, Chile and elsewhere, and even military actions that international courts later deemed illegal. Washington routinely toppled governments it saw as unfavourable or a threat to U.S. geopolitical interests.
By 2013, the Obama administration sought to distance itself from that legacy. Then–Secretary of State John Kerry stood before the Organization of American States and declared: “The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over.” It was meant as a symbolic shift toward treating Latin American governments as equals, not subordinates. For a decade, the doctrine largely faded from official rhetoric even as U.S. influence continued in subtler forms.
That chapter now appears to be closing.
On December 4, President Donald Trump’s administration formally revived the Monroe Doctrine in its newly released National Security Strategy (NSS). The document, which outlines Washington’s global priorities, does more than simply nod to history. It declares a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, unapologetically asserting that the Western Hemisphere is once again America’s top foreign-policy priority — above Europe, the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific.
“The days when the Middle East dominated American foreign policy are thankfully over,” the strategy states. It frames U.S. dominance in Latin America as essential not only to regional stability but to America’s own economic prosperity and national security.
The NSS directly links U.S. strategic interests with keeping China, and to a lesser degree Russia and Iran, out of Latin America’s ports, air bases, critical mineral reserves, satellite networks, digital infrastructure and political systems. It presents the region’s geography — proximity to U.S. shores and vital sea lanes through the Caribbean and Panama Canal — as reason enough for an elevated American presence.
In effect, Washington is once again declaring Latin America its sphere of influence.
The doctrinal revival helps explain a series of controversial moves by the Trump administration over recent months, especially its increasingly aggressive military operations in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean.
Since mid-2025, U.S. forces have been striking boats they accuse of transporting drugs, killing dozens of people. These attacks have taken place without congressional authorization and far from U.S. territory. International law specialists, including former UN rapporteurs and maritime legal scholars, say the strikes violate long-established principles governing the use of force at sea.
The administration, however, frames the operations as a “defensive necessity” against “narco-terrorists.” By linking drug trafficking to terrorism, Trump officials argue they have broad presidential authority to act, even in peacetime and without congressional approval.
The NSS further links the “narco-terrorist threat” to Chinese influence. It warns that Beijing could exploit criminal networks, ports, and weak governments to gain strategic access to the hemisphere — a fusion of counter-narcotics rhetoric with great-power competition.
On December 2, Trump went further, stating that any country he believes is manufacturing or transporting drugs to the U.S. could become a military target. His remarks explicitly mentioned Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia — all crucial partners or neighbours whose leaders reacted with alarm.
The same day that Trump threatened military action, he granted a sweeping pardon to Juan Orlando Hernández, the former Honduran president sentenced to 45 years in a U.S. court for facilitating the transport of massive quantities of cocaine into the United States.
The pardon stunned legal experts, human rights advocates and many in Congress. But the NSS provides a framework for understanding it. Trump’s foreign policy, the document argues, is guided not by ideology or consistency but by “what works for America” — or, as the strategy bluntly puts it, “America First.”
Within that logic, Hernández remains valuable. He is a former head of state with longstanding connections to Honduran security forces and conservative political elites. Honduras hosts U.S. military personnel, serves as a critical transit hub for northbound migrants, and has historically been one of Washington’s closest allies in Central America.
The timing also raised eyebrows. Trump announced the pardon just days before Honduras’ national elections, widely interpreted as a move to bolster conservative networks aligned with Hernández and to boost Trump’s preferred candidate, Nasry Asfura. Analysts say the pardon sends two messages across the region: loyalty is rewarded, and moral objections are subordinate to U.S. strategic interests.
Trump’s revived Monroe Doctrine also sheds new light on Washington’s fixation on Venezuela.
Although U.S. officials frequently label President Nicolás Maduro a “narco-dictator,” Venezuela is a minor player in the drug routes into the United States. What the country does possess is far more strategically significant: the world’s largest proven oil reserves, vast gold deposits, and a long Caribbean coastline near the Panama Canal.
After years of punishing U.S. sanctions, Caracas turned increasingly toward China, signing major energy, mining, and technology agreements. Beijing has since become a critical financier and political backer of Maduro’s government — a reality the NSS bluntly calls unacceptable.
Though the strategy avoids directly naming Venezuela, it warns that “foreign influence may be hard to reverse where political alignments already exist.” It refers to several Latin American governments that have forged deep partnerships with “foreign actors,” a clear reference to China’s expanding footprint.
The geopolitical contest may be entering a new phase. According to The New York Times, Maduro’s government has quietly offered Washington a dominant stake in its oil and gold sectors, diverting exports away from China in hopes of normalizing relations with the U.S. If verified, the proposal would represent a staggering attempt at realignment by a government long isolated by Washington.
However, many Western officials and Venezuelan opposition figures believe Trump’s real objective is regime change, not rapprochement. Venezuela’s opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado — who won the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize — has been courting U.S. investors with promises of a post-Maduro boom. She has described a “US$1.7 trillion opportunity” to privatize Venezuela’s oil, gas and infrastructure sectors.
For American and European corporations, the potential profits are enormous.
Latin America’s governments appear unsure how to respond. Regional organizations — including the Organization of American States, CELAC and UNASUR — are weakened by political polarization and lack a unified diplomatic front. At a recent summit, leaders called for peace but stopped short of condemning U.S. maritime strikes, reflecting both caution and fragmentation.
Privately, diplomats across South America and the Caribbean express fear of being labelled “narco-states” if they challenge Washington too openly. Others hope to be singled out as preferred allies, likely to receive favourable economic or security treatment.
For many, the situation feels uncomfortably familiar.
Two hundred years after Monroe’s famous warning to Europe, the Trump administration’s strategy suggests that Washington still views the hemisphere as its own strategic backyard — a space in which it is “free to roam,” intervene and shape outcomes.
The revived doctrine signals a return to a more openly interventionist Washington, one that employs military force, sanctions, and political patronage to secure its interests while countering rival powers.
Whether Latin America can forge a collective response remains uncertain. For now, each government is forced to navigate Trump’s unpredictable blend of coercion and reward on its own — aware that today’s ally could become tomorrow’s target.
