India’s potential acquisition of the American F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter seems to be hitting a roadblock, as shifts in US foreign policy and concerns over operational sovereignty prompt New Delhi to reconsider its options. While Washington formally offered the F-35 to India, a renewed US tilt toward Pakistan, combined with the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) reservations about the jet’s operational framework, has increasingly positioned Russia’s Su-57E as a pragmatic alternative.
The initial momentum for the F-35 deal followed a high-profile offer from then-US President Donald Trump during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington in February 2025. At the time, Indian defence planners saw the stealth fighter as a way to bridge the technological gap until the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) enters service in the mid-2030s. However, subsequent US actions have complicated this picture.
In March 2025, the Trump administration authorized a $450 million sustainment package for Pakistan’s F-16 fleet. While Washington framed the aid as counter-terrorism support, New Delhi perceives it as a “maverick powerplay” undermining India’s security interests. Open-source intelligence indicates that the package included technical support and engine modifications—capabilities that enhance the Pakistan Air Force’s readiness for conventional threats, not just counter-terror operations. The optics of the US offering F-35s to India while simultaneously bolstering Pakistan’s F-16s have fueled a perception of American hedging, eroding the trust needed for a purchase of such sensitive technology.
Beyond geopolitics, the IAF has expressed reservations about the F-35’s operational design. According to a senior Pentagon official, the jet is not merely hardware but a node within a US-controlled network. While this architecture allows interoperability with allied assets like the E-7 Wedgetail early warning aircraft, it comes at a cost to autonomy.
The F-35 relies on a complex logistics and data system—often discussed in open sources as ALIS or ODIN—that necessitates frequent data exchanges with US-based servers. Daily activation codes theoretically enable the US to restrict jet operations during crises, while maintenance reports suggest potential repair delays that could compromise readiness. A 2024 Pentagon study cited average downtime for major repairs at 141 days, a logistical risk for a frontline force like the IAF. For a country whose strategic doctrine emphasizes full control over its nuclear-capable and frontline combat assets, such constraints present a major operational concern.
In response to these challenges, India is increasingly exploring the Russian Su-57E as an alternative. Accelerated by President Vladimir Putin’s December 2025 visit to Delhi, negotiations now focus on an initial flyaway batch of 40–60 jets, with the possibility of scaling up to 140 units manufactured domestically at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Nashik.
Unlike the American offer, the Russian proposal aligns closely with India’s core demand for technology transfer (ToT) and operational autonomy. Open-source reporting suggests that Russia is prepared to grant access to the Su-57E’s source code, allowing India to integrate indigenous weaponry such as the Astra air-to-air missile. The arrangement also promises full indigenization, including the production of the advanced AL-51F1 engine, which could upgrade the IAF’s existing Su-30MKI fleet.
Defence analysts argue that the Su-57E would serve as a “gap filler,” addressing the squadron shortfall created by the retirement of MiG-21s and ensuring India retains a qualitative edge over regional rivals, particularly China’s J-20. Crucially, the move does not represent a retreat from self-reliance; instead, it offers a practical bridge until the AMCA, India’s indigenous fifth-generation fighter, is ready for service. The AMCA, approved in May 2025, is expected to produce a prototype by 2030 and enter IAF service in the mid-2030s.
While the F-35 remains a symbol of US-India defence collaboration, practical considerations are reshaping New Delhi’s procurement strategy. The F-35’s dependence on US-controlled networks and logistics, combined with the perceived unpredictability of Washington’s regional policy, makes reliance on the platform less appealing. In contrast, the Su-57E offers India strategic autonomy, extensive technology transfer, and the ability to indigenize critical components—all without sacrificing combat capability.
India’s current trajectory points toward a diversified “multi-vendor” approach, maintaining strong US ties while hedging against potential constraints. The 2025 Defense Framework, signed in Kuala Lumpur in October, reaffirmed that US-India defence relations remain robust on paper. Yet, when it comes to operational readiness and sovereignty, Indian planners are prioritizing platforms that do not tether critical capabilities to foreign control.
Ultimately, the pivot toward the Su-57E reflects a pragmatic balancing act: securing advanced combat capability in the near term while nurturing indigenous projects that promise long-term technological self-reliance. For the IAF, the immediate imperative is maintaining air superiority across multiple fronts, particularly against an increasingly assertive China, without compromising India’s ability to control its own assets.
As talks progress, the Su-57E deal may define India’s fifth-generation fighter landscape for decades, bridging the gap to the AMCA while preserving strategic autonomy in an era of shifting alliances and regional uncertainties.
