China is intensifying its push into Southeast Asia’s lucrative defense market, using high-profile air shows and increasingly sophisticated military hardware to expand regional influence, build long-term security dependencies, and challenge both Russia’s traditional role as an arms supplier and the United States’ strategic presence across the Indo-Pacific.
At the heart of this effort is the Singapore Airshow, Asia’s largest and most prestigious aerospace and defense exhibition, held biennially and closely watched by military planners, arms manufacturers, and policymakers across the region. Beijing has used the event to showcase some of its most advanced combat aircraft, signaling that Chinese defense technology is no longer confined to the lower end of the global arms market.
Among the most prominent Chinese exhibits is the J-10CE multirole fighter, alongside scale models and promotional material for the J-35A fifth-generation stealth fighter. Together, these platforms represent China’s ambition to offer a full-spectrum alternative to Western and Russian combat aircraft, tailored to the budgets and political realities of developing and middle-income states.
One of the most significant Chinese participants at the Singapore Airshow is the J-10CE, the export variant of the J-10C fighter operated by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). The aircraft has been positioned as the flagship of China’s indigenous combat aviation industry and a direct competitor to Western fourth-generation fighters such as the US-made F-16 Fighting Falcon and the French Rafale.
Adding to the spectacle, J-10C fighters from the PLAAF’s Bayi Aerobatic Team are making their flight-performance debut at the airshow, offering potential buyers a rare opportunity to see the jet’s agility and handling characteristics firsthand. Aerobatic demonstrations remain a powerful marketing tool, particularly for air forces evaluating aircraft performance beyond brochure specifications.
China has aggressively promoted the J-10C’s combat credentials by leveraging its reported use during the May 2025 Indo-Pakistan confrontation. Beijing and Islamabad have highlighted Pakistani claims that J-10C fighters, armed with long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles, successfully downed multiple Indian Rafale jets during the crisis. India has categorically rejected these claims, and independent verification remains elusive.
Despite the controversy, the episode generated significant international attention and elevated the profile of Chinese fighter jets. The J-10C, alongside the lighter JF-17, suddenly found itself at the center of global debate over air combat performance, missile technology, and the shifting balance of power in South Asia.
That attention appears to have translated into concrete interest. In October 2025, Indonesia signaled that it was assessing the J-10C and could potentially acquire up to 42 aircraft, reflecting Jakarta’s broader effort to diversify suppliers and modernize its air force amid rising regional tensions.
China has also showcased the J-10CE at other major venues, including the Dubai Airshow in October 2025, as part of a coordinated global marketing campaign.
Despite its high-profile promotion, the J-10C’s export record remains modest. Pakistan, China’s closest strategic partner, is still the aircraft’s only confirmed foreign customer. Over the years, countries such as Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Colombia, and Iran have reportedly evaluated or held discussions with Beijing over possible J-10C acquisitions, but none have finalized deals.
Chinese officials and analysts have sought to explain this slow uptake by pointing to entrenched Western supply chains, interoperability concerns, and political pressure from Washington and its allies. At the same time, Beijing has emphasized the aircraft’s cost competitiveness, presenting the J-10C as a capable yet affordable alternative to more expensive Western fighters.
For many Southeast Asian air forces, affordability remains a decisive factor. Defense budgets are limited, and governments must balance modernization needs against domestic priorities. China’s pitch focuses on lower acquisition costs, flexible financing, and fewer political conditions compared with US or European suppliers.
If the J-10C represents China’s bid for the fourth-generation fighter market, the J-35A signals its ambition to compete in the elite fifth-generation space long dominated by the United States.
A scale model of the J-35A stealth fighter has reportedly taken center stage at the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) booth at the Singapore Airshow. Unveiled publicly at the China Airshow in Zhuhai in November 2024, the J-35A is China’s second operational fifth-generation stealth aircraft after the J-20.
Designed with both land-based and carrier-capable variants, the J-35A reflects lessons learned from the J-20 program and from years of observing Western stealth aircraft. According to Wang Ya’nan, chief editor of Beijing-based Aerospace Knowledge magazine, the aircraft was developed with a balanced focus on performance, reliability, maintainability, and affordability.
