The absence of any reference to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) in the United States’ newly released 24-page National Defense Strategy (NDS) on January 23 has reignited debate about the Trump administration’s true commitment to the Indo-Pacific’s most prominent minilateral grouping. For observers of Asian security, the omission is striking—not least because the QUAD was explicitly highlighted in the previous 2022 edition of the strategy as a key pillar of U.S. regional policy.
In the 2022 NDS, the QUAD was described as a vital component of what Washington called a “latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships” designed to counter coercive behavior and promote democratic values in the Indo-Pacific. That document framed the grouping not merely as a security mechanism, but as an increasingly broad-based partnership addressing challenges ranging from climate change and cyber threats to public health and emerging technologies. The QUAD, the strategy argued, demonstrated how democracies could deliver tangible outcomes and effectively govern in a contested strategic environment.
By contrast, the 2026 NDS—produced under the second Trump administration—contains no mention of the QUAD at all. For some analysts, this silence is yet another example of the confusing and often contradictory signals emanating from Washington about the importance it attaches to the four-nation grouping comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.
This apparent downgrading is all the more puzzling given that the QUAD has never officially been projected as an anti-China alliance. Indeed, joint statements and meetings have consistently avoided naming Beijing directly. Instead, the grouping has emphasized principles that implicitly apply to any country that seeks to unilaterally and forcibly alter the territorial status quo, disregard international law, or threaten freedom of navigation and overflight. The language has been carefully calibrated to stress a “free and open Indo-Pacific” rather than explicit containment.
Originally initiated in 2007, the QUAD lay dormant for nearly a decade before being revived in 2017—ironically during President Donald Trump’s first term. That reinvigoration led to regular consultations among senior officials, including foreign ministry representatives and intelligence chiefs. Over time, the grouping gained political momentum, culminating in leader-level summits that significantly elevated its profile.
What truly strengthened the QUAD was the institutionalization of annual summits involving the U.S. president and the prime ministers of Australia, India, and Japan. Since the beginning of President Joe Biden’s administration in January 2021, four such summits have been held, the most recent in September 2024. These meetings signaled that the QUAD had matured into a standing feature of Indo-Pacific diplomacy rather than an ad hoc arrangement.
However, the return of President Trump to the White House for a second term has complicated matters. U.S.-India relations have noticeably deteriorated over the past year, a development that has had knock-on effects for the QUAD. The leader-level summit scheduled to be hosted by India last year did not materialize, fueling speculation about waning political enthusiasm at the top.
Despite this setback, the QUAD has not ground to a halt. Operational cooperation continues in several areas, underscoring the grouping’s resilience below the political surface. The Malabar naval exercise—long a symbol of maritime cooperation among QUAD members—remains a key fixture. Infrastructure initiatives and coordination on supply chains and emerging technologies have also moved forward.
Most notably, the third Quad Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) meeting was held in New Delhi on December 4–5, 2025. The meeting focused on threats posed by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and emerging technologies, highlighting continued collaboration on practical security challenges. For many observers, this demonstrated that while leader-level momentum may have slowed, the bureaucratic and operational machinery of the QUAD remains active.
Adding further nuance to the picture is the role of key individuals within the Trump administration. The newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to India, Sergio Gor—widely regarded as being close to President Trump—has been a consistent and vocal supporter of the QUAD. Gor has repeatedly emphasized Washington’s commitment to the grouping and has spoken publicly about efforts to schedule a leader-level summit, potentially in early 2026, coinciding with a possible Trump visit to India.
Symbolic gestures in recent days have also suggested that the QUAD may still matter more than the NDS text implies. As this article was being written, President Trump issued a message congratulating the Indian government and people on the country’s 77th Republic Day. “The United States and India share a historic bond as the world’s oldest and largest democracies,” he said, echoing familiar rhetoric about shared values.
Earlier the same day, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also extended Republic Day greetings to New Delhi, explicitly referencing QUAD cooperation. “From our close cooperation on defense, energy, critical minerals, and emerging technologies to our multi-layered engagement through the QUAD, the U.S.-India relationship delivers real results for our two countries and for the Indo-Pacific region,” Rubio said. His remarks stood in sharp contrast to the silence of the NDS.
