The U.S. Congress has formally confirmed that the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) will be integrated into the future Trump-class guided-missile battleship, designated BBG(X), marking a historic shift in U.S. naval nuclear posture. The decision establishes, for the first time since the early 1990s, a planned deployment of a nuclear cruise missile aboard a U.S. surface warship, reconnecting nuclear strike capability with large surface combatants after more than three decades of absence.
The confirmation links two major defence initiatives that have evolved in parallel since 2024: the revival of a non-strategic nuclear sea-launched cruise missile and the political decision to resurrect battleship-scale surface warships as part of a broader fleet expansion and industrial mobilisation strategy. Together, they signal a decisive expansion of sea-based nuclear options beyond ballistic missile submarines and attack submarines alone, reflecting changing deterrence calculations amid intensifying great-power competition.
The integration of SLCM-N into BBG(X) represents a clear reversal of post-Cold War U.S. naval policy, which deliberately removed nuclear weapons from surface ships. The last such system, the TLAM-N nuclear Tomahawk, entered service in the mid-1980s with a declared range of approximately 2,500 kilometres and was deployed aboard both surface combatants and attack submarines. Following the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the United States withdrew all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, completing the removal of TLAM-N by mid-1992 and eliminating the nuclear mission for surface ships.
Although a latent capability remained within the submarine force, the Obama administration formally recommended retiring TLAM-N in 2010, with the Navy completing its dismantlement by 2013. That posture endured until the first Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which argued that the absence of a non-strategic sea-based nuclear option weakened U.S. regional deterrence. That review proposed the SLCM-N alongside the low-yield W76-2 warhead deployed on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, reintroducing the concept of a nuclear cruise missile as a flexible, regional deterrent.
Since 2024, the SLCM-N program has moved steadily from conceptual status toward concrete deployment requirements, driven largely by congressional action. While successive administrations expressed reservations about cost, escalation risks, and arms-control implications, lawmakers repeatedly reinstated funding and imposed statutory deadlines.
Congressional authorisations for SLCM-N rose sharply, from $25 million in FY2023 to $190 million in FY2024 and $252 million in FY2025. Warhead funding followed a similar trajectory, with the W80-derived nuclear package receiving $20 million in FY2023, $70 million in FY2024, and a further $70 million authorised in FY2025. Beyond discretionary appropriations, reconciliation legislation assumed nearly $2 billion in mandatory funding for missile development and more than $270 million for the warhead, with additional acceleration funds later added.
The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) cemented the program’s trajectory by authorising $210 million for the missile and $50 million for the warhead, while imposing a requirement to deliver a limited number of deployable assets by September 2032. An earlier statutory requirement mandates initial operational capability by September 30, 2034. According to Congressional Budget Office estimates, combined missile and warhead costs could reach $10 billion between 2023 and 2032, excluding production at scale, integration on multiple platforms, and long-term operations.
SLCM-N is deliberately structured to minimise technical risk by leveraging existing technologies. The missile is intended to be a nuclear-capable cruise missile deployable from standard naval launch systems rather than a new ballistic platform. Early integration efforts focused on Virginia-class attack submarines, with surface-ship integration added later as Congress expanded the program’s scope.
The nuclear package is based on the W80 warhead family, already associated with air-launched cruise missiles, avoiding the need to design an entirely new warhead. Development work during 2025 included prototype missile design, launcher and canister contracts, and platform-integration planning, indicating a shift from theoretical studies to executable engineering.
Operationally, SLCM-N is designed to provide a low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear option that can be forward deployed or rapidly deployed without overt force generation. Advocates argue that this gives U.S. decision-makers a signalling tool distinct from strategic ballistic missiles or aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons, complicating adversary escalation calculations in regional contingencies.
The decision to integrate SLCM-N into BBG(X) is inseparable from the revival of the battleship-scale surface warship itself. The U.S. Navy has not operated battleships since the Iowa-class vessels were retired in 1992, and no new battleships have been constructed since World War II. Subsequent efforts to provide heavy surface firepower culminated in the Zumwalt-class destroyers, a program curtailed after just three ships.
Planning later shifted to the DDG(X) large surface combatant, but by late 2025 the administration announced a new guided-missile battleship concept as part of a broader fleet expansion and industrial competition strategy. The Trump-class was presented as both a symbolic and functional revival of very large surface warships, designed to concentrate missile firepower, command functions, and advanced defensive systems on a single platform.
Current planning parameters describe the Trump-class as a missile-centric combatant rather than a traditional gun-armed battleship. The ship is expected to exceed 35,000 tonnes in full-load displacement, with a length between approximately 256 and 268 metres and a beam of 32 to 35 metres. Crew size is projected at between 650 and 850 personnel, reflecting extensive automation but also the demands of operating a large, multi-mission platform.
Propulsion is planned around an integrated power system combining gas turbines and diesel generators, enabling sustained speeds above 30 knots while supplying the electrical power required for advanced sensors and directed-energy weapons. The primary missile battery is expected to include 128 Mk 41 vertical launch cells, supplemented by a dedicated 12-cell launcher for Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles.
The confirmed ability to embark SLCM-N adds a nuclear strike dimension to the surface fleet, something absent for more than three decades. Additional systems under consideration include two 127-mm guns, Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, close-in weapon systems, directed-energy weapons rated between 300 and 600 kilowatts, modern radar and electronic-warfare suites, and aviation facilities for helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft to support fleet-level command and coordination.
The Trump-class program’s scale and cost have attracted significant attention. Navy officials indicated in January 2026 that an initial design schedule would be clarified within 30 to 60 days. The design phase is expected to run from 2026 into 2031 or 2032, followed by construction in the early 2030s and commissioning in the late 2030s or around 2040.
Cost estimates range from approximately $10 billion per ship for later units to as much as $15 billion for the lead ship, provisionally named USS Defiant, potentially making the Trump-class more expensive than a Ford-class aircraft carrier. Industrial planning anticipates a design effort of roughly 72 months, absorbing and superseding elements of earlier DDG(X) work and engaging major U.S. shipbuilders.
These timelines overlap closely with SLCM-N’s mandated limited deployment by 2032, linking the missile’s early operational availability with the longer-term ambition to embed it within a new generation of large surface warships. While early SLCM-N deployments are expected on submarines, the BBG(X) integration signals a permanent reintroduction of nuclear strike capability into the surface fleet.
Together, the SLCM-N and Trump-class decisions represent a profound shift in U.S. naval deterrence strategy. By restoring nuclear capability to surface combatants and pairing it with a revived battleship concept, the United States is broadening its menu of sea-based nuclear options at a time of intensifying competition with nuclear-armed rivals. Whether this approach enhances deterrence or introduces new escalation risks will remain a central question as both programs advance toward deployment in the 2030s.