Visually, the J-35A bears a striking resemblance to the US F-35 Lightning II, a similarity that has fueled both technical comparisons and political controversy. Chinese officials, however, frame the aircraft as an independent design optimized for China’s operational requirements.
Despite the hype, the J-35A has yet to secure an export order. Earlier reports suggested that Pakistan might acquire up to 40 aircraft, but Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif dismissed those claims in July 2025. As of now, there is no official confirmation that the Pakistan Air Force has ordered the jet.
Nevertheless, China continues to market the J-35A aggressively, particularly in the Middle East. Beijing has emphasized faster delivery timelines and fewer political strings than those associated with US platforms like the F-35, which are tightly controlled and often linked to broader strategic commitments.
The third major fighter featured at the airshow is the JF-17 Thunder, jointly developed and produced by China and Pakistan. While not as technologically advanced as the J-10C or J-35A, the JF-17 has carved out a niche as a relatively inexpensive, multirole fighter suitable for air forces with modest requirements and budgets.
Models of the JF-17 were widely circulated in images published by Chinese media and military bloggers during the airshow. Its presence comes amid reports that Pakistan has received inquiries from five countries—Iraq, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Libya—regarding potential JF-17 acquisitions.
According to a Bloomberg report published on February 3, 2026, Pakistan currently produces fewer than 20 JF-17s annually, nearly all of which are absorbed by its own air force. This raises questions about whether Islamabad can scale up production to meet foreign demand, particularly as it seeks to position itself as a supplier to developing nations.
Chinese experts have downplayed these concerns, arguing that production constraints represent a “sweet problem” rather than a structural limitation. Wang Ya’nan told Global Times that China could assist Pakistan by expanding assembly lines or increasing production speed, steps he described as technically straightforward.
Beyond fighter jets, China has brought a wide array of military platforms to the Singapore Airshow, underscoring its ambition to offer comprehensive defense solutions rather than isolated systems.
The L-15 Falcon advanced jet trainer has attracted growing interest as a cost-effective supersonic training aircraft with light combat capabilities. Zambia and the United Arab Emirates have already acquired the platform, and reports from late 2024 and early 2025 indicated that Morocco is seriously considering the L-15 to replace its aging Dassault Alpha Jets.
China has also promoted the Y-20 heavy transport aircraft, known officially as “Kunpeng” after a mythical Chinese bird and nicknamed “Chubby Girl” due to its bulky appearance. Powered by four indigenous WS-20 engines in its export configuration, the Y-20E marks China’s entry into the exclusive club of nations capable of designing and producing heavy military transport aircraft, alongside the United States and Russia.
Despite being displayed at multiple international air shows, the Y-20 has yet to secure its first export customer, reflecting both the niche nature of the market and the dominance of established platforms like the C-17 and Il-76.
Similarly, the Z-20 medium-lift utility helicopter—designed for troop transport, logistics, search and rescue, and naval operations—has been marketed internationally but has not yet attracted confirmed orders.
In contrast to the mixed results seen with manned aircraft, China’s unmanned aerial vehicles have been a clear export success. The Wing Loong series of medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drones has been sold in large numbers to countries across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Pakistan, Nigeria, Morocco, and Algeria are among the customers that have acquired Wing Loong I and II variants. These drones have been marketed aggressively at air shows, with export versions offering customizable sensor packages and weapon configurations.
China’s success in the UAV market stems from a combination of affordability, rapid delivery, and minimal political conditions—an appealing package for governments that face restrictions when seeking similar capabilities from Western suppliers.
China’s expanding presence at the Singapore Airshow reflects more than commercial ambition. Arms exports serve as a tool of statecraft, shaping military doctrine, maintenance dependencies, training pipelines, and long-term strategic alignments.
For Southeast Asian nations navigating intensifying US-China competition, Chinese military hardware offers an alternative path—one that promises modernization without overt alignment. Whether Beijing can translate airshow buzz into sustained export success remains uncertain, but its intent is clear.
As China continues to refine its technology and marketing strategy, the region’s defense landscape is likely to become more contested, more diversified, and more strategically complex than at any time in recent decades.