Against this backdrop, the omission of the QUAD from the latest NDS appears surprising—unless one accepts the administration’s argument that the document is a narrowly focused instrument designed only to implement the broader National Security Strategy (NSS) released in November 2025.
The distinction between the two documents is crucial. The NSS, produced by the White House and signed by the president, lays out the administration’s overarching foreign policy vision. It defines how all elements of American power—economic, diplomatic, and military—will be employed to advance national interests. The NDS, by contrast, is prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, currently headed by Pete Hegseth, and translates the NSS’s broad goals into concrete military priorities, force structures, and budgetary decisions.
In official terms, the NDS “nests” within the NSS. Under President Trump, the NSS is framed around the concepts of “Flexible Realism” and “America First.” It identifies China as the primary long-term challenger to U.S. power while elevating non-traditional concerns such as economic security, industrial resilience, and border control to the level of national security priorities.
The NDS, in turn, focuses on what the Pentagon sees as its core responsibilities. It prioritizes homeland defense and “sealing the borders” as the military’s primary mission, followed by deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. The document emphasizes maintaining a “favorable balance of power” to ensure that China cannot “veto” U.S. access to critical economic centers or dominate key maritime routes.
To understand the QUAD’s apparent disappearance from the NDS, it is necessary to examine what the NSS itself says about the Indo-Pacific—and how much space it devotes to groupings like the QUAD.
After elevating the Western Hemisphere as Washington’s top regional priority—citing its importance for homeland protection and access to strategic geography—the 2025 NSS places the Indo-Pacific second, ahead of Europe. It designates the region as the central “decisive theatre” for global competition, primarily against China, with a strong emphasis on economic security, supply chains, and technological leadership.
The NSS’s military approach to the Indo-Pacific centers on deterring Chinese aggression against U.S. partners and interests, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and across the broader First Island Chain. Maintaining a “favorable conventional military balance” in the region is described as “an essential component of strategic competition.”
At the same time, the document introduces a distinctly transactional tone to alliance management. Allies and partners are expected to contribute more—both economically and militarily—to sustaining the regional order. “Fairness” is listed as a guiding principle, reflecting long-standing Trump-era complaints about “free-riding.”
In the Indo-Pacific context, the NSS emphasizes the combined economic weight of the United States and its allies, urging coordinated action to counter “predatory economic practices” and prevent allied economies from becoming subordinate to any single competing power. This language implicitly targets China, even if it avoids overtly ideological framing.
Importantly, the NSS does mention India and the QUAD—albeit briefly. It calls for improved commercial and strategic relations with New Delhi to encourage India to contribute more actively to Indo-Pacific security, “including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States.” In this sense, the NSS envisions India as a rising security provider and sees the QUAD as a useful, if not central, vehicle for that role.
Still, many experts argue that the QUAD and India receive far less emphasis than they did in 2022. The earlier NSS portrayed the QUAD as a “premier partnership,” highlighting its evolution into a multifaceted grouping delivering practical benefits and offering a democratic alternative to autocratic models of governance. The 2025 version, by contrast, is more narrowly focused on burden-sharing and strategic utility.
This shift in tone helps explain the NDS’s silence. The defense strategy is not designed to spotlight specific diplomatic arrangements unless they directly shape U.S. force posture or operational planning. Even Taiwan—arguably the most sensitive flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific—is not explicitly mentioned. Instead, the NDS speaks in general terms about “peace through strength,” “deterrence by denial,” and preventing domination along the First Island Chain stretching from Japan to the Philippines.
Crucially, the NDS makes clear that U.S. allies and partners are expected to assume “primary responsibility” for their own conventional defense. American support, while still important, is described as “critical but more limited.” The document underscores that Washington will press and enable partners to take on a greater share of the burden, including through closer collaboration on force planning and readiness.
In this framework, the QUAD’s absence is less an outright rejection than a reflection of changing priorities. American allies and partners are being told, in effect, that U.S. backing is no longer unconditional. They must invest more, coordinate more, and do more for their own security.
For the QUAD, the message is ambiguous but unmistakable. The grouping may continue to function operationally and diplomatically, but its future relevance will increasingly depend on how much its members are willing—and able—to carry the weight themselves.
