Recent high-resolution satellite imagery has laid bare what defence planners across the Middle East have quietly anticipated for more than a year: Iran has entered the final infrastructural phase of integrating Russia’s Su-35 multirole fighter into frontline service. The near-completion of hardened aircraft shelters at Hamadan Air Base represents a decisive material commitment rather than a speculative procurement signal, pushing the programme beyond political intent and into irreversible military implementation.
The imagery reveals a cluster of newly constructed, arched hardened aircraft shelters whose scale, geometry and spatial configuration are unmistakably aligned with the basing requirements of large, twin-engine fourth-plus-generation fighters. These reinforced shelters, each measuring approximately 25 by 30 metres, significantly exceed the dimensions necessary for the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force’s ageing F-4 Phantom II fleet, underscoring that the infrastructure has been purpose-built for the incoming Sukhoi Su-35.
More critically, the timing of construction — accelerating from early foundational work in late 2024 to near-operational readiness by December 2025 — synchronises closely with confirmed production milestones at Russia’s Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant. This alignment strongly indicates that Tehran is matching base readiness to delivery schedules rather than planning post-hoc adaptation after aircraft arrival.
Taken together, the convergence of satellite evidence, production timelines and strategic geography points to an unavoidable conclusion: Hamadan Air Base is being prepared as the first operational home for at least one Iranian Su-35 squadron. If confirmed, this would mark the most consequential leap in Iranian airpower since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The pace and scale of investment signal that Tehran now views the Su-35 not as a symbolic prestige acquisition, but as a survivable wartime asset expected to operate under constant threat. Hardened aircraft shelters are not peacetime conveniences; they are wartime infrastructure, designed to absorb pre-emptive precision strikes, electronic warfare and sustained air campaigns by technologically superior adversaries.
Iran’s emphasis on hardened basing reflects hard lessons drawn from recent conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and Syria, where exposed aircraft on open aprons were neutralised within hours of hostilities, collapsing airpower before it could meaningfully influence the battlespace. By shaping Hamadan’s basing architecture around the Su-35’s physical footprint, maintenance demands and sortie-generation tempo, Iran is implicitly acknowledging a doctrinal shift from force preservation in peacetime to force endurance under high-intensity combat conditions.
This also suggests that Tehran anticipates the Su-35 to play a central role in early-warning, interception and deterrence missions, rather than being relegated to rear-area defence or ceremonial deployments intended primarily for strategic signalling.
Formally designated the 3rd Tactical Air Base, Hamadan occupies a uniquely strategic position roughly 47 kilometres north of Hamadan city, embedded within the western Zagros foothills. From this location, combat aircraft can rapidly cover Tehran, Iran’s central nuclear infrastructure belt — including Natanz and Fordow — and western approach corridors vulnerable to potential Israeli or NATO-aligned Turkish air operations.
The base’s elevation confers performance advantages in hot-and-high operating conditions, while the surrounding mountainous terrain complicates targeting solutions for adversaries employing stand-off precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles or low-observable strike packages. The newly constructed hardened shelters dramatically elevate Hamadan’s survivability profile, with reinforced concrete thickness and blast-resistant design features optimised to resist bunker-busting munitions and mitigate near-miss penetrator effects.
Satellite imagery indicates the shelter complex spans roughly 0.2 square kilometres, with access taxiways, revetments and dispersal spacing suggesting a doctrinal emphasis on aircraft survival under sustained attack rather than peacetime efficiency. This architectural philosophy mirrors lessons drawn from recent high-intensity conflicts, where concentrated air assets without hardened protection proved catastrophically vulnerable during opening salvos.
The basing preparations at Hamadan cannot be separated from the broader geopolitical transaction reshaping Iran–Russia defence cooperation since 2023. That partnership culminated in a confirmed agreement valued at approximately €6 billion, or about US$6.5 billion (RM30.7 billion), covering up to 48 Su-35 multirole fighters.
