The head of U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) has downplayed the current significance of China’s push to develop new long-range strike aircraft with global reach, arguing that Beijing remains, at best, a regional bomber power despite its aggressive modernization efforts.
In his first major interview since assuming command in November 2025, Gen. Stephen Davis told The War Zone’s Howard Altman that while China is clearly seeking to replicate key elements of America’s long-range strike enterprise — including the long-anticipated H-20 stealth bomber — it has not yet achieved the technological maturity or operational reach required to rival the United States.
“I can certainly understand their desire to have a long-range strike capability like the United States, and I know that they’re pursuing it aggressively,” Davis said, referring to the H-20 and two very large stealthy flying wing-type drones that emerged in China last year and appear to be in early flight testing. “What I can tell you is they’re just not there yet.”
His remarks offer a pointed assessment of China’s strategic aviation ambitions at a time when Beijing has unveiled an array of advanced combat aircraft, uncrewed systems, and naval aviation platforms. Yet, according to Davis, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) remains fundamentally constrained by geography and capability.
“There’s no other country in the world [besides the United States] that can take and deliver a long-range strike platform pretty much on any day, in any time and place that they’re choosing,” he said. “Really, China is a regional bomber force at best. I think they’re trying to continue to develop that.”
The H-20 is widely believed to be a stealthy flying-wing bomber roughly analogous in concept to the U.S. B-2 Spirit and the forthcoming B-21 Raider. Development of the aircraft reportedly dates back to the early 2000s, and it has been teased repeatedly in official Chinese media, including a 2021 PLAAF recruitment video that briefly hinted at its silhouette.
U.S. military estimates have suggested the H-20 could achieve an unrefueled range of approximately 6,214 miles (10,000 kilometers), potentially extendable with aerial refueling. Reports have also indicated it may carry up to 10 tons of ordnance, including land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles.
Such a capability would represent a dramatic leap for China, allowing it to hold targets across the Indo-Pacific at risk — including U.S. territories like Guam and potentially Hawaii — while expanding pressure on regional competitors such as Japan and India.
Yet Davis and other U.S. officials have expressed skepticism about the platform’s current state of development.
In 2024, an unnamed U.S. intelligence official characterized the H-20 as “not really” a major concern, noting that it was likely “nowhere near as good as U.S. LO [low observable] platforms, particularly more advanced ones that we have coming down.”
“They’ve run into a lot of engineering design challenges, in terms of how do you actually make that system capability function in a similar way to, like, a B-2 or a B-21,” the official said at the time.
The Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on Chinese military developments in 2024 suggested the H-20 “may debut sometime in the next decade.” That same report highlighted work on a stealthy medium-range bomber known as the JH-XX.
Notably, however, the Pentagon’s most recent China report, released in December 2025, made no mention of either the H-20 or JH-XX — an omission that has fueled speculation about delays, program restructuring, or reallocation of resources within China’s aerospace sector.
For now, the backbone of China’s bomber fleet remains the H-6, a design derived from the Soviet Tu-16 Badger of the 1950s. Though heavily modernized over decades, the aircraft’s origins reflect the limitations of China’s legacy long-range strike capabilities.
The H-6N, unveiled publicly in 2019, marked a significant step forward. Designed to carry a large air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) under its fuselage, the H-6N restored a key leg of China’s strategic nuclear triad — complementing land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and ballistic missile submarines.
The H-6N is also capable of aerial refueling and is believed to carry the nuclear-capable Jinglei-1 (JL-1), though the full range of missiles integrated onto the aircraft remains unclear.
Still, even with these enhancements, U.S. assessments emphasize that China’s current bomber force is optimized primarily for regional missions. The Pentagon’s 2025 report noted that systems such as the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile and the H-6N’s ALBM are “highly precise theater weapons” suitable for delivering low-yield nuclear weapons — underscoring their regional, rather than global, orientation.
This aligns closely with Davis’ remarks that China has yet to demonstrate the global reach and day-to-day operational flexibility that characterize U.S. bomber forces.
