China may have quietly crossed a significant threshold in long-range strike warfare, with new US assessments indicating that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has likely operationally fielded the DF-27 missile—an unprecedented system that blends intercontinental reach with anti-ship strike capability.
The Pentagon’s 2025 Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, released on December 23, for the first time places the DF-27 within the PLA’s fielded conventional strike forces. According to the report, the missile is capable of striking both land and maritime targets at ranges between 5,000 and 8,000 kilometres, dramatically expanding China’s ability to threaten distant military assets.
The confirmation came via an official Pentagon graphic outlining China’s deployed conventional strike systems—marking the first explicit acknowledgement that the DF-27 is no longer merely experimental. At its stated range, the missile could reach US military infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific, including Hawaii and Alaska, and potentially parts of the continental United States, depending on launch location and flight profile.
Strategically, the DF-27 gives Beijing the ability to hold at risk US Pacific territories and bases that could be used to support military operations against China during a crisis. The range also brings Australia, a key US ally in the South Pacific, within potential striking distance, raising new questions about regional deterrence dynamics.
What sets the DF-27 apart is not only its reach, but its anti-ship role. The Pentagon notes that this system would allow China to target US Navy vessels at distances beyond the engagement envelopes of its existing cruise, supersonic, and hypersonic missiles. While its range is shorter than that of China’s nuclear-focused DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, the DF-27 appears optimized for conventional precision strikes, particularly against high-value naval targets.
The prospect of an operational DF-27 is especially concerning for Washington amid persistent tensions over Taiwan. US military planners have long warned that a Chinese move against the self-ruled island could draw American forces into a high-intensity Indo-Pacific conflict. With Beijing repeatedly refusing to rule out the use of force and analysts frequently citing 2027 as a potential flashpoint, the arrival of a new class of long-range anti-ship missile sharpens the risks of escalation.
Despite its strategic importance, the DF-27 remains one of the PLA’s most closely guarded weapons. It was notably absent from China’s large Victory Day Parade in September 2025, where several previously unseen systems were unveiled. Most public knowledge of the missile has emerged through US intelligence leaks and Pentagon reporting rather than Chinese disclosures.
The missile’s existence first surfaced in the Pentagon’s 2021 China Military Power Report, which described it as a long-range system under development. In 2023, the Washington Post reported that China had tested an advanced experimental missile—identified as the DF-27—on February 25 of that year. Citing a leaked classified document, the report said the vehicle flew for about 12 minutes over roughly 2,100 kilometres and had a high likelihood of penetrating US ballistic missile defenses.
By 2024, the Pentagon assessed that the DF-27 had been deployed to the PLA Rocket Force, noting that it might carry an optional hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and could support land-attack, anti-ship, and nuclear missions. However, the 2025 report clarifies that the missile is not listed under China’s fielded nuclear forces, underscoring its conventional strike role.
Andrew Erickson, a professor at the US Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, described the DF-27 as a global first. “China became the first to field an analogous capability: a conventional ICBM—with an ASBM variant—that can conduct rapid, long-range precision strikes out to intercontinental distances,” he said, including against an adversary’s homeland and naval forces at sea.
If equipped with an HGV, the DF-27 would pose an even greater challenge. Unlike traditional ballistic missiles that follow predictable trajectories, hypersonic glide vehicles can maneuver during much of their flight, complicating detection, tracking, and interception. Such characteristics could leave major surface combatants—including destroyers and aircraft carriers—highly vulnerable.
The US Navy’s current air-defense architecture is designed primarily to counter aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, and conventional ballistic missiles. While systems such as the SM-6 interceptor have shown promise against some high-speed threats, the Navy does not yet field a defense specifically optimized for highly maneuverable hypersonic weapons.
Beyond its immediate military implications, the DF-27 reinforces China’s standing as a global leader in hypersonic and long-range strike technologies. Its integration significantly enhances Beijing’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, complementing existing “carrier-killer” systems such as the DF-21D and DF-26B ballistic missiles, as well as air- and sea-launched weapons like the KD-21 and YJ-21.
Together, these systems are designed to deny foreign navies—especially US carrier strike groups—access to contested waters during a Taiwan contingency. According to Erickson, China’s expanding family of anti-ship ballistic missiles now constitutes “a new form of naval force,” reshaping the balance of power in the Western Pacific.
The DF-27’s apparent fielding comes amid fresh warnings from US defense analysts that Chinese hypersonic missiles could disable or sink aircraft carriers within minutes of conflict. Whether or not such scenarios play out, the Pentagon’s latest findings suggest that China’s long-range strike capabilities have entered a new and more destabilizing phase—one that will increasingly shape US-China military calculations across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
