Russia is once again pressing India to take a decisive step in defence cooperation by co-producing the fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighter. The renewed push comes at a time of shifting global power balances, rapid advances in Chinese and Pakistani air capabilities, and India’s own struggle to bridge the gap between present operational needs and future indigenous ambitions.
For New Delhi, the proposal revives memories of earlier Indo-Soviet and Indo-Russian collaborations that fundamentally shaped India’s aerospace and defence ecosystem—from the MiG-21 programme of the 1960s to the Su-30MKI project that today forms the backbone of the Indian Air Force (IAF). For Moscow, facing economic pressures, sanctions, and a shrinking export market, India represents not only a trusted strategic partner but also a manufacturing base capable of sustaining advanced aerospace programmes at scale.
India’s defence relationship with the Soviet Union dates back to the early years after independence. In 1951, Moscow used its veto at the United Nations Security Council to support India on the Kashmir issue. During the 1959 border tensions and the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the Soviet Union maintained neutrality despite strong Chinese objections. By the early 1960s, India had received more Soviet economic and military assistance than China.
The defining moment came in 1962, when the USSR agreed to transfer technology for the licensed production of nearly 800 MiG-21 fighters in India—technology it had earlier denied to Beijing. Soviet assistance helped India set up factories for aircraft, aero-engines, and avionics, effectively laying the foundations of India’s modern aerospace industry. The partnership deepened further after the 1965 India-Pakistan War, when the Soviet Union brokered peace, and culminated in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. During the Bangladesh Liberation War, Moscow stood firmly by New Delhi against US and Chinese pressure.
Through the Cold War, the relationship evolved into what both sides described as a “special and privileged strategic partnership,” spanning defence, civil nuclear energy, space cooperation, and counter-terrorism. Even after the Soviet Union’s dissolution, India maintained close ties with Russia, formalised by a Strategic Partnership agreement in 2000. Today, both countries cooperate through the India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission (IRIGC) and share platforms such as BRICS, G20, SCO, RIC, and the UN, where Russia continues to support India’s bid for a permanent Security Council seat.
Long before “Make in India” became a policy slogan, Soviet cooperation enabled indigenous defence manufacturing. The MiG-21 factories established in the 1960s later produced the MiG-27 and, from the 2000s onward, the Su-30MKI. The Su-30MKI itself was a joint design and development effort, incorporating Indian, Russian, French, and Israeli systems. Russia, in turn, absorbed lessons from the programme, later reflected in its Su-30SM variant.
Since 2004, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has produced 222 Su-30MKIs at its Nashik facility, alongside around 920 AL-31FP engines at HAL’s Koraput division. The aircraft remains the IAF’s mainstay. Soviet support also extended to land systems: the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi, set up in 1965, went on to manufacture T-72 Ajeya and T-90 Bhishma tanks.
Naval cooperation followed a similar pattern. The first contract for Soviet naval equipment was signed in 1965, including submarines, corvettes, and motor boats, as well as assistance in building a submarine base at Visakhapatnam. More recently, frigates such as INS Tushil and INS Tamala have been built in Russia, while sister ships are under construction in India with technology transfer. Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) is also building river-sea class cargo vessels for Russian clients, at nearly half the unit cost of comparable Russian production.
India and Russia’s defence ties go well beyond a buyer-seller relationship. Joint ventures, shared R&D, training, and service-to-service contacts have become defining features. The most successful example is BrahMos Aerospace, a joint venture between India’s DRDO and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile—now with ranges up to 800 km and future hypersonic variants under development—has been inducted across Indian services and exported to countries such as the Philippines, with Vietnam and Indonesia also signing deals.
Another major initiative is the AK-203 rifle programme, under which more than 610,000 assault rifles are being manufactured in India with technology transfer. Indigenous content has already reached around 50 percent, with a target of full localisation.