The muted public discussion of the H-20 contrasts sharply with a broader surge in high-profile Chinese aviation developments.
Over the past year, China has unveiled or advanced multiple next-generation platforms, including the J-36 and J-XDS sixth-generation stealth fighters, the GJ-11 uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), and the KJ-3000 airborne early warning and control aircraft. Two very large stealthy flying-wing drones — distinct from the GJ-11 — have also appeared in testing imagery, suggesting potential long-endurance strike or reconnaissance roles.
Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has accelerated progress in carrier-based aviation, expanding flight operations and integrating more advanced aircraft aboard its growing fleet of aircraft carriers.
These developments highlight Beijing’s determination to modernize across the full spectrum of airpower, even if its strategic bomber program appears less visible at present.
China has also expanded bomber operations in the Western Pacific. PLAAF H-6 variants routinely conduct flights around Taiwan and over contested areas of the South China Sea. Joint patrols with Russia have become increasingly common, including missions that have utilized Russian bases.
In 2024, Chinese H-6K missile carriers flew in international airspace near Alaska for the first time during a joint patrol with Russian aircraft — a symbolic demonstration of growing coordination between the two powers and their ability to project presence beyond East Asia.
As China pushes forward, the United States is simultaneously modernizing its own strategic arsenal.
Davis emphasized that American bombers remain central to deterrence and warfighting in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the face of expanding Chinese anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) networks.
“We have a requirement to be able to do that, day-to-day, for the President,” he said. “We have to be able to penetrate adversary air defenses and deliver capabilities as directed.”
A cornerstone of this modernization is the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, which is expected to replace portions of the B-1 and B-2 fleets and operate alongside upgraded B-52s. The B-21 is designed with advanced sensors, open-architecture systems, and enhanced survivability to penetrate sophisticated air defense environments.
“One of the great things about the B-21 is it’s going to be much more capable,” Davis said. “It will have more sensors, it will have more inputs to it that will make it even stronger and more capable as a penetrating bomber.”
In addition, AFGSC is overseeing the development of the LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, which will replace the aging Minuteman III force. Together, these systems represent a sweeping recapitalization of America’s nuclear triad.
“Long-range strike, I think, contributes to every important mission set that we have in the Department of War,” Davis noted, emphasizing that modern bombers can carry a wide variety of weapons and engage diverse target sets — from hardened land facilities to naval formations.
“I think in any major confrontation that the U.S. would find itself in, you’re going to find your bomber forces are participating in bringing those skill sets to bear,” he added.
If fielded in meaningful numbers and with credible performance, a platform like the H-20 would significantly expand China’s strategic options. It could enable Beijing to hold distant targets at risk without relying solely on ballistic missiles, complicating U.S. and allied defense planning.
A stealthy bomber capable of long-range cruise missile strikes would offer flexibility, signaling value, and potentially lower escalation thresholds compared to ballistic missile launches. It could also provide China with more persistent presence operations across the Indo-Pacific.
However, as Davis’ comments suggest, the United States believes it retains a substantial qualitative edge — particularly in stealth technology, global basing access, aerial refueling networks, and decades of operational experience.
For now, China’s bomber fleet remains oriented primarily toward regional contingencies, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, and nearby U.S. bases. Whether the H-20 emerges in the coming years as a credible peer to America’s penetrating bombers remains an open question.
Despite past Chinese assurances that the program is on track, public discussion of the aircraft has diminished, and its debut timeline remains uncertain. At the same time, Beijing’s rapid advances in other aviation domains indicate that its long-range strike ambitions have not faded.
As strategic competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific, the evolution of China’s bomber force — and the continued rollout of U.S. systems like the B-21 — will play a central role in shaping the balance of power.
For now, according to the commander of America’s premier strategic air arm, the gap remains significant.
“They want to mimic it,” Davis said of China’s pursuit of U.S.-style long-range strike capabilities. “But they can’t — not yet.”
