Uzbekistan’s Armed Forces have conducted a strategically calibrated and highly consequential live-fire air defence exercise in early February 2026, underscoring Tashkent’s deliberate transformation into a multi-layered, multi-origin air defence power capable of countering complex aerial threats across Central Asia’s increasingly contested strategic airspace.
Staged across the vast steppe and desert expanses of Uzbekistan, the exercise featured the simultaneous operational employment of Chinese-supplied long-, medium-, and short-range surface-to-air missile systems alongside legacy Russian platforms. The integration of these systems was neither symbolic nor experimental. Instead, it represented an operational validation of a doctrinal shift toward diversified procurement, redundancy, and survivability in national air defence architecture.
In a region shaped by Afghan instability, the rapid proliferation of unmanned aerial systems, the diffusion of cruise missile technology, and renewed great-power competition, Uzbekistan’s decision to integrate Chinese FD-2000B, KS-1C, and FM-90 systems with the Russian S-125 Neva/Pechora reflects a calculated response to evolving threat vectors rather than military theatre.
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has repeatedly framed defence modernisation as inseparable from national technological competitiveness. During his February 2025 visit to the Center for Innovative Technologies, he stated, “We must strengthen the competitiveness of the defense sector by developing new products and incorporating advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics.”
That declaration, delivered amid accelerating defence reforms initiated after 2016, directly links air defence modernisation to Uzbekistan’s pursuit of technological sovereignty. The February 2026 live-fire exercise was not an isolated drill but a practical demonstration of how those reforms are translating into operational capability.
Footage released by the Ministry of Defence showed missiles launched by day and night against simulated aerial targets, revealing a force testing far more than kinetic performance. The drills assessed sensor fusion, command-and-control resilience, and interoperability between disparate Eastern air defence ecosystems—areas that increasingly determine success in modern air warfare.
By synchronising Chinese radar-guided interceptors with Russian radio-command legacy systems, Uzbekistan signalled that its airspace is no longer defended by isolated batteries. Instead, it is protected by a coordinated, adaptive, and increasingly autonomous defensive grid.
The exercise demonstrated Uzbekistan’s capacity to orchestrate layered engagements spanning high-altitude strategic intercepts, medium-range tactical defence, and low-altitude counter-drone operations. This approach reflects a clear understanding that modern air defence effectiveness is determined less by individual platforms and more by networked integration.
FD-2000B batteries were observed conducting long-range intercept profiles consistent with countering strategic aircraft or cruise missiles. KS-1C units followed with rapid sequential launches against medium-altitude targets, while FM-90 systems engaged low-flying drones simulating asymmetric threats. Legacy S-125 Neva/Pechora systems were also brought into the engagement sequence, providing depth, redundancy, and an opportunity to test cross-system cueing and fallback engagement protocols.
Daytime firings evaluated optical and radar tracking under clear conditions, while night launches validated all-weather performance, thermal tracking, and crew proficiency. The tempo and coordination of the engagements suggested a matured command-and-control structure capable of managing heterogeneous systems under a unified operational doctrine.
This evolution carries direct implications for Central Asia’s strategic balance. Uzbekistan is increasingly positioning itself as a credible airspace gatekeeper amid shifting geopolitical fault lines stretching from Afghanistan to the Caspian basin.
Airspace control in the region now intersects with energy corridors, transnational infrastructure, and regional stability. Pipelines, rail routes, and Belt and Road Initiative projects depend on predictable security conditions. By demonstrating the ability to deny or control airspace across multiple threat axes, Tashkent enhances its leverage over crisis escalation dynamics despite maintaining a formally non-aligned defence posture.
Uzbekistan’s deliberate exposure of its hybridised air defence construct through a live-fire event also serves as strategic signalling aimed at both state and non-state actors. The message is clear: Tashkent possesses not only diverse hardware but also the doctrinal maturity required to manage saturation attacks, multi-axis incursions, and technologically asymmetric threats.
Beyond deterrence, the integration of Chinese and Russian systems offers tangible operational and economic benefits. By distributing engagement tasks across different missile classes, Uzbekistan can optimise cost-per-intercept ratios and preserve high-value long-range interceptors for critical threats.
This diversified inventory also mitigates lifecycle risks associated with sanctions, supply-chain disruptions, and geopolitical coercion. With Russia increasingly absorbed by the war in Ukraine and its economic consequences, reliance on a single supplier has become a strategic vulnerability rather than a guarantee of stability.
Chinese systems, perceived as cost-effective and technologically current, provide an alternative supply line while allowing Uzbekistan to retain and repurpose Soviet-era assets as secondary or tertiary layers. The result is enhanced long-term force sustainability without sacrificing deterrent credibility.
Uzbekistan’s contemporary air defence posture cannot be understood without reference to its Soviet inheritance. Upon independence in 1991, the country absorbed remnants of the 73rd Air Army and the 15th Air Defence Division, including S-125 Neva/Pechora systems that once formed the backbone of low-to-medium altitude protection across the Turkestan Military District.
Designed during the Cold War to counter aircraft, helicopters, and early cruise missiles, the S-125 offered reliability but increasingly constrained capability. With engagement ranges of up to 35 kilometres and altitude coverage between 100 metres and 18 kilometres, its two-stage solid-fuel missile—armed with a 70-kilogram high-explosive fragmentation warhead—was effective against legacy threats but vulnerable to modern electronic countermeasures.
