Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have reportedly held recent discussions aimed at advancing defence cooperation, signaling a potential shift in regional strategic alignments. While the talks appear to involve a straightforward arms transaction, analysts say they reflect a broader recalibration of geopolitical ties in the Middle East.
Reports indicate Riyadh is exploring converting roughly $2 billion in loans to Islamabad into an arms package centered on the JF-17 fighter jet, jointly developed by Pakistan and China. The arrangement would help Pakistan address its strained finances while providing Saudi Arabia with a lower-cost alternative to Western aircraft.
Experts, however, see a deeper dimension to the deal. Beijing is reportedly leveraging Pakistan as a politically acceptable intermediary to re-enter markets historically resistant to Chinese defence exports. Asian media have described the proposal as a “debt-for-arms” initiative.
“At first glance, the agreement resembles a classic debt-for-arms swap. Yet the export history of the JF-17 raises serious questions,” EU Reporter noted. China previously marketed the aircraft to countries including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Saudi Arabia. Most negotiations stalled, and Myanmar—the only buyer—reportedly grounded the majority of its fleet by 2023 due to chronic engine, avionics, radar, and structural issues, raising doubts about the fighter’s operational reliability.
Against this backdrop, Pakistan has floated potential export deals with Libya, Bangladesh, and now Saudi Arabia, positioning itself as a defence hub for Muslim-majority states while presenting the JF-17 as a “neutral” option that avoids direct reliance on Chinese or Russian suppliers. Observers emphasize that China’s role—supplying complete aircraft or critical subsystems—is indispensable due to Pakistan’s limited industrial base.
Analysts describe this as Beijing’s “backdoor” strategy, bypassing political resistance and reputational risk. For Europe, the indirect exports challenge the EU’s ability to enforce human rights safeguards and end-use assurances, weakening its soft power in arms governance.
For the United States, the implications are equally significant. Using Pakistan as an intermediary allows China to expand its defence footprint without triggering American red lines, raising concerns over interoperability, data security, and strategic alignment—particularly as Washington seeks to consolidate security partnerships in both the Indo-Pacific and Middle East.
