Iran’s decision to cripple Starlink satellite internet nationwide has emerged as a watershed moment in modern information warfare, fundamentally reshaping assumptions about the resilience of space-based communications. Iranian digital-rights expert Amir Rashidi, Director of Digital Rights and Security at the Miaan Group, described the scale of the operation as unprecedented. “I have been monitoring and researching access to the internet for the past 20 years, and I have never seen such a thing in my life,” he said, underscoring the sophistication of Tehran’s electronic assault.
As anti-regime protests intensified across Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan and more than 190 cities, Iranian authorities activated a multi-layered digital suppression campaign on January 8, 2026. The operation combined a nationwide terrestrial internet “kill switch” with advanced military-grade electronic warfare systems capable of degrading satellite communications previously believed to be largely immune from state control.
Analysis by technology journalist Zak Doffman, drawing on packet-loss data, revealed that Iranian jamming initially disrupted around 30 percent of Starlink uplink and downlink traffic. Within hours, disruption escalated beyond 80 percent, transforming satellite connectivity into what engineers described as a fragmented “patchwork quilt” of intermittent access. For many users, connections flickered briefly before collapsing entirely.
The strategic shock lies not merely in the disruption itself but in the precedent it sets. This is the first verified instance of a nation-state successfully neutralising Starlink at national scale during an internal political crisis. The operation directly challenges the long-held assumption that low-Earth-orbit satellite constellations guarantee uncontrollable access to information, regardless of state opposition.
Simon Migliano, Head of Research at Top10VPN, characterised Iran’s shutdown as “a blunt instrument intended to crush dissent.” He estimated that the blackout drains approximately US$1.56 million per hour—about RM7.4 million—deepening economic strain on a sanctions-battered economy already under severe fiscal pressure.
The convergence of electronic warfare, domestic repression, and strategic signalling illustrates how Tehran has elevated digital control from reactive censorship into an integrated national security doctrine. Satellite connectivity is no longer treated as a civilian utility but as a contested battlefield domain.
Beyond Iran, the episode is reverberating across global defence planning. It raises urgent questions about the survivability of commercial satellite networks in contested environments and the future role of space-based systems in civil resistance, military operations, and geopolitical competition. By demonstrating that even space-borne infrastructure can be forcibly subordinated to state authority, Iran has turned the Starlink shutdown into a defining case study of how authoritarian regimes may reclaim digital sovereignty through electromagnetic dominance rather than legislation.
By imposing electromagnetic denial over a commercially operated low-Earth-orbit constellation, Iran has effectively collapsed the perceived distinction between civilian satellite infrastructure and military targets. Defence planners worldwide are now being forced to accept that future conflicts will extend deep into the commercial space domain.
Iran’s neutralisation of Starlink did not rely on diplomatic pressure or cooperation from SpaceX. Instead, it leveraged a sophisticated electronic warfare architecture designed to exploit the constellation’s dependence on precise GPS-based timing, geolocation, and beamforming—functions essential for synchronising user terminals with fast-moving satellites.
Military-grade jammers reportedly flooded GPS frequencies with high-power noise, preventing Starlink terminals from calculating accurate positional data. Deprived of reliable location information, terminals were unable to lock onto satellites despite the constellation’s numerical density. This approach mirrors counter-drone and counter-missile techniques refined during Iran’s 12-day confrontation with Israel in June 2025, now repurposed for internal population control.
Rashidi’s observation of packet losses ranging from 30 to 80 percent across different regions suggests the deployment of mobile and semi-fixed jamming platforms. These systems allowed Iranian forces to dynamically target Ku- and Ka-band frequencies used by Starlink without requiring blanket nationwide saturation. The result was uneven connectivity: partial access persisted in some rural regions, while protest-heavy urban centres experienced near-total blackouts.
This selectivity marks a departure from Iran’s historically crude internet shutdowns. Instead of indiscriminate blackouts, authorities employed calibrated electromagnetic denial tailored to population density, protest intensity, and political risk. The strategy minimised economic disruption where possible while maximising suppression of political mobilisation.
Speculation about the involvement of advanced Russian electronic warfare systems, such as Murmansk-BN or Krasukha-4, remains unconfirmed. However, such speculation aligns with Iran’s expanding military-technical cooperation with Moscow amid shared opposition to Western technological dominance. If validated, Iran’s Starlink suppression would represent not only a domestic security operation but a live demonstration of emerging authoritarian counter-space doctrine.
Starlink’s proliferation inside Iran had transformed satellite internet from a connectivity solution into a strategic enabler of political resistance. Tens of thousands of smuggled terminals bypassed state-controlled infrastructure, granting protesters unfiltered access to global information networks. Activists used the system to livestream crackdowns, coordinate demonstrations, and transmit evidence of repression to international audiences.
Unlike fibre-optic and mobile networks governed by Iran’s telecommunications authorities, Starlink’s architecture rendered conventional censorship ineffective. The regime’s formal ban on terminals paradoxically increased their strategic value. Scarcity and illegality turned satellite connectivity into a prized asset within decentralised protest networks that proved resilient against traditional “kill switch” tactics.
Earlier shutdowns in 2022 and again in 2025 exposed the limits of Iran’s digital repression. Starlink’s continued availability during those crises convinced security planners that satellite internet represented a structural vulnerability rather than a manageable nuisance. By January 2026, Starlink had become Iran’s digital “Plan B” for dissent—a redundancy system that allowed protests to survive even as conventional communications collapsed.
Neutralising Starlink therefore became a strategic imperative. Severing this final layer of connectivity aimed to deprive protests of the informational oxygen sustaining nationwide mobilisation. In targeting satellite redundancy, Tehran signalled that future authoritarian information control strategies will prioritise denying alternatives, ensuring no communication pathway remains beyond state reach.
Iran’s nationwide shutdown, extended beyond 60 hours by January 11, reduced national connectivity to around one percent of normal levels. Economic disruption was weaponised as a coercive tool. With losses estimated at US$1.56 million per hour, potential monthly damage could exceed US$1.1 billion, or roughly RM5.2 billion.
Despite these losses, Tehran selectively whitelisted government institutions and security agencies, preserving regime functionality while paralysing private commerce and civil society. Small businesses reliant on digital payments, logistics platforms, and online marketplaces bore disproportionate harm, intensifying unemployment and inflation in an economy already under strain.
This asymmetry reflects a doctrine of internal economic warfare, deliberately distributing pain downward to exhaust protest participation over time. By accepting short-term economic haemorrhaging, Tehran signalled confidence that repression costs would remain lower than the political consequences of reform.
Iran’s success in degrading Starlink reverberates internationally. For authoritarian and revisionist states, the operation offers a blueprint for neutralising satellite communications during crises without kinetic escalation. In regions such as the Asia-Pacific, where satellite connectivity underpins disaster response and military command systems, the precedent raises urgent resilience questions.
The episode also complicates U.S.–Iran relations. While Washington has voiced support for Iranian protesters, its capacity to counter electronic warfare conducted deep inside Iranian territory remains limited. President Donald Trump’s statement that the United States was “ready to help” highlights political intent but also the technological asymmetry between enabling satellite access and defending it against hostile electromagnetic environments.
For defence planners, the lesson is stark. Satellite systems can no longer be treated as guaranteed lifelines. Iran’s Starlink shutdown stands as a defining moment in the evolution of information warfare, demonstrating that in the 21st century, control of the electromagnetic spectrum may ultimately determine who controls information itself.