Even upgraded Pechora-2M variants retained radio-command guidance architectures that limited adaptability against agile, low-observable targets operating under heavy electronic warfare conditions.
For much of the post-Soviet period, Uzbekistan relied on Russian maintenance, training pipelines, and joint exercises, including counter-insurgency focused drills such as Hamkorlik-2025 at the Termez training ground. That dependency began to appear increasingly risky as regional and global conditions shifted.
The resurgence of Taliban control in Afghanistan introduced new uncertainties along Uzbekistan’s southern frontier, including the potential spillover of militant groups and the increasing use of drones by non-state actors. At the same time, Russia’s military and economic absorption in Ukraine reduced its capacity to act as a dependable sole defence partner.
These pressures coincided with China’s expanding footprint in Central Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative, which offered not only economic infrastructure but also pathways for military-technical cooperation. Against this backdrop, Uzbekistan’s gradual pivot toward Chinese air defence systems emerged as a pragmatic hedge rather than an ideological realignment.
The February 2026 exercise operationally validated this shift by demonstrating that Soviet-era systems could be retained as depth layers while Chinese platforms assumed primary interception roles.
The introduction of Chinese air defence systems has fundamentally reshaped Uzbekistan’s defensive envelope. The cornerstone of this transformation is the FD-2000B, the export variant of China’s HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile system.
First tested by Uzbekistan against aerial targets in 2021, the FD-2000B offers an estimated engagement range of 250 to 300 kilometres and altitude coverage reaching approximately 50 kilometres. This extends Uzbekistan’s air defence reach deep beyond its borders, enabling early interception of strategic aircraft, cruise missiles, and select ballistic threats.
Capable of speeds exceeding Mach 4 and employing dual-mode guidance systems, the FD-2000B is designed to retain effectiveness against electronic countermeasures and low-observable targets—attributes critical in contested airspace.
Complementing this long-range layer is the KS-1C, or HQ-12, a medium-range system bridging the gap between strategic interceptors and point-defence assets. With engagement distances ranging from 5 to 70 kilometres and altitude coverage up to 27 kilometres, the KS-1C targets tactical aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles at speeds approaching Mach 3.
Weighing approximately 900 kilograms and carrying a 100-kilogram warhead, the KS-1C employs semi-active radar and radio-command guidance, allowing flexibility in dense threat environments.
At the lowest tier, the FM-90 short-range system—derived from the French Crotale design—provides close-in defence against drones, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft within 15 kilometres and altitudes up to 6,000 metres. This tri-layered architecture enables proportional responses across the threat spectrum while preserving missile inventory efficiency.
The February 2026 exercise unfolded as a deliberate simulation of multi-vector aerial intrusion. High-altitude, medium-range, and low-altitude targets were introduced in sequence and in parallel to stress-test Uzbekistan’s integrated air defence network.
Visual evidence showed FD-2000B launchers elevating canisters and executing long-range intercepts, followed by KS-1C batteries conducting rapid salvo launches across overlapping engagement zones. FM-90 systems engaged low-flying drones, highlighting official recognition that unmanned systems now constitute a primary asymmetric threat in Central Asian security planning.
The inclusion of S-125 systems allowed commanders to evaluate cross-system cueing and fallback engagement capacity under simulated degradation scenarios. The level of synchronisation observed points to a command structure capable of managing heterogeneous systems under a single operational picture.
Uzbekistan’s decision to publicly demonstrate Chinese-Russian air defence integration carries significant geopolitical signalling value. It reflects a calibrated balancing act between Moscow, Beijing, and emerging Western security interests without formal alignment to any bloc.
China benefits from the arrangement through expanded defence exports and deeper military-technical influence westward. Russia, while retaining legacy ties, faces gradual erosion of defence primacy as Uzbekistan explores alternatives perceived as more resilient and technologically current.
Regionally, the exercise resonates with neighbouring states such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which are also reassessing air defence strategies in response to Afghan instability and drone proliferation.
Domestically, Uzbekistan’s investments in artificial intelligence, robotics, and indigenous platforms—such as the Lochin UAV series and Arslan 8×8 armoured vehicles—signal long-term ambition to internalise defence production.
Future acquisitions, potentially including advanced Chinese combat aircraft to replace ageing MiG-29 and Su-27 fleets, would further consolidate this trajectory and deepen the logic of integrated, multi-origin defence architecture.
At the strategic-industrial level, diversified air defence enhances Uzbekistan’s leverage in negotiations by reducing vendor lock-in and enabling competitive technology transfer arrangements. It also creates conditions for selective localisation of maintenance, repair, and overhaul capabilities, directly supporting long-term defence autonomy.
The February 2026 live-fire exercise represents more than a routine military drill. It marks a doctrinal milestone in Uzbekistan’s pursuit of resilient, diversified, and sovereign air defence capability within an increasingly multipolar strategic environment.
Collectively, these dynamics elevate Uzbekistan from a passive security consumer to an active shaper of Central Asian airspace security norms. By demonstrating credible, integrated airspace denial, Tashkent positions itself to influence regional threat perceptions, interoperability standards, and crisis-management mechanisms—while insulating itself from abrupt geopolitical realignments driven by external power rivalries.
In doing so, Uzbekistan has signalled that control of the skies is no longer merely a defensive necessity, but a central pillar of its emerging strategic identity.