Not all projects succeeded. India withdrew from the Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme over concerns about costs, timelines, and technology sharing. The Ka-226T helicopter project stalled as India opted to pursue its indigenous Light Utility Helicopter, which has since faced delays. The joint Multirole Transport Aircraft programme was also cancelled. Yet Russia has continued to re-engage, offering renewed collaboration on platforms such as the Il-276 transport aircraft and, most prominently, the Su-57.
The renewed Su-57 pitch comes against a changing regional backdrop. China has unveiled two sixth-generation fighter concepts, while Pakistan has announced plans to acquire around 40 Chinese J-35 stealth fighters, potentially by 2029. Such developments threaten to tilt the air-power balance in the subcontinent.
India’s own answer, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), received Cabinet Committee on Security approval for prototype development in March 2024, with an official induction target of 2035. Most analysts, however, believe timelines could slip. This leaves India facing a decade-long capability gap in fifth-generation fighters—precisely the space Russia is urging New Delhi to fill through the Su-57.
The Sukhoi Su-57 “Felon” is designed as a highly manoeuvrable, multirole stealth fighter. It features integrated modular avionics with fibre-optic data buses, a nose-mounted X-band AESA radar flanked by side-looking arrays, L-band radars embedded in the wing leading edges, and advanced electronic warfare systems. The aircraft is designed for man-unmanned teaming, with plans to operate alongside combat UAVs such as the S-71M “Monochrome” and the Okhotnik UCAV.
Internally, the Su-57 can carry long-range R-37M air-to-air missiles and short-range R-74 variants, while external hardpoints allow carriage of heavy weapons—including hypersonic missiles—when stealth is not critical. Russia claims a flyaway cost of around $45 million per aircraft, significantly lower than Western counterparts, and lifecycle costs comparable to earlier Sukhoi fighters.
Crucially, Moscow is offering what it calls a “mother of all offers”: full technology transfer and co-production in India. This includes engines, sensors, stealth materials, avionics, and access to the broader fifth-generation ecosystem—areas where Western suppliers have traditionally imposed tight restrictions.
Russian aerospace technology has long combined brute performance with pragmatic design. Soviet engineers achieved remarkable results with limited budgets, producing platforms such as the MiG-21, Mi-8/17 helicopters, and the AK-47 rifle—systems that became global benchmarks. Russian aircraft were often simpler, rugged, and standardised, making pilot transition easier. Western platforms, by contrast, offered more sophisticated avionics and electronic warfare systems.
There are trade-offs. Russian engines have historically been fuel-hungry, and lifecycle costs could overtake Western aircraft over time. Maintenance philosophies differ, as do cockpit ergonomics and navigation systems. Yet many Indian pilots who have flown both types argue that Russian designs deliver formidable capability at lower upfront costs.
Russia today faces sanctions, workforce constraints, and limited domestic production runs. India, by contrast, is a rising economic power with a vast market, skilled manpower, software expertise, and ambitious industrial policies. Defence cooperation—particularly in aerospace—offers a natural convergence. Russia brings technology and experience; India brings scale, manufacturing capacity, and long-term demand.
India is already upgrading its Su-30MKI fleet, integrating new avionics and extended-range BrahMos missiles, with Russian support. Talks are reportedly underway on exporting Indian-built Su-30 variants to third countries. Meanwhile, HAL has signed agreements with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation to produce civilian aircraft such as the SJ-100 regional jet in India, underlining the breadth of cooperation.
If India opts for licensed production of the Su-57, the impact would be transformative. The IAF would gain fifth-generation capabilities far sooner than waiting for the AMCA alone, while Indian industry would absorb cutting-edge technologies under the Make in India framework. For Russia, an Indian partnership could secure the Su-57’s long-term viability, fund upgrades, and stabilise production amid geopolitical constraints.
The decision will not be easy. India continues to diversify its defence suppliers, balancing ties with the US, France, Israel, and others. Yet history suggests that when strategic pressure mounts, New Delhi often turns to its most time-tested partner. As the MiG-21 and Su-30MKI once did, a Su-57 partnership could once again redefine India-Russia defence cooperation—and reshape the aerospace landscape of both nations for decades to come.
