As maritime competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, aircraft carriers remain among the most visible and potent symbols of national power. Capable of projecting air power far beyond a country’s coastline, these massive vessels serve as floating airbases, command hubs, and political statements of intent. While only a handful of Asian nations operate such ships, Indonesia is now poised to join this exclusive club through a potential transfer of Italy’s decommissioned flagship, the ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi.
Across the Asian continent, only three countries currently operate aircraft carriers.
India fields two: INS Vikrant, its first indigenously built carrier commissioned in 2022, and INS Vikramaditya, a modified Kiev-class carrier acquired from Russia. Together, they anchor New Delhi’s ambition to project power across the Indian Ocean.
China, meanwhile, operates three carriers—Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian—forming the backbone of Beijing’s expanding blue-water navy. The launch of Fujian, equipped with advanced electromagnetic catapults, signaled China’s rapid technological evolution in carrier operations.
Japan has taken a different route. Rather than building traditional carriers, Tokyo has converted two helicopter destroyers into platforms capable of operating the short take-off and vertical landing F-35B Lightning II, effectively giving it light carrier capability without labeling them as such.
If Indonesia proceeds with the acquisition of Giuseppe Garibaldi, it would become the fourth Asian country to operate a carrier-capable platform.
On February 13, 2026, Brigadier General Rico Ricardo Sirait, head of the Indonesian Ministry of Defence’s Public Relations and Information Bureau, confirmed that the vessel would be transferred as a “grant” from the Italian government, according to Antara News.
However, he clarified that “grant” does not mean cost-free.
“The Giuseppe Garibaldi is a grant from the Italian government. The Indonesian government will allocate a budget for retrofitting or adjustments to meet the operational needs of the Indonesian Navy,” he said, noting that negotiations and administrative processes remain underway.
The transfer follows Italy’s decision to place the 10,300-ton carrier in reserve in October 2024 after commissioning Trieste, a modern multi-purpose landing helicopter dock (LHD) that replaced Garibaldi in frontline service.
Admiral Muhammad Ali, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy, has expressed hope that the ship will arrive before October 5, 2026—the anniversary of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). The annual celebration typically features a high-profile military parade and fleet review, often used to unveil newly acquired strategic assets.
If delivered on schedule, the carrier could take center stage at the event.
In September 2025, Indonesia’s Ministry of National Development Planning approved up to $450 million in foreign loans to support the acquisition and associated operational costs. According to industry sources cited by defense publication Janes, the deal could potentially include the transfer of Italy’s retired AV-8B Harrier II short take-off and vertical landing jets, though neither Rome nor Jakarta has confirmed such details.
The Harrier option would, in theory, restore the vessel’s fixed-wing aviation capability. Originally commissioned in the 1980s, Giuseppe Garibaldi was designed to operate Harriers and helicopters. Over the decades, it served as Italy’s flagship in NATO operations and humanitarian missions.
However, Indonesian officials have not publicly committed to acquiring fighter aircraft for the carrier. The Ministry of Defense has also not clarified whether upgrades would be undertaken by domestic firms such as Republikorp, which earlier expressed interest in participating.
Indonesia has framed the potential acquisition primarily within the context of non-combat military operations (Operasi Militer Selain Perang, or OMSP). Officials argue that a carrier platform would enhance maritime security, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance across the archipelago.
As the world’s largest archipelagic nation—spanning more than 17,000 islands—Indonesia faces frequent earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and other natural disasters. Proponents contend that a helicopter-capable carrier could serve as a mobile logistics hub, delivering medical aid, engineering teams, and supplies to remote regions.
The acquisition would also align with Jakarta’s Modernisation of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) policy, which envisions a more capable navy equipped with missile patrol boats, frigates, and helicopter-capable ships.
Yet the debate is far from settled.
Critics argue that aircraft carriers are designed primarily for sustained high-tempo air operations in contested waters—not for disaster relief. The Diplomat previously noted that carriers are optimized to command complex task groups and signal strategic intent, attributes more relevant to global naval powers than to humanitarian missions.
Disaster response typically requires shallow-water access, rapid offloading capability, and the ability to deploy heavy engineering equipment directly ashore—tasks often better suited to landing platform docks (LPDs) or specialized civilian vessels.
Indonesia already operates several LPD-type ships of around 7,000 tons. These vessels can carry helicopters and amphibious craft while accessing ports that might be inaccessible to a larger carrier.
Some analysts suggest that investing in a dedicated disaster-response ship or additional LPDs could provide better value, especially given Indonesia’s fiscal constraints.
Adding to the debate is Indonesia’s recent push toward a “distributed defense” model.
On February 11, 2026, Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister, Air Marshal (Ret.) Donny Ermawan Taufanto, highlighted efforts to convert sections of toll roads into emergency runways. During a demonstration in Lampung province, an F-16 fighter and a Super Tucano light attack aircraft successfully landed and took off from a Trans-Sumatra highway segment.
“We want every major island to have multiple base options. If one is attacked, another is available,” Donny said.
Supporters of this concept argue that dispersing air assets across dozens of improvised runways enhances survivability and reduces reliance on a single high-value platform like a carrier. In contested waters, an aircraft carrier could become a prime target for anti-ship missiles or submarines.
By contrast, a network of highway runways scattered across 38 provinces effectively functions as “multiple cheaper aircraft carriers” embedded throughout the archipelago.
Collin Koh, a Singapore-based maritime security expert, wrote on social media that preparing highways for emergency aircraft operations “makes more strategic and operational sense than an aircraft carrier.”
If the Giuseppe Garibaldi transfer proceeds, Indonesia will face a steep learning curve. The country has never operated an aircraft carrier. Training naval aviators, deck crews, and maintenance personnel would likely require close Italian assistance, at least initially.
Given the tight delivery timeline suggested by Admiral Ali, significant refurbishment and modification work may be conducted in Indonesian shipyards after arrival.
There are also questions about the vessel’s remaining service life. Built in the 1980s, Giuseppe Garibaldi is decades old. Even with upgrades, its operational lifespan would be limited compared to newly constructed ships.
Yet supporters argue that as a stepping stone, the platform could provide valuable experience in carrier operations, even if primarily focused on helicopters or unmanned systems such as drones.
Indonesia’s potential entry into the carrier club carries symbolic weight.
In a region marked by rising naval competition—particularly in the South China Sea—the presence of an Indonesian carrier would signal Jakarta’s intent to strengthen maritime capabilities. While Indonesia is not a claimant in the main South China Sea disputes, it has faced tensions around the Natuna Islands.
However, Indonesian officials have been careful to frame the acquisition as defensive and humanitarian in nature.
Whether Giuseppe Garibaldi ultimately serves as a helicopter carrier, drone platform, or limited fixed-wing airbase remains to be seen. Much will depend on budget allocations, upgrade decisions, and the broader strategic vision of Jakarta’s defense planners.
The debate over acquiring Giuseppe Garibaldi reflects a broader tension within Indonesia’s defense policy: balancing ambition with practicality.
On one hand, a carrier enhances prestige, expands operational flexibility, and aligns Indonesia with other major Asian naval powers. On the other, critics warn of high costs, operational complexity, and potential misalignment with national defense priorities.
As negotiations continue between Rome and Jakarta, the coming months will determine whether Indonesia takes a historic step into carrier operations—or opts for a different path to strengthen its maritime security.
If the ship arrives before October 5, 2026, it may sail into Jakarta Bay amid fanfare, symbolizing Indonesia’s evolving maritime aspirations. Whether it proves to be a transformative capability or an expensive experiment will depend on how effectively it is integrated into the nation’s broader defense strategy.
