China appears to have crossed a decisive threshold in airborne strike warfare with the first publicly observed integration of the YJ-21E hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile on the Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter. The development fundamentally redefines the operational ceiling of 4.5-generation combat aircraft and signals Beijing’s accelerating ambition to democratise hypersonic strike capability across lighter, more numerous tactical platforms.
The appearance of a J-10C armed with a weapon long associated with heavy bombers represents a doctrinal inflection point in Chinese airpower. It collapses the traditional divide between strategic and tactical aviation by enabling frontline fighters to deliver theatre-level hypersonic effects previously reserved for large, slow, and high-value platforms such as bombers.
Imagery circulating in late December 2025 depicting a J-10C lifting off with a large conical missile mounted on its centreline hardpoint has electrified defence circles. The reaction is not driven merely by novelty, but by what the sighting reveals about China’s rapidly maturing ability to miniaturise hypersonic payloads without sacrificing speed, lethality, or survivability.
The missile’s geometry—an elongated booster section, sharply tapered nose cone, and distinctive aerodynamic stabilisation surfaces—closely matches the export-configured YJ-21E variant unveiled at recent Chinese airshows. This alignment confirms that the weapon is not a conceptual mock-up or static display model, but an operationally viable configuration intended for real-world use.
Equally significant is the context in which the sighting occurred. The aircraft appeared to be conducting what looked like a routine sortie rather than a carefully choreographed demonstration. That detail suggests the integration process has progressed well beyond early experimental trials into an advanced phase of weapons-airframe compatibility testing, if not pre-operational evaluation.
Strategically, the J-10C–YJ-21E pairing marks China’s first credible attempt to field a hypersonic “fighter-borne” strike capability. This innovation could profoundly complicate regional air and maritime defence planning across the Indo-Pacific, particularly for navies and air forces already struggling to adapt to compressed decision timelines.
The significance of the integration lies not only in the missile’s speed—exceeding Mach 5—but in its ability to shrink detection-to-impact timelines to a degree that renders many existing missile-defence architectures operationally brittle. Reaction windows measured in minutes are reduced to seconds, leaving little margin for error.
By enabling a lightweight fighter to deliver a hypersonic ballistic payload, China is effectively expanding its anti-access and area-denial envelope both horizontally and vertically. Potential adversaries are confronted with multi-vector threats launched from unpredictable axes, altitudes, and distances, complicating defensive planning and sensor coverage.
The fact that this integration involves the export-oriented YJ-21E variant further underscores Beijing’s intent to make hypersonic warfare a transferable capability rather than an exclusive strategic asset. For regional militaries already grappling with long-range cruise missile salvos, fighter-borne hypersonic weapons represent a quantum escalation in the character of aerial warfare.
The Chengdu J-10C, often described as China’s most refined 4.5-generation fighter, was never originally conceived as a hypersonic strike platform. Yet its evolution reflects the adaptability of Chinese aerospace design philosophy and the growing emphasis on multi-role lethality.
Entering service in 2018, the J-10C represents the culmination of incremental improvements over earlier J-10 variants. It incorporates advanced avionics, sensor fusion, reduced radar cross-section features, and a significantly upgraded propulsion system. Powered by the indigenous WS-10B turbofan engine, delivering roughly 144 kilonewtons of thrust with afterburner, the aircraft reaches speeds of up to Mach 1.8, a service ceiling of around 18,000 metres, and a combat radius of approximately 1,240 kilometres without refuelling.
At the core of the J-10C’s combat effectiveness is its active electronically scanned array radar, widely assessed to be comparable to Western AESA systems. The radar supports long-range detection, multi-target tracking, and high-fidelity engagement in electronically contested environments. Integrated with an infrared search and track system, helmet-mounted display, and an advanced electronic warfare suite, the aircraft can function as both a shooter and a sensor node in a network-centric battlespace.
Design features such as the diverterless supersonic inlet and extensive use of composite materials reduce the aircraft’s radar cross-section, complicating detection by legacy air-defence systems. With eleven hardpoints and a maximum external payload exceeding 5,600 kilograms, the J-10C has traditionally carried a mix of air-to-air missiles, precision-guided munitions, and anti-radiation weapons.
The integration of long-range PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles, with reported engagement distances exceeding 200 kilometres, has already transformed the J-10C into a formidable aerial interceptor. Exercises between 2019 and 2021 reportedly demonstrated its ability to defeat heavier fighters such as the Su-35 and J-16 by leveraging superior sensor fusion, data-linking, and electronic warfare rather than raw kinematic performance.
The combat debut of the export-configured J-10CE with the Pakistan Air Force during the 2025 India–Pakistan conflict further elevated the platform’s credibility. Multiple Indian aircraft, including Dassault Rafales, were claimed to have been engaged successfully in beyond-visual-range combat. Those engagements underscored how a compact single-engine fighter, paired with advanced missiles and integrated command-and-control, could decisively shape the air battle.
The addition of the YJ-21E now pushes the J-10C beyond the tactical air combat realm into the strategic strike domain, enabling it to threaten high-value maritime and land targets at unprecedented speed.
The YJ-21 family represents one of China’s most consequential advances in missile technology. The baseline YJ-21 is widely assessed as a hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile with a range approaching 1,500 kilometres, cruising at around Mach 6 and accelerating to terminal speeds beyond Mach 10.
Unlike traditional ballistic missiles following predictable trajectories, the YJ-21 employs a quasi-ballistic flight profile, combining high-altitude boost with manoeuvrable hypersonic glide in the terminal phase. This severely complicates interception, as the missile can alter its trajectory late in flight, overwhelming defensive fire-control solutions.
The YJ-21E represents a deliberate effort to shrink this capability into a form suitable for air-launch from a broader range of platforms. Measuring roughly 8.3 metres in length, it is shorter and lighter than its domestic counterpart but retains hypersonic velocity and terminal manoeuvrability. Its guidance architecture is believed to combine inertial navigation, satellite updates, and terminal seekers capable of discriminating moving maritime targets amid heavy electronic countermeasures.
At hypersonic speeds, the missile generates a plasma sheath that degrades radar visibility, while high-G evasive manoeuvres during the terminal phase further erode interceptor effectiveness. This makes it particularly lethal against large naval assets such as aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and logistics vessels.
Adapting such a weapon for fighter carriage required advances in miniaturisation, thermal management, and structural integration, highlighting the depth of China’s missile-engineering ecosystem. By decentralising hypersonic firepower across numerous fighters, Beijing makes it far harder for adversaries to neutralise through pre-emptive strikes.
Operationally, a J-10C armed with a YJ-21E could launch from hundreds of kilometres away and strike a target in minutes. For carrier strike groups operating in the Western Pacific, the threat of hypersonic weapons launched from agile fighters adds a new layer of complexity, with attacks potentially originating from unexpected vectors and altitudes.
From an export perspective, pairing the J-10CE with the YJ-21E could be transformative. For Pakistan, such a capability would significantly alter South Asia’s strategic calculus. In Southeast Asia, the proliferation of fighter-borne hypersonic weapons would further militarise contested maritime spaces.
Compared with Western hypersonic programmes constrained by delays and cost overruns, China’s apparent ability to field operational systems at scale suggests a widening capability gap. The J-10C–YJ-21E combination exemplifies shifting warfare economics, where a missile costing perhaps US$10–15 million can threaten platforms worth tens of billions.
As hypersonic weapons become routine elements of tactical airpower, the sight of a J-10C lifting off with a YJ-21E beneath its fuselage may come to be seen as the moment when tactical aviation irrevocably crossed.
