In most countries, negotiations over billion-dollar energy infrastructure projects fall under the remit of trade ministries, energy regulators, or state-owned utilities. In Vietnam, however, a recent high-profile meeting has underscored a significant and controversial shift in the country’s power structure.
Instead of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), it was the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) that hosted talks with a major foreign investor. General Luong Tam Quang, Vietnam’s Minister of Public Security, recently met with the chief executive of US-based Nebula Energy to discuss the company’s proposed acquisition of a 49% stake in the Cai Mep liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal project.
At face value, the meeting could be interpreted as inter-ministerial coordination. But for analysts and diplomats, it signals something deeper: the expanding role of Vietnam’s powerful security apparatus into sectors traditionally governed by civilian economic institutions. Under General Secretary To Lam, himself a former Minister of Public Security, the MPS appears to be extending its influence from safeguarding the regime to shaping, and profiting from, the national economy.
The question many observers are asking is simple: why would a US energy firm seek approval from the country’s top police official rather than its energy regulator?
The answer lies in Vietnam’s current bureaucratic paralysis. Years of the sweeping “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign have hollowed out the leadership of MOIT and the state utility Electricity of Vietnam (EVN). Senior officials have been arrested, dismissed, or sidelined, leaving technocrats reluctant to approve large projects for fear of future investigations.
This climate of caution has stalled critical energy investments, particularly in gas and power generation, at a time when Vietnam’s electricity demand is rising rapidly. In response, foreign investors have become increasingly pragmatic. With decision-making frozen in civilian agencies, the MPS is widely seen as the only institution with enough political authority to push projects forward and shield them from bureaucratic or legal obstruction.
For companies like Nebula Energy, engaging directly with the security ministry functions as a form of political risk insurance — an implicit guarantee that their capital will be protected in an unpredictable regulatory environment.
The MPS’s interest in LNG is not merely opportunistic. It aligns closely with the ministry’s broader strategic ambitions in the digital domain. The MPS is spearheading Project 06, a nationwide population database, alongside the VNeID digital identification platform. Together, these initiatives form the backbone of a rapidly expanding digital surveillance and governance system.
Such infrastructure requires vast amounts of stable, uninterrupted electricity — something Vietnam’s aging and overstretched power grid struggles to provide. By embedding itself directly in energy supply chains through projects like the Cai Mep LNG terminal, the MPS is effectively building a self-sustaining ecosystem. It would control both the data infrastructure used to monitor citizens and the energy assets needed to keep that system running, reducing dependence on civilian utilities.
This expansion is being reinforced by changes to Vietnam’s legal framework. Recent amendments to the Law on Public Employees, passed by the National Assembly, allow members of the armed forces to contribute capital to and participate in the management of private enterprises. While Vietnam has long tolerated military-run companies such as telecoms giant Viettel, the formal entry of the police force into commercial ventures marks a new and more troubling development.
The MPS is the country’s primary investigative authority for economic crimes. Its direct involvement in profit-driven enterprises creates an inherent conflict of interest. Critics warn that market competition and oversight become impossible when the regulator and enforcer is also a market player.
These developments come as Hanoi intensifies its lobbying for the United States to recognize Vietnam as a market economy. Yet the growing concentration of economic power within the security apparatus points in the opposite direction.
A functioning market economy depends on transparency, independent regulation, and a level playing field. A system in which critical sectors such as energy and data are dominated by an armed ministry risks entrenching cronyism and suffocating private enterprise.
For Vietnam, the danger is that “national security” becomes a justification for monopoly control — and that the economy becomes captive to the very institution tasked with protecting it.