Production of the first tranche of 16 aircraft is already underway, with deliveries expected to begin in 2026 and extend through 2027. Crucially, Iran has reportedly secured provisions for local assembly — a clause that fundamentally alters the deal’s strategic impact by enabling Tehran to bypass sanctions constraints, develop domestic sustainment capacity and potentially manufacture more than 100 aircraft over the next decade.
Defence observers note that local production transforms Iran from a sanctioned end-user into a quasi-sovereign aerospace producer operating largely outside Western control mechanisms. The roots of the deal trace back to Egypt’s withdrawal from a similar Su-35 purchase under CAATSA pressure, leaving Russia with completed airframes and an unexpected geopolitical opportunity.
In parallel, Iran’s large-scale provision of Shahed-136 loitering munitions and ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine created a quid pro quo dynamic that redefined bilateral relations from transactional to strategically interdependent. Analysts increasingly frame the Su-35 transfer not merely as a commercial sale, but as strategic payment for Iran’s support to Moscow amid Western pressure.
For the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, the Su-35 represents a discontinuous leap. Decades of embargoes have forced reliance on platforms whose technological relevance peaked during the Cold War: F-4 Phantoms, F-14 Tomcats, F-5 Tigers, limited Mirage F1s and Chinese-origin J-7s, many plagued by chronic availability issues.
By contrast, the Su-35 offers dramatic improvements in range, situational awareness, lethality and survivability. With a combat radius exceeding 2,000 kilometres, it enables sustained operations across the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, the Levant and potentially into the Eastern Mediterranean. Its Irbis-E PESA radar, with detection ranges approaching 400 kilometres against large targets, significantly outclasses sensors on most regional fourth-generation fighters.
Complementing this are L-band radar arrays embedded in the wing roots, optimised for detecting low-observable targets and enhancing resilience in contested electromagnetic environments. Three-dimensional thrust-vectoring engines provide extreme supermaneuverability, improving survivability in missile-dense airspace and dominance in within-visual-range combat.
Perhaps most consequential is the weapons suite. The R-37M long-range air-to-air missile introduces a credible 300–400 kilometre engagement threat against high-value airborne assets such as tankers, airborne early warning aircraft and command platforms — cornerstones of Western airpower projection.
Basing Su-35s at Hamadan allows Iran to exploit these strengths while mitigating vulnerabilities, particularly during the opening phases of conflict. From Hamadan, fighters can rapidly intercept incoming strike packages targeting Tehran or nuclear facilities while remaining within layered Iranian air defence coverage.
The base’s western orientation positions Iranian aircraft to contest Israeli flight paths, complicate mid-course refuelling operations and threaten support assets operating over regional airspace. In crisis scenarios, Su-35s could also loiter near the Strait of Hormuz, reinforcing Iran’s air-sea denial strategy and amplifying its asymmetric maritime posture.
Analysts anticipate a dispersal doctrine, with Hamadan serving as a primary node complemented by underground facilities such as the “Eagle 44” base, which previously showcased Su-35 mock-ups. This mirrors Russian and Chinese survivability strategies that prioritise mobility, redundancy and concealment over static defence.
The imminent deployment of Su-35s at Hamadan reverberates far beyond Iran’s borders. Israel, whose doctrine relies on air dominance and freedom of action, now faces a more complex environment where stand-off operations carry higher risk. Even limited numbers of Su-35s could alter cost-benefit calculations and force deeper strike planning.
Gulf states operating F-35s, Eurofighters and advanced F-15 variants must similarly factor Iranian long-range interception capability into their defensive planning. For Russia, the deal delivers financial relief and geopolitical leverage, generating billions in revenue while cementing Iran as a strategic partner in defiance of Western sanctions.
The hardened shelters rising at Hamadan Air Base are more than concrete and steel; they are a declaration of intent visible from space. Iran is no longer merely aspiring to modern airpower — it is structurally committing to it.
With Su-35 deliveries approaching, pilot training reportedly underway and infrastructure nearing readiness, Tehran is positioning itself to contest airspace, deter adversaries and project power in ways unimaginable just a decade ago. As defence planners across the region scrutinise each new satellite pass, one reality is now undeniable: Iran’s Su-35 era is no longer theoretical — it is taking shape on the ground.
