The deployment of China’s advanced J-10C multirole fighter aircraft and the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platform—often described as a “flying radar”—to the United Arab Emirates for the Falcon Shield 2025 joint air force exercises has emerged as a defining inflection point in the rapidly deepening military and strategic relationship between Beijing and Abu Dhabi.
More than a routine expansion of bilateral defence ties, the exercises signal a broader recalibration of power projection, alliance diversification, and airpower diplomacy across the Middle East, with implications extending into the wider Indo-Pacific strategic continuum. For the first time, high-end People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) combat and command assets operated from Emirati soil, underscoring China’s transition from a largely regionally focused air force into one capable of sustained expeditionary operations far from the Chinese mainland.
“The ‘Falcon Shield’ joint training is a signature project of cooperation between the air forces of China and the United Arab Emirates,” Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, said in a statement. “So far, it has been held three times and has played an important role in promoting practical cooperation between the two sides and maintaining regional peace.”
Held from 9 to 22 December 2025, Falcon Shield 2025 unfolded against a backdrop of intensifying great-power competition, heightened instability across the Middle East, and growing frustration within Gulf capitals over delayed or politically constrained Western arms deliveries. Within this context, the latest iteration of the exercise represented the most operationally ambitious phase of Sino-Emirati air cooperation to date.
According to Chinese defence officials, participating troops from both sides conducted operations in mixed formations, focusing on command-and-control simulations, air superiority combat, night operations using night-vision equipment, unmanned combat integration, and battlefield search-and-rescue missions. The deliberate integration of Chinese and Emirati pilots into combined operational groupings marked a clear shift away from symbolic fly-pasts toward meaningful operational interoperability.
This structure was designed to build mutual trust, deepen tactical familiarity, and expose Emirati planners to Chinese approaches to sensor fusion, network-centric warfare, and distributed air battle management under contested conditions. Defence analysts note that official references to “mixed grouping” and “command simulations” indicate a willingness to share operational concepts and command philosophies rather than merely demonstrate individual platforms.
The inclusion of night combat, unmanned systems, and multi-domain coordination further elevated Falcon Shield 2025 beyond a conventional bilateral drill. In effect, the exercise functioned as a live laboratory for testing expeditionary command structures, sensor-to-shooter kill chains, and airspace control mechanisms relevant to high-intensity conflict scenarios across the Gulf and adjacent theatres.
The Falcon Shield exercise series, initiated in 2019, has steadily evolved alongside broader China–UAE relations. Earlier drills, including those held in China’s Xinjiang region in 2023, focused primarily on basic manoeuvres and familiarization flights. The 2025 edition, however, represented a qualitative leap by deploying advanced Chinese combat aircraft and high-value enablers to Emirati territory—significantly raising both the operational stakes and the strategic signalling value of the exercise.
Chinese officials have openly described Falcon Shield as a “flagship cooperative project,” reflecting Beijing’s growing confidence in presenting itself as a credible security stakeholder in the Middle East rather than a distant economic partner. This approach aligns with China’s broader strategy of embedding defence cooperation within wider economic, political, and infrastructure partnerships across the Arab world.
For the UAE, the exercises dovetail with a deliberate foreign-policy recalibration aimed at enhancing strategic autonomy. Long reliant on U.S.-supplied F-16s and French Mirage 2000 aircraft, Abu Dhabi has in recent years faced mounting challenges linked to export controls, technology-security concerns, and protracted negotiations over next-generation platforms, most notably the politically fraught F-35 Lightning II programme.
While the Abraham Accords initially appeared to open pathways to advanced Western capabilities, shifting regional dynamics and changing U.S. priorities have complicated those expectations. As a result, Emirati defence planners have increasingly sought alternative partners capable of delivering advanced capabilities without restrictive political conditionalities.
China has moved decisively to fill this space. The UAE has already operated Chinese Wing Loong II armed drones in multiple theatres, and cooperation has expanded into naval exercises, intelligence exchanges, and now advanced airpower integration. These defence ties rest on a strong economic foundation: bilateral trade exceeded US$100 billion in 2024, making the UAE China’s largest trading partner in the Arab world.
The centrepiece of Falcon Shield 2025 was the deployment of the Chengdu J-10C, China’s most advanced fourth-generation multirole fighter. Developed by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, the J-10C features an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, advanced electronic warfare systems, integrated sensor fusion, and compatibility with a wide range of precision-guided munitions, including beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles.
Powered by the indigenous WS-10 turbofan engine, the J-10C has a top speed of around Mach 1.8 and a combat radius exceeding 1,000 kilometres. Its ability to conduct air superiority, strike, suppression of enemy air defences, and electronic attack missions within a single sortie makes it particularly attractive to Gulf air forces seeking versatility under resource and political constraints.
During the exercises, Emirati pilots reportedly flew alongside J-10C aircraft in mixed formations and simulated air combat scenarios. One senior Emirati defence official described the aircraft’s performance as “impressive,” noting its potential as a cost-effective alternative to Western fighters without the political baggage increasingly associated with arms transfers.
For China, showcasing the J-10C in the Middle East serves both strategic and commercial objectives, reinforcing the platform’s credibility following its export to Pakistan and positioning it as a viable option for air forces unable or unwilling to procure fifth-generation Western aircraft, which often exceed US$100 million per unit when lifecycle costs are considered.
Equally significant was the presence of the KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft, based on the Shaanxi Y-9 airframe. Featuring a fixed dorsal radar array capable of detecting aerial targets at ranges approaching 470 kilometres, the KJ-500 provides persistent situational awareness, battle management, and resilience against electronic jamming.
Its deployment to the UAE marked the first time the KJ-500 has participated in a joint exercise with a non-Asian partner. During Falcon Shield 2025, it served as the central command node for integrated Sino-Emirati air operations, coordinating fighter manoeuvres and relaying targeting data in complex, multi-threat scenarios.
Supporting these operations was the Y-20A aerial refuelling tanker, underscoring the PLAAF’s growing ability to project and sustain airpower over intercontinental distances. Mid-air refuelling enabled extended J-10C sorties, simulating long-range missions relevant to Gulf defence planning.
Unmanned aerial vehicles were also incorporated for reconnaissance and strike simulations, reflecting both countries’ emphasis on drone warfare as a cost-effective force multiplier. Ground-based exchanges on maintenance, logistics, and cyber defence further broadened the scope of cooperation.
Strategically, Falcon Shield 2025 intersects directly with the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China and the Middle East’s gradual shift toward a more multipolar security architecture. Washington has repeatedly voiced concerns over Chinese military engagement with U.S. partners in the Gulf, particularly regarding technology security and intelligence exposure.
Abu Dhabi, however, has framed the exercises as stabilizing rather than destabilizing, arguing that diversified partnerships enhance resilience and contribute to regional peace amid an increasingly uncertain global security environment.
For Beijing, the drills reinforce the security dimension of the Belt and Road Initiative, linking economic investments with a growing military footprint designed to protect critical maritime and energy corridors.
As China refines its expeditionary doctrine and Gulf states reassess their security partnerships, Falcon Shield 2025 is likely to reverberate across the region, shaping procurement decisions and alliance behaviour. In an era where air superiority and sensor dominance define military credibility, the skies over the UAE offered a glimpse of a future in which airpower diplomacy plays an increasingly central role in determining strategic outcomes.
